Table of Contents
List of Figures xii
List of Tables xiii
Preface xv
Acknowledgments xix
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Why You Should Want to Know About Abduction 1
1.2 Two Common Misconceptions 13
1.3 Overview 25
2 What Is Abduction? 29
2.1 Abduction in the Wild 30
2.2 Deduction, Induction, Abduction 34
2.3 Abduction and Underdetermination 55
3 The Psychology of Abduction 69
3.1 Into the Mud 69
3.2 The New Paradigm and Bayesian Rationality 71
3.3 Explanation and Belief Change 83
3.4 Just Noise? 89
3.5 Explanatory Reasoning and Accuracy 94
3.6 Good-Enough and Second-Best Explanations 96
3.7 Should Philosophers Care? 100
4 Facing the Challenges 103
4.1 The Dynamic Dutch Book Argument Revisited 104
4.2 Abductive Reasoning and Practical Interests 117
4.3 Abduction and Our Epistemic Goal 122
4.4 Summary 131
5 A Closer Look at Scoring 135
5.1 Standard Scoring Rules and Truthlikeness 135
5.2 Truthlikeness and Inaccuracy Minimization 143
5.3 Truthlikeness and Impropriety 146
6 The Ecological Rationality of Abduction 157
6.1 The Justification of Abduction 157
6.2 Previous Defenses of Abduction 158
6.3 Simulating Explanatory Reasoning 168
6.4 Concluding Remarks 184
7 The View from Social Epistemology 189
7.1 The Hegselmann-Krause Model and Beyond 192
7.2 Further Generalizing Group Learning 201
7.3 Evolutionary Computing and Optimal Group Learning 206
7.4 Optimal Group Learning in Action 214
7.5 The Upshot 217
8 An Abductive Response to the Skeptic 221
5.1 The Skeptical Challenge 221
8.2 Mooreans and Russellians against the Skeptic 224
8.3 Evidence, Inference, and Expert Functions 231
8.4 How to Resolve the Skepticism Debate? 243
Epilogue 253
Appendices
A Proof of Theorem 4.1 265
B Proof of Theorem 5.1 269
C Proof of Theorem 5.2 273
D Proof of Theorem 8.1 275
E Using Julia 279
References 301
Index 345