Still the Arena of Civil War: Violence and Turmoil in Reconstruction Texas, 1865/1874
Still the Arena of Civil War: Violence and Turmoil in Reconstruction Texas, 1865/1874
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| ISBN-13: | 9781574414578 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | University of North Texas Press |
| Publication date: | 03/15/2012 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| File size: | 4 MB |
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Still The Arena Of Civil War
Violence and Turmoil in Reconstruction Texas, 1865â"1874
By Kenneth W. Howell
University of North Texas Press
Copyright © 2012 University of North Texas PressAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-57441-457-8
CHAPTER 1
The Post of Greatest Peril?: The Freedmen's Bureau Subassistant Commissioners and Reconstruction Violence in Texas, 1865–1869
by Christopher Bean
Following the Civil War, federal authorities often described Texas as a bastion of unconquered former Confederates and violence-prone frontiersmen. Many northerners viewed Texas as an unpleasant place—in many cases, a deadly one, especially for Unionists and freedmen who either worked for or supported the federal government and the Republican Party. During the early postwar years, white Texans were particularly concerned about subassistant commissioners (SAC) of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands (more commonly referred to as the Freedmen's Bureau), a select group of men who were entrusted to oversee the former slaves' transition from bondage to freedom and who proved a biting reminder of the South's recent defeat. Even the commissioner of the Bureau, Oliver Otis Howard, wrote in his autobiography that Texas was "the post of greatest peril." Given that contemporaries viewed Texas in such negative terms, it is not surprising that scholars examining the Reconstruction era have emphasized the role that violence played in obstructing the Bureau's activities in the state. In fact, during the last fifty years within academia, violence against members of the Freedmen's Bureau has become a self-evident truth, something all Bureau men experienced in the performance of their duties. However, scholars have failed to produce a comprehensive study of the violence waged against Bureau men in the Lone Star State. As such, this essay will examine the frequency and intensity of violent acts perpetrated against SACs in Texas as described by the Bureau agents themselves.
Although the Bureau entered the state in September 1865, major resistance to the organization and its agents did not occur until the spring and summer of 1866. As they recovered from the shock of defeat, white Texans "awakened" with a clearer idea about what the Radical Republicans wanted to achieve with their Reconstruction agenda. Compared with this agenda, which most white Texans found unacceptable, President Andrew Johnson's plan for Reconstruction was more acceptable, if not more lenient, one that allowed them to retain control of their states with little control and interference from the national government. Once the newly elected state legislature "met" benchmarks set down by Johnson, and he declared Reconstruction complete, white Texans quickly moved to reassert greater autonomy over their own affairs. The recently elected governor, James W. Throckmorton, a prewar Unionist but a man imbued with racial beliefs similar to those of the most ardent fire-eating Democrat, was a fierce opponent of federal intervention in state matters. The governor resented the Freedmen's Bureau, which he sarcastically called "one of the grand Institutions of the country." Throckmorton announced that he would not "countenance any wrong or outrage" arising from the Bureau's activities, which included any actions taken by agents other than caring for black indigents. His belligerent stance not only caused conflict between ex-Confederates and Bureau men, but also emboldened some local officials to resist all federal authority.
Although superiors reminded subordinates that "you must not pay any attention to any action" from the local officials, these words were of little consolation to those in the field. When written appeals for redress—both to state executives and Bureau officials—proved ineffective, local officials resorted to more forceful maneuvers, i.e., attempted arrest and detainment of SACs. Crockett officials indicted Stanton Weaver for interfering with a freedman's arrest, while the Harris County sheriff issued an arrest warrant for Bryon Porter. Backed by the local post commander, however, Porter ignored the writ. Jacob C. DeGress also feared arrest if not for the local garrison's presence. A simple "reminder" that an agent's power rested in federal authority defused the situation, but on rare occasions that reminder had to come armed with bayonets.
