The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, And Evidence / Edition 1

by Daniel Friedman, John Rust

Overview

This book focuses on markets organized as double auctions in which both buyers and sellers can submit bids and asks for standardized units of well-defined commodities and securities. It examines evidence from the laboratory and computer simulations.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780201624595
Publisher:	Westview Press
Publication date:	01/01/1993
Series:	Santa Fe Institute Series , #14
Edition description:	REV
Pages:	456
Product dimensions:	6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x (d)

Table of Contents

About the Santa Fe Institute — Santa Fe Institute Editorial Board June 1991 — Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity — Preface — Institutions — The Double Auction Market Institution: A Survey — Automating the Continuous Double Auction in Practice: Automated Trade Execution Systems in Financial Markets — Theories — Theories of Price Formation and Exchange in Double Oral Auctions — The Bayesian Theory of the k-Double Auction — Design of Efficient Trading Procedures — Behavior of Trading Automata in a Computerized Double Auction Market — Lower Bounds for Efficiency of Surplus Extraction in Double Auctions — Some Effects of Restricting the Electronic Order Book in an Automated Trade Execution System — An Empirical Analysis of Price Formation in Double Auction Markets — Buyer’s Bid Double Auctions: Preliminary Experimental Results — Designing a Uniform-Price Double Auction: An Experimental Evaluation — On The Anatomy of the “Nonfacilitating” Features of the Double Auction Institution in Conspiratorial Markets — Convergence in Experimental Double Auctions for Stochastically Lived Assets — Liquidity and Persistence of Arbitrage in Experimental Options Markets