Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War
Germany’s surprise attack on June 22, 1941, shocked a Soviet Union woefully unprepared to defend itself. The day before the attack, the Red Army still comprised the world’s largest fighting force. But by the end of the year, four and a half million of its soldiers lay dead. This new study, based on formerly classified Soviet archival material and neglected German sources, reveals the truth behind this national catastrophe.

Drawing on evidence never before seen in the West—including combat records of early engagements—David Glantz claims that in 1941 the Red Army was poorly trained, inadequately equipped, ineptly organized, and consequently incapable of engaging in large-scale military campaigns—and that both Hitler and Stalin knew it. He provides the most complete and convincing study of why the Soviets almost lost the war that summer, dispelling many of the myths about the Red Army that have persisted since the war and soundly refuting Viktor Suvorov’s controversial thesis that Stalin was planning a preemptive strike against Germany.

Stumbling Colossus describes the Red Army’s command leadership, mobilization and war planning, intelligence activities, and active and reserve combat formations. It includes the first complete Order of Battle of Soviet forces on the eve of the German attack, documents the strength of Soviet armored forces during the war’s initial period, and reproduces the first available texts of actual Soviet war plans. It also provides biographical sketches of Soviet officers and tells how Stalin’s purges of the late 1930s left the Red Army leadership almost decimated.

At a time when blame for the war in eastern Europe is being laid with a fallen regime, Glantz’s book sets the record straight on the Soviet Union’s readiness—and willingness—to fight. Boasting an extensive bibliography of Soviet and German sources, Stumbling Colossus is a convincing study that overshadows recent revisionist history and one that no student of World War II can ignore.

"1117687824"
Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War
Germany’s surprise attack on June 22, 1941, shocked a Soviet Union woefully unprepared to defend itself. The day before the attack, the Red Army still comprised the world’s largest fighting force. But by the end of the year, four and a half million of its soldiers lay dead. This new study, based on formerly classified Soviet archival material and neglected German sources, reveals the truth behind this national catastrophe.

Drawing on evidence never before seen in the West—including combat records of early engagements—David Glantz claims that in 1941 the Red Army was poorly trained, inadequately equipped, ineptly organized, and consequently incapable of engaging in large-scale military campaigns—and that both Hitler and Stalin knew it. He provides the most complete and convincing study of why the Soviets almost lost the war that summer, dispelling many of the myths about the Red Army that have persisted since the war and soundly refuting Viktor Suvorov’s controversial thesis that Stalin was planning a preemptive strike against Germany.

Stumbling Colossus describes the Red Army’s command leadership, mobilization and war planning, intelligence activities, and active and reserve combat formations. It includes the first complete Order of Battle of Soviet forces on the eve of the German attack, documents the strength of Soviet armored forces during the war’s initial period, and reproduces the first available texts of actual Soviet war plans. It also provides biographical sketches of Soviet officers and tells how Stalin’s purges of the late 1930s left the Red Army leadership almost decimated.

At a time when blame for the war in eastern Europe is being laid with a fallen regime, Glantz’s book sets the record straight on the Soviet Union’s readiness—and willingness—to fight. Boasting an extensive bibliography of Soviet and German sources, Stumbling Colossus is a convincing study that overshadows recent revisionist history and one that no student of World War II can ignore.

39.99 In Stock
Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War

Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War

by David M. Glantz
Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War

Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War

by David M. Glantz

Paperback

$39.99 
  • SHIP THIS ITEM
    Qualifies for Free Shipping
  • PICK UP IN STORE
    Check Availability at Nearby Stores

Related collections and offers


Overview

Germany’s surprise attack on June 22, 1941, shocked a Soviet Union woefully unprepared to defend itself. The day before the attack, the Red Army still comprised the world’s largest fighting force. But by the end of the year, four and a half million of its soldiers lay dead. This new study, based on formerly classified Soviet archival material and neglected German sources, reveals the truth behind this national catastrophe.