Conflict between SACs and civil officials often arose when state officials refused to abide by state or federal law, such as providing aid to refugees and the poor in their counties regardless of color. In a few instances, however, disputes arose due to the actions of belligerent or obtuse SACs. The cases of William Longworth and Samuel A. Craig are instructive. These two agents had great difficulties—for differing reasons—with local officials. Although born in New York, Longworth was considered by white Texans to be a "scalawag," since he lived in the state for many years prior to the war. Due to his Unionism, Longworth claimed to be the most persecuted man in West Texas. This Unionism and persecution helped win his appointment as chief justice of Wilson County in the administration of Throckmorton's predecessor, Governor A. J. Hamilton and in the Bureau. Longworth exuded confidence in his abilities. "I think I am equal to the extent of the whole territory asked for," he boldly wrote, "and am in the bosom of almost every individual within the same."
Almost immediately, Longworth got into problems with citizens about apprenticeship, which was an established practice prior to the war to alleviate suffering, but one subject to abuse after the war. Used to procure labor for planters, the practice could easily transition into "legalized kidnapping" or a "cruel injustice." As an agent, Longworth had firsthand knowledge of such abuse, since black parents often came to him wanting help to get back their children. Moved by these pleas, he believed apprenticing was simply slavery in a new form; thus he refused to apprentice freed children and returned those already apprenticed to their parents or guardians. For example, wanting to make a point, Longworth ordered James L. Dial to return two freed children apprenticed to him and fined the man ninety dollars as well as charged him with kidnapping and false imprisonment and had him detained. The incensed defendant believed Longworth had disgraced "and continues to disgrace" his position as a federal officer and petitioned Bureau headquarters, but found little support.
The story might have ended there if not for Longworth's confrontation with William C. Wiseman, judge of Guadalupe County. Believing the agent had exceeded his authority, Wiseman not only issued a writ of habeas corpus in order to retrieve the two freed children, but also ordered Longworth's arrest, something the agent successfully avoided. The saga, however, did not end there. Angry citizens flooded Bureau headquarters with letters decrying what they called illegal and heavy-handed tactics by Longworth. To Longworth, these attacks only confirmed the justness of his course. "Where is the man, from Abraham Lincoln, down to myself that has not been hardened" by people like these, he wrote, for with these people "Christ himself would find persecutors and slanderors [sic]...."
Although Longworth thought his course sound, officials at Bureau headquarters in Galveston began to wonder. He received a letter enumerating the many complaints about his conduct. Admitting only timidity in fining whites to the maximum, Longworth dismissed the charges, calling them "false, absolutely and unqualifiedly false" and "transparent." For having to answer them, in fact, he even chided superiors for wasting the agency's already scarce paper. In response to his critics, Longworth reminded his superiors that "I was sent here to counteract and keep in check" these very people and asked for a court martial to clear his name.
Superiors assured him that a court martial was unnecessary, news Longworth expressed disappointment about, for he believed that such an inquiry would embarrass those, both in and out of the Bureau, who doubted him. And doubt was exactly what many at headquarters felt toward him. Wanting certainty, headquarters dispatched William H. Sinclair, the Bureau's inspector in the state, to get to the bottom of the matter. But in a surprise move, Assistant Commissioner J. B. Kiddoo decided not to wait for the inspector's report. Whether due to his "unnecessary" actions against the white citizens in his district or his generally abrasive and insulting manner toward the staff at headquarters, Longworth was relieved. The official explanation was that Kiddoo desired to replace civilian agents with army officers, but most certainly, Longworth precipitated his own removal. This statement is supported by Sinclair's report, which confirmed many of the white citizens' accusations and Bureau officials' suspicions: Longworth caused much unnecessary strife by exceeding his authority and engaging in arbitrary justice. In fact, Sinclair was so angered by the agent's actions, he recommended he be turned over to civil authorities for questioning, something Bureau officials declined to do.
Longworth's successor, Samuel A. Craig, entered this tense situation as the problems between white residents and former agent Longworth were still unfolding. Longworth, now a private citizen and smarting after his removal, told Bureau officials he fully expected—"it is inevitable"—to have to answer to a "rebel jury" for his actions when he was sub-assistant commissioner. Despite belittling his successor, Longworth nonetheless appealed to Craig for protection, especially after Guadalupe County (Seguin) officials arrested the former agent for "illegal" acts committed when he was agent. Kiddoo ordered Craig to secure Longworth's release and seize all papers relating to the former agent's arrest. Although some at headquarters believed he deserved his current fate, the actions of the local authorities could not be allowed to stand, for the ramifications would be detrimental to all other Bureau agents. Craig, accompanied by some soldiers, freed Longworth from jail.
