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CHAPTER 1
The Early Stalinization Process: 1944–1949
The process of bringing the churches under Soviet control had hardly begun, much less been completed, in the short period of the first Soviet occupation in 1940–41.1 To be sure, the harsh Soviet legislation of 1929 — nationalization of church property, denial of juridical status to churches, prohibition of religious instruction of youth, elimination of religious holidays, limitation to cultic functions, and onerous taxation on clergy and church property — was introduced, though not fully implemented. Monasteries and church schools were targeted for closure. The theological faculties in Riga and Tartu were eliminated, substantial deportations and executions of clergy and bishops took place, and many of the German pastors still active in the Baltics fled to Germany. Clergymen lost their homes in the nationalization process and cells of the League of Militant Godless launched a propaganda campaign against religion. The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) was tasked with "reorganization or liquidation" of the churches in February 1941. Deportation of remaining clergy was being planned in June 1941. But the organizational capacity of the Communists was inadequate and their priorities were eliminating political opposition and introducing collectivization and nationalization into the economy. After cutting short the Soviets' plan by its invasion of the USSR in June 1941, Germany did not restore independence to the Baltic states, but instead subjected them to direct rule under the German Reichskommissariat Ost. Most of the Soviet strictures on religion and the churches were rescinded, although the theological faculties were not reinstated. Many church leaders and clergy — some under German orders — were evacuated ahead of the advancing Red Army and, along with large numbers of other civilians, founded Lutheran exile churches in the West. Latvians from traditionally Catholic Latgale fled to Lutheran areas, depopulating Latgale and leaving other areas more mixed confessionally.
Tentative Early Steps
With the return of Soviet rule in 1944 the Baltics fell victim to more sustained efforts to control the churches. Initially, however, the devastation and collapse of the infrastructure in the wake of war limited the state's capabilities, as did the paucity of cadres. Even while hostilities with the Germans continued in some areas, the Soviets named CARC (Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults) commissioners in each republic, in August 1944 in Latvia, in September 1944 in Lithuania, and later in 1944 in Estonia. But they often lacked clear directives from Moscow for implementing policies and were given more leeway in their work than their counterparts in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). For a considerable period after the German retreat, the regime faced armed opposition from rural guerrillas known as "forest brothers." In the early years, commissioners were often delegated to conduct "party work" in the provinces, especially in the struggle against these guerrillas, and were thus unavailable to oversee religious policy. Commissioners faced logistical difficulties and were overstretched, resulting in delayed submission of reports and supporting materials to Moscow. Voldemars Šeškens, the Latvian commissioner, complained in mid-1945 that he had no translator or typist and, for these services, was forced to rely on "directive organs," which sought speedy action based on their own motives. The Soviet desire to avoid antagonizing the Western Allies also argued for a moderate approach to economic and political transformation throughout the newly conquered areas in this period.
Behind this tentativeness lay divisions among CPSU ideological officials regarding the correct approach to religion in 1944–45. A September 1944 analysis by the Red Army political command concluded that the Baltic population "was not yet accustomed to our Soviet ways." In straightforward terms, the military conveyed the fears of the population — "would churches be permitted, where would they find pastors, will there be russification in the Baltics, is it not true that in Russia they oppress and even shoot believers" — but made no specific recommendations. On the other hand, Communist Party Agitprop officials in Moscow were alarmed by increasing religiosity during the war and pressed chief ideologue Andrei Zhdanov to crack down and end disputes over the religious question.
For their part, the churches were also left dramatically weakened at the war's end. One-half of the Lutheran pastors, many German, had fled to the West. Eight of the eleven district deans (middle-level administrators, in German Probst) in Latvia were exiled, shot, or had died. Flight among Catholic clergy was significantly less than among Lutherans: Archbishop Antonijs Springovics ordered them to stay, but nonetheless three bishops and 19 percent of the clergy fled. Large numbers of church buildings had been laid to waste as a result of the war, many occupied by Red Army units or itinerant groups of people. The church leadership was also left in limbo. In Estonia, the emigration of Bishop Johan Kõpp to Sweden in 1944 left the church leadership in the hands of Anton Eilert, who went into hiding after KGB intimidation. Eventually, on the basis of a provisional church council, August Pähn was chosen as bishop in January 1945, although his apostolic succession could not be conveyed by foreign bishops. A similar situation existed in the Latvian Lutheran Church, where Bishop Teodors Grinbergs named Dean Karlis Irbe as acting bishop. The financial base of the churches had naturally been greatly weakened by the destruction and dislocations of war; foreign ties that had flourished in the interwar period were now abruptly ruptured.