Drawing on evidence never before seen in the West—including combat records of early engagements—David Glantz claims that in 1941 the Red Army was poorly trained, inadequately equipped, ineptly organized, and consequently incapable of engaging in large-scale military campaigns—and that both Hitler and Stalin knew it. He provides the most complete and convincing study of why the Soviets almost lost the war that summer, dispelling many of the myths about the Red Army that have persisted since the war and soundly refuting Viktor Suvorov’s controversial thesis that Stalin was planning a preemptive strike against Germany.

Stumbling Colossus describes the Red Army’s command leadership, mobilization and war planning, intelligence activities, and active and reserve combat formations. It includes the first complete Order of Battle of Soviet forces on the eve of the German attack, documents the strength of Soviet armored forces during the war’s initial period, and reproduces the first available texts of actual Soviet war plans. It also provides biographical sketches of Soviet officers and tells how Stalin’s purges of the late 1930s left the Red Army leadership almost decimated.

At a time when blame for the war in eastern Europe is being laid with a fallen regime, Glantz’s book sets the record straight on the Soviet Union’s readiness—and willingness—to fight. Boasting an extensive bibliography of Soviet and German sources, Stumbling Colossus is a convincing study that overshadows recent revisionist history and one that no student of World War II can ignore.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780700617890
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
Publication date: 05/15/1998
Series: Modern War Studies
Pages: 392
Sales rank: 986,088
Product dimensions: 6.00(w) x 8.90(h) x 0.80(d)

About the Author

David M. Glantz is the author or coauthor of numerous books including To the Gates of Stalingrad: Soviet-German Combat Operations, April-August, 1942; Armageddon in Stalingrad: September-November 1942; When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler; The Battle of Kursk; The Battle for Leningrad, 1941-1944; Zhukov's Greatest Defeat: The Red Army's Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942; and Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War.

Table of Contents

List of Maps and Illustrations

Preface

List of Abbreviations

Introduction

One. Red Army Forces

-Size and Configuration

-Actual Force Generation and Mobilization

-Statistical Data

Two. Command and Control and Command Personnel

-The Continuing Purges

-Command Cadre and Training

-Key Command and Staff Personnel

-Statistical Data

Three. The Soviet Soldier

-Stereotypes

-Sources

-The Evolving Official Image

-The Emerging Human Dimension

Four. Strategic Deployment Planning and Mobilization

-War and Strategic Deployment Planning on the Eve of War

-Mobilization Planning

-Mobilization and Strategic Deployment Prior to 22 June 1941

-Statistical Data

Five. Combat Readiness: Ground Combat Forces

-Ground Forces

-Rifle Forces

-Mechanized Forces

-Cavalry

-Airborne Forces (Air Assault)

-Fortified Regions

-Statistical Data

Six. Combat Readiness: Combat Support and Rear Service Forces

-Artillery

-Engineers

-Signal Forces

-Air Defense

-Border Guards and NKVD Forces

-Rear Services

-Statistical Data

Seven. Air Forces

-Structure, Equipment, and Command and Control

-Personnel and Unit Training and Tactics

-Readiness for War

-Readiness in Practice

-Statistical Data

Eight. Stavka and Strategic Reserves

-Initial Reserves (June to 15 July 1941)

-Subsequent Reserves (15 July to August 1941)

-Mechanized Reserves

-Support Forces

-Statistical Data

Nine. Red Army Intelligence on the Eve of War

-Warning of War

-On the Eve of Barbarossa

-Judgments on Soviet Intelligence in June 1941

Conclusions

Appendix A. Red Army Order of Battle, 22 June to 1 August 1941

Appendix B. Red Army 1941 Defense Plans

Appendix C. An Opponent's View: German Intelligence Assessments

Appendix D. Correlation of Forces on the German-Soviet Front

Notes

Bibliographical Essay and Selective Bibliography

Index

From the B&N Reads Blog

Customer Reviews