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Overview
Between 1945 and 1953, while the Soviet Union confronted postwar reconstruction and Cold War crises, its unchallenged leader Joseph Stalin carved out time to study scientific disputes and dictate academic solutions. He spearheaded a discussion of "scientific" Marxist-Leninist philosophy, edited reports on genetics and physiology, adjudicated controversies about modern physics, and wrote essays on linguistics and political economy. Historians have been tempted to dismiss all this as the megalomaniacal ravings of a dying dictator. But in Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars, Ethan Pollock draws on thousands of previously unexplored archival documents to demonstrate that Stalin was in fact determined to show how scientific truth and Party doctrine reinforced one another. Socialism was supposed to be scientific, and science ideologically correct, and Stalin ostensibly embodied the perfect symbiosis between power and knowledge.
Focusing on six major postwar debates in the Soviet scientific community, this elegantly written book shows that Stalin's forays into scholarship can be understood only within the context of international tensions, institutional conflicts, and the growing uncertainty about the proper relationship between scientific knowledge and Party-dictated truths. The nature of Stalin's interventions makes clear that more was at stake than high politics: these science wars were about asserting that the Party was rational and modern, and about codifying the Soviet worldview in a battle for the hearts and minds of people around the globe during the early Cold War. Ultimately, however, the effort to develop a scientific basis for Soviet ideology undermined the system's legitimacy.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9781400843756 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Princeton University Press |
| Publication date: | 05/11/2021 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 288 |
| File size: | 8 MB |
About the Author
Read an Excerpt
Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars
By Ethan Pollock Princeton University Press
Copyright © 2006 Princeton University Press
All right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-13825-1
Chapter One INTRODUCTION
Stalin, Science, and Politics after the Second World War
Joseph Stalin collected many encomiums while ruling the Soviet Union. At various times the Soviet press called him, among other things: "the Standard-bearer of Peace," "the Great Helmsman of the Revolution," "the Leader of the International Proletariat," "Generalissimo," and "the Father of Nations." In the years following the Second World War he assumed yet another title: "the coryphaeus of science." As the "leader of the chorus"-or coryphaeus-Stalin stood on the podium while Soviet scientists sang in rhythm to the commanding movements of his baton.
Stalin tried to live up to the ideal of a man who united political power and intellectual acumen. Between the end of the Second World War and his death in 1953 he intervened in scientific debates in fields ranging from philosophy to physics. In late 1946, when Stalin was sixty-seven years old and exhausted from the war, he schooled the USSR's most prominent philosopher on Hegel's role in the history of Marxism. In 1948, while the Berlin crisis threatened an irreparable rift between the United States and the USSR, Stalin wrote memos, held meetings, and offered editorial comments in order to support attacks against Mendelian genetics. In 1949, with the first Soviet atomic bomb testonly months away, Stalin called off an effort to purge Soviet physics of "bourgeois" quantum mechanics and relativity. In the first half of 1950 he negotiated a pact with the People's Republic of China and discussed plans with Kim Il Sung about invading South Korea, while also writing a combative article on linguistics, carefully orchestrating a coup in Soviet physiology, and meeting with economists three times to discuss a textbook on political economy. In some cases he denounced whole fields of scholarship, leading to the firing and occasional arrest of their proponents. His efforts to unmask errors in science were paralleled by an equally intense drive to show how each discipline could contribute to building communism and serve as a symbolic weapon of Soviet superiority in the battle with the West along an "ideological front."
Why was Stalin so keen to be a scholar? His direct involvement in academic disputes reveals a side of the aging dictator that supplements what we have long known about him from the extensive memoir literature. He took ideology seriously. He was not simply a megalomaniac and reclusive old man who used scholarly debates only to settle political problems. (After all, he had much more direct ways of taking care of things he did not like.) The evidence shows he was far more concerned about ideas than was previously known. We do not have to accept the intellectual value of Stalin's proclamations about biology, linguistics, physiology, or political economy to recognize that he consistently spent time on the details of scholarly disputes.
Applying Marxist-Leninist principles to academic controversies often led to unpredictable results. Even those members of Stalin's inner circle who were responsible for ideology had to wait for word from the coryphaeus before they could be confident that they understood the outcomes he had in mind. For his part, Stalin's strategies for solving scholarly conflicts evolved in response to ideas put forth by scientists themselves. When he did reveal his judgments, others were left with the unenviable task of interpreting his words and working out their implications for a wide range of fields. In this sense Marxist-Leninist ideology was often subject to reformulation.
