Strategic Impasse: Offense, Defense, and Deterrence Theory and Practice

by Stephen J. Cimbala

Overview

There is probably no area of more crucial concern nor one more riddled with paradox than nuclear weapons and their use, not only in war, but as deterrents to war. Cimbala examines the critical issues, problems, and paradoxes inherent in the current nuclear situation. It is from a fundamental contradiction--the usefulness of nuclear weapons versus the undesirability of nuclear war--that nuclear deadlock arises. Their usefulness as deterrents is based on their destructive potential and the balance of power in Europe cannot be adjusted until the inflexible, bipolar "balance of terror" is addressed.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780313015694
Publisher:	ABC-CLIO, Incorporated
Publication date:	08/23/1989
Series:	Contributions in Military Studies Series
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
File size:	417 KB

About the Author

STEPHEN J. CIMBALA, Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, has contributed to the field of national security studies for many years. He has written National Security Strategy (Praeger, 1984), Strategic War Termination (Praeger, 1986), Challenges to Deterrence (Praeger, 1987), Nuclear War and Nuclear Strategy (Greenwood Press, 1987), Nuclear Strategizing (Praeger, 1988), and Nuclear Endings (Praeger, 1989).

Table of Contents

Introduction
Issues of Theory and Strategy
Nuclear Offense and Antinuclear Defense: Principles and Dilemmas
Nuclearized Conventional Warfare
Deterrence, Rationality, and War Planning
Stretching Deterrence
Extending the Nuclear Umbrella
Deterrence in Europe and Soviet Operational Art
New Technology, Strategy, and Deterrence
Beyond Deterrence?
Controlling Escalation in Europe
Nuclear Weapons and Third World Conflicts: Strategic Irrelevancy
Deterrence, Nuclear Avoidance, and Future Superpower Relations
Selected Bibliography
Index