Craig's stern course drew praise from his superiors and enmity from civil officials. The district judge for the area, John Ireland, a former Confederate, was livid at Craig's actions and wanted to "make short work of the Bureau." Ireland issued a warrant for Craig's arrest, but the sheriff feared U.S. soldiers still in the county and refused to arrest him. By early 1867, however, the soldiers had left the county and Ireland once again moved against the SAC. Craig recalled later that the sheriff arrived at a pool hall where he was playing. He knew the reason for the sheriff's arrival. "I slowly with my cue in hand, backed toward the door and found it locked," Craig later wrote. "The sheriff came over near as tho[ugh] watching the game ... Soon he took out the warrant and commenced to read it to me." The agent quickly realized resistance was futile. Six men had arrived to help the sheriff with the arrest; he added, "all were loaded [with] six, six shooters to my one, it was no use to resist." Military officials ordered the recently departed detail back to Guadalupe County, and they released the imprisoned agent. The ordeal, however, took its toll on Craig and shortly after his release he left the Bureau.
Events in Washington, D.C., only exacerbated problems. In early 1866 Bureau officials in Washington and Texas warned field personnel to expect trouble as Congress moved to renew the Freedmen's Bureau. President Johnson's actions and words proved these officials quite prescient, for they greatly influenced white Texans' resistance. Through his proclamations and vetoes, including the second Bureau bill and Civil Rights Act, President Johnson resisted congressional influence in reconstructing the former Confederate states. With "a friend in Washington," white Texans were encouraged to resist the Radicals' plan, particularly the renewal of the hated Bureau. A planter from southeast Texas spoke for many whites when he applauded the president's veto of "that most rascally Freedmen's Bureau Bill." Many SACs reported to headquarters the "increased spirit of hostility manifested" by the president's stance. As one of them noted, "We suppose [Johnson] had leaned southward by this time."
A good many of these reports of increased hostility were valid, while some were not. Agents assigned in Texas could easily have been influenced by the state's reputation and the numerous stories from the northern press about murder and mayhem. Before these men ever assumed their positions or set foot in their subdistricts, they "expected" the worst, for it was widely reported that Union men and federal agents were never safe in the Lone Star State. For some, it was as bad as they thought. For a few, however, it was not. Consider the cases of Bureau agents Thomas H. Baker, Louis W. Stevenson, and James P. Butler. At Lockhart, Thomas H. Baker arrived at his post in May 1868 and immediately requested troops, claiming that the feeling of the white people "is any thing else but good either by words or actions." He further admitted that the "freed people can get but little or no protection outside" the Bureau agent's office. Within two months of being at his post, however, Baker notified superiors that "for the present the free people can manage to get along without them." For the rest of the year, he reported the same, even remarking in October that "I get along with my business to use a common saying as a lasy [sic] as an old Shoe." Louis W. Stevenson at Columbus reported that local law enforcement was to carry out the execution of a freedman and that he needed a detachment of soldiers. He worried that "certain bad white men may take advantage of the event to cause a disturbance which is evidently desired." Stevenson even suggested that the governor commute the man's sentence, believing this would prevent the expected "emergency." The next month, after the execution had "passed off quietly," Stevenson wrote that "I see no real necessity for troops." For the first half of 1868, James P. Butler at Huntsville wrote superiors that he needed troops and expected trouble and could not do his duty without them. "There are no troops stationed at this post," he stated in March 1868, "the necessity for their presence is very obvious to you and it would be almost superfluous for me to report that I have so often embraced in my former reports in regard to their necessity. One thing very evident they give tone and force to the existence of a Bureau." By the late spring of 1868, however, Butler admitted he still did not have troops but "they are not much needed," and he labored "under no difficulties ..., everything is progressing peaceably and amicably."