This book analyzes the content of Stalin's scientific forays, places them within the context of the broader academic disputes, and then traces their impact on both domestic high politics and the Soviet conceptualizations of the Cold War. In order to do this, the story moves up and down the Soviet system, from the institutes and universities where scientific debates often began and where their effects became apparent, to the presidium of the colossal Academy of Sciences, to deliberations in the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and finally to Stalin's office and desk, where the leader passed final judgments.
Controversies erupted in many academic fields in the 1940s and early 1950s. Six stand out because of their broad implications and because Stalin and his closest lieutenants in the Soviet government and the Communist Party directly intervened in them. These six debates-or "discussions," as they were often called-took place in philosophy, biology, physics, linguistics, physiology, and political economy. Stalin's active participation in these debates demonstrates that more was at stake than scholarly disagreements: the science wars of the late Stalin period encompassed themes crucial to the Party's legitimacy and fundamental to the Soviet worldview in the early Cold War. Marxist-Leninist "scientific philosophy" provided the foundation for the ideology that underpinned the state and society. Physiology and biology had a direct bearing on the new "Soviet man" that the system tried to create and on nature, which communism promised to transform. Quantum mechanics and relativity in physics potentially challenged Marxist-Leninist materialist epistemology even as they seemed crucial for the development of atomic weapons. Linguistics encompassed issues of consciousness, class, and nationality. And political economy required a critique of capitalism, a justification of Soviet socialism, and a road map for achieving communism in the USSR and throughout the world.
Stalin did not venture into scientific laboratories, conduct specific experiments, or solve equations. Yet he insisted that science was intertwined with the foundations of socialism and with the Party's raison d'être. Thousands of newly accessible and previously unexplored documents from Communist Party, Russian State, and Academy of Sciences archives reveal that he was determined-at times even desperate-to show the scientific basis of Soviet Marxism. As both an editor and an author, Stalin actively engaged with the content of scholarly work and contemplated its overall implications for Marxism-Leninism. His memos and top secret documents are saturated with the same Marxist-Leninist language, categories, and frames for understanding the world that appeared in the public discourse. He did not keep two sets of books, at least on ideological questions.
Under Stalin's guidance, the USSR went further than any previous state in placing the support of science at the center of its stated purpose. As a Marxist presiding over an agrarian country, Stalin was eager to modernize as quickly as possible. He believed that science provided the key to updating and industrializing the economy. Principles of scientific management would improve not only industrial production but all other aspects of societal development. Like Engels and Lenin before him, Stalin understood Marxism as a science inextricably tied to the methodology and laws of the natural sciences. Marxism-Leninism claimed to provide a "science of society" that would help to create a "kingdom of freedom" on earth. The Party's political authority relied on the perceived rationality and scientific basis of its actions. If Marxism-Leninism was scientific, and science would flourish if it was based on Marxist principles, it followed that science and Soviet Marxism should mutually reinforce each other. They led to the same discoveries about the nature of things and, together, progressed steadily to absolute truths.
Science played a unique role in Soviet ideology. When Soviet citizens publicly spoke or wrote about Soviet ideology, they were referring to a set of ideas identified and propagated by the regime and used to justify the superiority of the Soviet state. In principle, these ideas were derived from interpretations of canonical texts by Marx, Engels, and Lenin and were supposed to reflect and shape Soviet reality. They were supposed to be all-encompassing and internally consistent with "Party lines" defining the parameters of acceptable positions within various fields of thought. Soviet ideology contrasted with "bourgeois ideology"-a pejorative term depicting ideas in the Western political "superstructure" that reflected the capitalist "economic base." By definition, Soviet ideology was an accurate depiction of the material world, while bourgeois ideology consisted of lies and illusions that helped the capitalists to maintain power. The regime strictly upheld its prerogative to judge every activity on ideological grounds. But what about the cases when science and Soviet ideology seemed to contradict one another? Unlike the literary or artistic intelligentsia, whose challenges to the Party's authority were based on subjective notions of justice and moral truth that the Party could simply reject, scientists based their autonomy on very limited fields of expertise that provided them with specific access to objective laws. Scientists claimed that their work reflected reality, just like Soviet ideology.
