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Overview
Israel’s victory in the June 1967 Six Day War provided a unique opportunity for resolving the decades-old Arab-Zionist conflict. Having seized the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights, Israel for the first time in its history had something concrete to offer its Arab neighbors: it could trade land for peace. Yet the political deadlock persisted after the guns fell silent. This book sets out to find out why.
Avi Raz places Israel’s conduct under an uncompromising lens. He meticulously examines the critical two years following the June war and substantially revises our understanding of how and why Israeli-Arab secret contacts came to naught. Mining newly declassified records in Israeli, American, British, and UN archives, as well as private papers of individual participants, Raz dispels the myth of overall Arab intransigence and arrives at new and unexpected conclusions. In short, he concludes that Israel’s postwar diplomacy was deliberately ineffective because its leaders preferred land over peace with its neighbors. The book throws a great deal of light not only on the post-1967 period but also on the problems and pitfalls of peacemaking in the Middle East today.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780300183535 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Yale University Press |
| Publication date: | 07/17/2012 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| File size: | 1 MB |
Read an Excerpt
The Bride and the Dowry
Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians in the Aftermath of the June 1967 WarBy AVI RAZ
Yale UNIVERSITY PRESS
Copyright © 2012 Avi RazAll right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-300-18353-5
Chapter One
The Two Options5 June–Early July 1967
Shortly after Israeli jets started blasting the Egyptian Air Force on its runways on the morning of 5 June 1967, Israel Defense Minister Moshe Dayan stated in a radio address to the nation, "Soldiers of Israel, we have no aims of conquest. Our purpose is to bring to naught the attempts of the Arab armies to conquer our land and to break the ring of blockade and aggression which threatens us." Soon afterward Foreign Minister Abba Eban echoed Dayan's declaration in a press conference in Tel Aviv. "The policy of Israel's government does not include any intention of conquest," he said. At noon Prime Minister Levi Eshkol assured President Lyndon Johnson in a personal message: "We seek nothing but peaceful life within our territory, and the exercise of our legitimate maritime rights." Eshkol made the same promise in a note to USSR Premier Aleksey Kosygin.
Less than three days later, by the morning of 8 June, the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip found themselves under Israeli military control. Not having taken any part in the fighting, they were astounded by the rout of the Arab armies and by the occupation of their areas. By all accounts, the Palestinians were in a state of shock. Their sense of humiliation and despair notwithstanding, a large number of West Bank leaders realized in the wake of the defeat that a new situation had arisen, and with it new prospects: after seventeen years as Jordanian citizens, they could now become Palestinians again—and turn the Palestinian problem, a humanitarian issue since 1948, back into a national one. Those members of the West Bank political elite who sought to seize the opportunity included prominent officials of the Jordanian regime. But by the end of the war, overwhelmed by the stunning battlefield victory and the territorial acquisitions that came with it, Israel's leadership already considered the West Bank and the Gaza Strip "liberated" and was having second thoughts about its pledges of 5 June.
The Palestinian Option Presents Itself
As early as Saturday, 10 June—the last day of the war—'Aziz Shehadeh, a fifty-five-year-old Christian lawyer from Ramallah, approached the Israelis with a written plan for peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, aiming at establishing an independent Palestinian state. Shehadeh, no friend of the Hashemite regime, was a 1948 refugee from Jaffa and a veteran political maverick: he had been one of the representatives of the Palestinian refugees at the Lausanne Conference, organized by the UN Conciliation Commission, in the spring of 1949, and had advocated then an independent Palestinian state on the basis of the UN Partition Resolution of November 1947. Eighteen years later, on 8 June 1967, Shehadeh repeated the same idea when Moshe Sasson, an Israeli Foreign Ministry official who had also taken part in the Lausanne Conference, hurried to the just-occupied Ramallah to pay him a courtesy visit. The next day Shehadeh discussed the subject in more detail with two Israeli intelligence officers.