To say violence did not exist or that the Reconstruction Texas experienced little violence would also be clearly wrong, for the works of George C. Rable and Allen W. Trelease show otherwise. But not all claims are trustworthy. For example, the "scalawag" Bureau agent Philip Howard at Meridian, Bosque County, believed his life threatened throughout the spring and summer of 1866. He thanked "the Supreme ruler for my preservation in my laborious and arderous [sic] duties I have done with no force to protect me, things but few men would [have] attempted and has won general esteem for my firm and mild course with these people." A few months later in July 1866, Howard further commented on his impending assassination. "I have run great risk of my life in holding this office," he observed. "I am old and they cannot cheat me out of many years if the[y] kill me, I have done what I considered was my duty under the surrounding circumstances." Howard heard about a fray in Waco, believing the incident would result in an assault against him and informed his superiors that he awaited his turn. "[T]he Rebs are getting moore [sic] bold every day and I do not know when they may attack me." Before his anticipated demise could come, however, Howard, "tired of the risk" and frustrated that he "can do nothing with them without help," asked to be relieved of duty in late 1866. Kiddoo personally thanked Howard for his service in the Bureau. Having "escaped" with his life, Howard was doubtless thankful to be rid of the job and its responsibilities. In fact, he was so "thankful" that he returned to Bureau service in 1867, accepting the position as SAC at Meridian and remaining there until early the next year. Ironically, after his tenure, he apparently set aside whatever "fears" he had of the people who supposedly wanted to kill him and married a local girl. The two lived in the same county until at least 1880 when he disappeared from the census.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Still The Arena Of Civil War by Kenneth W. Howell. Copyright © 2012 University of North Texas Press. Excerpted by permission of University of North Texas Press.
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Table of Contents
Contents
List of Maps and Illustrations,Preface,
Acknowledgments,
Introduction: The Elusive Story of Violence in Reconstruction Texas, 1865–1874 by Kenneth W. Howell,
Part One: Representatives of Change: Soldiers, Bureau Agents, and Lawmen,
1. The Post of Greatest Peril?: The Freedmen's Bureau Subassistant Commissioners and Reconstruction Violence in Texas, 1865–1869 by Christopher Bean,
2. "Shoot or Get Out of the Way!": The Murder of Texas Freedmen's Bureau Agent William G. Kirkman by Cullen Baker—and the Historiansby William L. Richter,
3. The World Turned Upside Down?: The Military Occupation of Victoria and Calhoun Counties, 1865–1867 by Charles D. Spurlin,
4. William Longworth, Republican Villain by Richard B. McCaslin,
5. "The Old Hero of Many Cowardly and Bloody Murders": Scalawag Gang Leader Ben Brown by Dale Baum,
6. Finding a Solution to Reconstruction Violence: The Texas State Police by Donaly Brice,
Part Two: The Insurgents and Their Allies: Texas Terrorists, Politicians, and Newspaper Editors,
7. When the Klan Rode: Terrorism in Reconstruction Texas by James M. Smallwood,
8. The Democratic Party, the Ku Klux Klan, and the Politics of Fear by Carl H. Moneyhon,
9. "A Free and Outspoken Press": Coverage of Reconstruction Violence and Turmoil in Texas Newspapers, 1866–1868 by Mary Jo O'Rear,
Part Three: The Victims: Minorities and Women,
10. Into Freedom's Abyss: Reflections of Reconstruction Violence in Texas by Ronald E. Goodwin,
11. Foreigners in Their Native Land: The Violent Struggle between Anglos and Tejanos for Land Titles in South Texas during Reconstruction by Andrés Tijerina,
12. "To Punish and Humiliate the Entire Community": White Violence Perpetrated Against African-American Women in Texas, 1865–1868 by Rebecca A. Kosary,
Part Four: Regional Perspectives: The Frontier, the Interior, and Places in Between,
13. Governor James Throckmorton and the Question of Frontier Violence in Reconstruction Texas, 1866–1867 by Kenneth W. Howell,
14. An Uncompromising Line between Yankee Rule and Rebel Rowdies: Reconstruction Violence in Lavaca County by Douglas Kubicek and Carroll Scogin-Brincefield,
15. Reconstruction Violence on the Lower Brazos River Valley by John Gorman,
List of Contributors,
Index,