The relationship between science and the Party evolved over the course of Soviet rule. During the 1920s the sciences, particularly the natural sciences, were relatively free from a radical Bolshevik agenda that sought to revolutionize thought in the name of building proletarian culture. While theorists debated the meaning of dialectical materialism as a Marxist philosophy of science, Lenin defended "bourgeois technical experts" and the contribution they could make to modernizing the state. The regime denounced bourgeois literature, art, social policies, and the like, but it supported bourgeois scientists. During the Great Break of the late 1920s and early 1930s, however, zealous Marxist-Leninist philosophers promoted some scientific theories as "proletarian" and rejected others as "bourgeois." In an attempt to create "red specialists," activists and young students pushed to expose, fire, and arrest so-called saboteurs and wreckers among the "bourgeois experts." In 1931 Stalin called for an end to the radical upheaval of the period, and subsequently the Party supported a calcified dialectical materialism based more on loyalty to the Party than on specific philosophical tenets. Scientists and the regime reached a new modus vivendi in which the Party supported scientific research while retaining control over scientific planning. By the end of the 1930s young scientists who owed their education to progressive Soviet policies tended to be more sympathetic to Marxism-Leninism, and young leaders in the Party and state apparatus who had received training in technical disciplines tended to see themselves as part of a new Soviet intelligentsia.
The Second World War altered the relationship between ideology and science in three crucial ways. First, scientists found themselves relatively free from Party oversight. Second, the atmosphere of international cooperation exemplified by the antifascist Grand Alliance created an opportunity for Soviet scholars to participate in "world science" and weakened the distinctions between "bourgeois" and "proletarian" science. And third, the development of atomic weapons, radar, and antibiotics during the war clarified that science was a crucial component of national security, which increased Party support and scrutiny. In these fields, science in the West was in the lead and could not be dismissed. The wartime mood was summed up at an international celebration of the 220th anniversary of the Academy of Sciences in the Kremlin in June 1945. With Stalin and foreign scientists in attendance, the Soviet minister of foreign affairs, Viacheslav Molotov, proposed a toast for "the development of close collaboration between Soviet and world science."
The opportunity for cooperation in science did not last long. In February 1946, Stalin delivered a speech blaming capitalist policies for the outbreak of the two world wars and outlining a plan to guarantee that the USSR would be militarily prepared for the next global conflict. From the perspective of American policy makers, the Cold War was under way. The speech also assured that science would be an important sphere of international competition. "I have no doubt that if we give our scientists proper assistance," Stalin said, "they will be able in the very near future not only to overtake but even outstrip the achievements of science beyond the borders of our country." The Cold War was not just about geopolitics and military conflicts. It also pitted two ways of organizing science against one another.
Stalin provided practical support for the effort to surpass foreign science. In early 1946 Stalin told Igor Kurchatov, the physicist in charge of the Soviet atomic bomb project, "our state has suffered much, yet it is surely possible to ensure that several thousand people can live very well, and several thousand people better than very well, with their own dachas, so that they can relax, and with their own cars." This was true not only of physicists working to end the American atomic monopoly. The rising tide raised all ships: funding for the Academy of Sciences expanded rapidly, as did the number of institutes and the number of scholars working in them. In turn for their loyalty and hard work, Stalin gave scientists material comforts that were extremely rare in the USSR at the time.
Science became a sphere of Cold War competition in ways that went beyond national security. Stalin assigned Soviet scholars two key roles on the "ideological front" of the Cold War: they had to criticize Western ideas, and they had to export Soviet ideas to newly emerging socialist states in Eastern Europe and Asia. Sustaining the argument that communism was the only viable way to organize society required a certain ideological coherency, which scholars could provide. One of the best ways to prove the merits of a materialist worldview was to show that adhering to it inevitably led to scientific breakthroughs. Soviet intellectual achievements could serve as symbolic measures of the superiority of the Soviet system. Scholars from every discipline joined the battle along the ideological front. Stalin implored one group of economists, for instance, to recognize the broader significance of their work, which would be "read by Americans and Chinese ... studied in all countries.... It will be a model for everyone." Soviet scholars had to espouse universal theories in an effort to win the hearts and minds of people around the globe. Stalin saw the real need for and value of science, hence his own involvement.