The two officers were Lt. David Kimche, an official of the Mossad, Israel's Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations, who chose to do his reserve duties with the Military Intelligence's "political department," in charge of psychological warfare, and his friend Capt. Dan Bavly, a Tel Aviv accountant who found himself at the beginning of the war "unemployed" by his own reserve infantry brigade and thus gladly accepted Kimche's invitation to join him on his assignments. On Friday, 9 June, Kimche's task was to reactivate the Ramallah radio station. While the two Israelis were in Ramallah, when the Jordanian official responsible for the radio station could not be found, it was suggested by Daud al-'Isa, a Palestinian journalist who accompanied them, that they meet "an interesting man" in the meantime; that man was 'Aziz Shehadeh.
Shehadeh told his guests that Israel must take advantage of the geopolitical change resulting from the removal of the Hashemite regime from the West Bank and establish without delay a Palestinian state, compatible with the UN Partition Resolution of 1947. When Kimche commented that the 1947 borders were no longer realistic and that the only possible basis for a settlement could be the 4 June Green Line demarcation, Shehadeh explained that he was only positing a starting point for negotiations. He undertook to give the names of roughly forty persons recommended for a Palestinian constituent assembly, indicating a dozen of them as suitable members of the proposed Palestinian government. Shehadeh insisted that his ideas were shared by many of his compatriots and agreed to put them in writing.
A day later, Saturday, 10 June, Kimche and Bavly returned to Shehadeh's house, accompanied by his friend Muhammad Tawfiq al-Yahya of Nablus, also a lawyer and former member of a Palestinian delegation at the Lausanne Conference. Shehadeh kept his promise: he handed the Israelis a two-page document, typed in English by his sixteen-year-old son Raja. The paper read:
A. Negotiations to be conducted between inhabitants of the Western Bank of Jordan and the Gaza Strip along the following lines:
1. The formation of an independent Palestine State to be admitted as a member state in the United Nations.
2. The territorial limits of the Palestine State shall be along the lines of the 1947 Partition Scheme with such necessary modifications as may be agreed upon by further negotiations and subject to the stipulations mentioned herein after.
3. The Old City of Jerusalem surrounded by the ancient walls shall be under the joint sovereignity [sic] of the state of Israel and Palestine and ruled in accordance with a special agreement to secure free access to all Holy Places.
4. The Capetal [sic] of the Palestine state shall be the Arab section of Jerusalem.
5. The Palestine State shall be provided with a port on the Mediterranean Sea linked by a corridor as may be agreed upon by further negotiations.
6. Economic and non aggression treaties shall be concluded between the two states.
7. The independence and territorial boundaries of the Palestine State shall be guaranteed by the United Nations[.]
8. Subject to any agreement as may be reached between the two States under the economic treaty referred to in para. 6 above; all rights of Palestinians in movable and immovable properties existing at the termination of the mandate in both states shall be settled by mutual agreement. In case of despute [sic], however, such rights shall be settled in accordance with the principles layed [sic] down in the U. N. resolution of Dec. 12, 1949.
B. The Israeli Government shall give written assurances that the above proposals are acceptable in principle and may be considered as a working scheme towards a final and peaceful solution of the Palestine problem in particular and the establishment of good relations with the Arab States in general.
C. When such assurances are given, attempts should be made to form a preliminary committee to call for a general assembly in order to adopt the necessary resolutions.
Shehadeh and Yahya assured the two Israelis that some of the eight points included in the first article did not reflect their own thinking and were drafted merely as a "bait" intended to lure the Palestinian extremists to join in. The second half of the document suggested that the preparatory committee should hold a meeting in Nablus, at the house of Deputy Mayor Hajj Ma'zuz al-Masri, a wealthy businessman, on Friday, 16 June. A supplementary paper, in Arabic, contained a tentative list of fifty-seven West Bank personalities as recommended members of the committee. The Israeli authorities were to allow two of them, Walid al-Shak'ah and Dr. 'Abd al-Majid Abu Hijleh, both from Nablus, to travel to Gaza in order to secure the names of that region's representatives at the meeting. The Shehadeh document emphasized the need to act fast and in the utmost secrecy.
Shehadeh's list lacked some names of influential West Bankers, including religious leaders. Particularly conspicuous was the omission of Anwar Nuseibeh, one of the most prominent figures in the West Bank. Several names on the list were of people of lesser stature and importance. Moreover, because of the curfew and cutting of telephone lines, Shehadeh had not been able to consult all of those whose names appeared on the list. His scheme was crude, rudimentary, and even somewhat naïve. Yet it was a significant initiative for two reasons. First, it brought to the fore a bold Palestinian readiness for the then "treacherous" idea of a separate settlement with Israel, and thus for a two-state solution. Second, on the Israeli side the plan generated a process of political contacts with the Palestinian leadership in the occupied territories. Though the Israeli authorities did not respond to Shehadeh's outline and timetable, Kimche was consequently commissioned by the Military Intelligence chief to conduct a survey of political trends among the West Bank leadership. Even Assistant Defense Minister Zvi Tsur, with whom Kimche and Bavly met on 11 June, encouraged them to continue meeting Palestinian representatives, in spite of his deep doubts about the political feasibility of implementing Shehadeh's scheme. In carrying out their assignment, the two junior but well-connected officers used the list of names Shehadeh had given them.
Hamdi Kan'an, the mayor of Nablus, disclosed in late 1968 that on the third day of the occupation he had been approached by two Israeli army officers, who suggested to him the establishment of a Palestinian state. According to Kan'an, he had rejected the idea outright and immediately afterward summoned the city council and notables, informed them of the Israeli proposal, and warned against its dangers. Kimche, however, contended that he and Bavly never proposed anything to any of the Palestinians they had met. "In our talks, we stressed that our aim is only to listen to their views, and that we have no intention to raise any suggestions at this stage," he claimed in his second report of 13 June. "But we emphasized that a totally new situation has been created, and under no circumstances would a return to the pre-war situation be possible." In their book, published in 1968, Kimche and Bavly endorse an Economist article which explained that the purpose of their mission was "to test the response of well-known groups and personalities to the idea of creating an autonomous Palestinian state, having federal bonds with Israel." A Foreign Ministry document reveals that the two Israelis did suggest to their interlocutors that Palestinian leaders in the West Bank should request the creation of an "independent Palestinian unit" on a limited part of the West Bank, with Israeli responsibility for its security.
Relying on Kimche's accounts, the director general of the Foreign Ministry recommended permitting the assembly of the Palestinian preparatory committee in Nablus on 16 June, outlined in Shehadeh's plan, and asked the foreign minister to discuss the matter with the prime minister. The available records do not reveal whether this recommendation was taken up, but the 16 June Nablus gathering never happened.
Kimche and Bavly, who met Kan'an, recorded in their report that he argued first for the return of the West Bank to Jordan, then began gradually to support the idea of an independent state. Kan'an might have had his reasons for publishing his own version of the encounter. The two Israelis, on the other hand, were unfamiliar with West Bank society, politics, and culture; neither of them was fluent in Arabic, so they conducted their talks in English or Hebrew or through a translator. These factors, coupled with their overenthusiasm, might have led them to a deep yet unfounded conviction that a settlement with the Palestinians was within reach. Little wonder, then, that already on 14 June, after meeting only fifteen West Bankers—and not necessarily the most prominent ones—Kimche and Bavly and two other Mossad officers attached to Military Intelligence headquarters drafted a detailed proposal for the immediate establishment of a Palestinian state by Israel. In the informal fashion characteristic of Israel in those days, they sent the document to the prime minister, the defense minister, and several other top decision makers.