Despite the value of scholars in Cold War competition, Stalin never fully trusted their loyalty. The lingering appeal of international cooperation and "world science" challenged the strict dichotomy between East and West that the Party emphasized. Even the stunning success of the USSR in the Second World War, an apparent vindication of Stalin's policies, exacerbated tensions between the regime and the scholarly elite. Soviet citizens hoped that victory in war would bring improvements in living standards and increased ideological flexibility. Instead, financial instability, widespread famine, severe health care problems, and the Party's attempt to gear the economy for the Cold War led to unexpected sacrifice by ordinary citizens. Stalin believed that this social dissatisfaction could undermine confidence in the system more generally. So, rather than loosening its grip, the Party tightened it and looked for scapegoats who could be blamed for the persistent hardships. Soviet intellectuals, including scientists, who had actively developed contacts with foreigners during the relative openness of the wartime alliance were easy targets.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars by Ethan Pollock
Copyright © 2006 by Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
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Table of Contents
List of Figures ix
CHAPTER 1: Introduction: Stalin, Science, and Politics after the Second World War 1
CHAPTER 2: "A Marxist Should Not Write Like That": The Crisis on the "Philosophical Front" 15
CHAPTER 3: "The Future Belongs to Michurin": The Agricultural Academy Session of 1948 41
CHAPTER 4: "We Can Always Shoot Them Later": Physics, Politics, and the Atomic Bomb 72
CHAPTER 5: "A Battle of Opinions": Stalin Intervenes in Linguistics 104
CHAPTER 6: "Attack the Detractors with Certainty of Total Success": The Pavlov Session of 1950 136
CHAPTER 7: "Everyone Is Waiting": Stalin and the Economic Problems of Communism 168
CHAPTER 8: Conclusion: Science and the Fate of the Soviet System 212
Notes 223
Biographical Notes 253
Acknowledgments 259
Index 263
What People are Saying About This
Ethan Pollock has written an elegant and brilliantly penetrating history that is so rich in detail and broad ranging in its analysis that it will quickly become required reading for anyone seeking to understand how Stalin managed the Soviet Union after World War II.
— Martin J. Sherwin, Tufts University
Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars tells the story of each of the scientific debates under focus with admirable clarity and concision, but without sacrificing the complexity of the issues or the stakes involved. Its portrayal of Stalin was, to me, utterly persuasive. This book will have a broad audience, not only in undergraduate courses on Soviet history, Stalinism, and the history of science, but also among the informed public.
— Lewis H. Siegelbaum, Michigan State University, author of "Stalinism as a Way of Life"
Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars is a fascinating book about one of the most enigmatic periods in Soviet history. With great insight, and on the basis of thorough archival research, Ethan Pollock examines the organized discussions of science in Stalin's last years. He shows how important those discussions are for understanding not only Stalinism but the Soviet experience as a whole. This will be an indispensable book for historians of the Soviet Union and for historians and sociologists of science more generally.
— David Holloway, Stanford University
"Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars is a fascinating book about one of the most enigmatic periods in Soviet history. With great insight, and on the basis of thorough archival research, Ethan Pollock examines the organized discussions of science in Stalin's last years. He shows how important those discussions are for understanding not only Stalinism but the Soviet experience as a whole. This will be an indispensable book for historians of the Soviet Union and for historians and sociologists of science more generally."—David Holloway, Stanford University"Ethan Pollock has written an elegant and brilliantly penetrating history that is so rich in detail and broad ranging in its analysis that it will quickly become required reading for anyone seeking to understand how Stalin managed the Soviet Union after World War II."—Martin J. Sherwin, Tufts University"This is a major and original contribution to the study of late Stalinist society. As a reader, I enjoyed it very much. It is poised to become a standard text on Stalinist ideology and science, fascinating for professionals and accessible to students. Clearly conceived and organized, the book is based on impressive research, including little-known or previously unknown documents from the Central Party archive, Russia's State Archive, and the Soviet Academy of Science."—Vladislav Zubok, Temple University, author of Inside the Kremlin's Cold War"Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars tells the story of each of the scientific debates under focus with admirable clarity and concision, but without sacrificing the complexity of the issues or the stakes involved. Its portrayal of Stalin was, to me, utterly persuasive. This book will have a broad audience, not only in undergraduate courses on Soviet history, Stalinism, and the history of science, but also among the informed public."—Lewis H. Siegelbaum, Michigan State University, author of Stalinism as a Way of Life
This is a major and original contribution to the study of late Stalinist society. As a reader, I enjoyed it very much. It is poised to become a standard text on Stalinist ideology and science, fascinating for professionals and accessible to students. Clearly conceived and organized, the book is based on impressive research, including little-known or previously unknown documents from the Central Party archive, Russia's State Archive, and the Soviet Academy of Science.
— Vladislav Zubok, Temple University, author of "Inside the Kremlin's Cold War"