During their weeklong assignment Kimche and Bavly held talks with thirty Palestinians, including eight from Jerusalem, ten from Nablus, five from Ramallah, and others from Tulkarm, 'Anabta, Bethlehem, Hebron, and Jericho; they made "preliminary contacts" with seven more Jerusalemites. These Palestinians represented a wide range of political leanings and affiliations—from radical Pan-Arabists, fervent nationalists, and Communists to pro-Hashemites and traditionalists. The overall impression of the Israeli surveyors was that most of their interlocutors did not want the West Bank to be returned to Jordan. Although there was no consensus on the form a desirable solution would take—some advocated an independent state, others preferred an autonomous entity—there was broad agreement about the need to come to terms with Israel and to make a lasting peace with the Jewish state. Fearing Jordanian retaliation, they declared their utter refusal to enter into negotiations before receiving official Israeli assurances that the West Bank would never be returned to Jordan under any circumstances. Most important, almost all of them wished to be allowed to convene in the near future in order to discuss freely and openly the fate of the West Bank.
Similar ideas were recorded separately by Maj. Rafi Sutton, a commander of an intelligence-collection unit based in Jerusalem. During the first days of the occupation Sutton held a series of conversations with eleven West Bank dignitaries, including Antoun 'Atallah of Jerusalem, a former foreign minister of Jordan, and the mayors of Hebron and Jericho. The men fiercely criticized the Arab states for mishandling the Palestinian problem and asked for a meeting of West Bank leaders and accredited Israeli representatives in order to conclude a final bilateral Palestinian-Israeli agreement, in the shape of either a federation or a confederation. Salah 'Abdu, the mayor of Jericho, undertook to convene a conference in his hometown to undo the outcome of the December 1948 Jericho Congress, which had effectively conferred on Jordan's King 'Abdallah the legitimacy for the annexation of the West Bank. Sheikh Muhammad 'Ali al-Ja'bari, the influential mayor of Hebron, had presided over the Jericho Congress of 1948. Sutton, according to his published account, apprised his superiors of the Palestinian overtures; the information was passed on to Defense Minister Moshe Dayan.
A desire for Israeli authorization for a meeting of West Bank notables was widespread in the West Bank in the early days of the occupation. Reports reached King Hussein of Jordan and his prime minister, Sa'd Jum'ah, almost instantly on the willingness of "certain Palestinians in the West Bank" to make peace with the Israelis and of support for a separate Palestinian entity, incorporating the West Bank. "There is some evidence that Palestinians in Nablus, Tulkarm and some other West Bank towns are prepared to accept Israeli occupation and possibly subsequent absorption by Israel," cabled the British ambassador in Amman. In Jerusalem another British diplomat discerned "a feeling among Palestinians that they should be left to work out their own destiny apart from the Arabs." The American consul general in Jerusalem also summarized the prevailing mood in the West Bank, based on visits and talks by him and his staff during the first week of the occupation; his account conformed to the findings of the Israeli survey: "Few Christians or Muslims have indicated a desire to return to [the] former status quo. More stress [the] need for lasting and peaceful solution." He found, however, that the most common proposal was that the West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem should be internationalized under UN control.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from The Bride and the Dowry by AVI RAZ Copyright © 2012 by Avi Raz. Excerpted by permission of Yale UNIVERSITY PRESS. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
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Table of Contents
Contents
List of Maps....................ixPrologue: Two Peoples, One Land....................xi
Preface....................xiii
Dramatis Personae....................xxv
List of Abbreviations....................xxxii
ONE The Two Options: 5 June–Early July 1967....................25
TWO The Jerusalem Syndrome: Late June–July 1967....................53
THREE In Search of Docile Leadership: July–September 1967....................79
FOUR The Right of No Return: June–September 1967....................103
FIVE An Entity versus a King: September–November 1967....................136
SIX A One-Way Dialogue: December 1967–January 1968....................165
SEVEN Go-Betweens: February–Early May 1968....................194
EIGHT The Double Game Redoubled: Mid-May–October 1968....................227
NINE "The Whole World Is Against Us": Epilogue....................262
Notes....................287
Sources and Bibliography....................377
Index....................417