In the context of this mutual weakness and uncertainty regarding the state's strategy regarding the churches, the early postwar period was characterized by a relatively conciliatory policy, particularly on the part of the central authorities in Moscow. On the key contentious issue in the Stalin period, the registration and opening of parishes, the regime sought to follow Soviet practice established in 1918, but was quite liberal in implementing it initially and gave considerable leeway to republic officials. In 1945, CARC ordered that automatic registration be granted to all Baltic parishes with religious headquarters in Moscow, namely the ROC, Baptists, Jews, and Adventists; the regime hoped in particular that these confessions would thereby be more supportive of their new status subordinate to their respective central headquarters in Moscow. Those functioning parishes lacking such centers, such as Lutherans and Catholics, would require CARC approval but would be given careful consideration for registration. In this initial registration process, to be completed in six months, CARC was more interested in compiling an inventory of property and clergy, deferring its later insistence on signed agreements nationalizing church property. CARC called for forthcomingness in allocating permanent buildings to parishes. When the Estonian commissioner invoked a lack of canonical qualifications in denying registration to certain clergymen, he was reprimanded by the CARC in Moscow. Similarly, the Estonian government forbade the closing of churches by local authorities except in exceptional cases and with the approval of CARC and the commissioner. In some cases churches were able to continue using church buildings officially listed as nonworking churches, due to the immobilization of the local authorities on this question. In principle, construction of new churches and materials for repair of damaged churches were permitted. In one Latvian case, a future hard-line Communist leader, Otto Latsis, offered assistance to a future church dissenter, Leons Taiwans, for the restoration of his heavily damaged church!16 The churches were granted limited rights as juridical entities, entitling them to acquire means of transportation, produce items for religious activities, and rent or purchase buildings in addition to their prayer houses. Many local authorities wished to quickly close the parishes that now lacked clergy, but central authorities restrained them, mandating a one-year waiting period before declaring them to be nonworking churches.
On religious practice as well the state showed greater tolerance than it would later. State officials were cautious about the churches' rites of confirmation and first communion, fearing a rise as had occurred in 1940–41. In January 1946, the Estonian commissioner argued that "on the question of confirmation, while adhering as much as possible to the general limits on religious instruction along Soviet lines, I consider it correct to deal with the possibility of confirmation flexibly, in order to avoid the outward appearance of pressure. Outwardly it is necessary to leave the impression with the believer that church and faith is his private matter and his participation in it is free. By itself this feeling will regulate his religious activity." In May 1945 the Latvian Lutherans proposed confirmation at age 15, based on 52 hours of instruction, with no indication of state disapproval. Even Irbe's successor, Gustav Turs, known for his pro-Soviet stance, requested in March 1946 that "the beloved tradition of the people" be continued.
Regarding church institutional interests, the pattern of moderation was also evident. Authorities were relatively generous in approving publication of religious literature. Christmas was even declared an official holiday in Estonia in 1946. In Soviet legal practice, cemeteries were state property, but, responding to the commissioner's concern, CARC opted to study Latvian conditions and delayed forcing the churches to transfer their cemeteries to the government. On theological education, which was to become a constant source of church-state friction in the years to come, the commissioners showed some tentative support, even as they feared it might result in a revival of religion. In 1945, the main focus seemed to be on the Catholic seminary at Aglona and a Catholic request to also open a seminary in Riga. By late 1945, the Latvian commissioner came to support such a seminary; the Kremlin and CARC concurred on the grounds that theology was not taught at the universities.
For their part, the churches also exercised restraint initially. In the context of armed opposition in 1945, the Lutheran churches appealed to members to "maintain order in the kingdom of God, as well as the kingdom on earth, in accordance with the Holy Scriptures." It urged members to cease protest against "the current socio-economic formation" and instead work for restoration of the economy and culture by means of good honest work. The Estonian church leadership urged members to vote in elections and to see the will of God in all things. Meeting with the Estonian commissioner in early 1946, Bishop Pähn excused the failure of the church to shower Stalin with gifts and praise, like the Russian Orthodox Church, since "it would not be credible that they suddenly become Soviet patriots." Nor did the Estonian Lutheran Church issue a declaration on the occasion of the October Revolution in 1946, although serious consideration was given to the idea. In contrast with the Lithuanian Catholic Church, the Catholic Church in Latvia was relatively supportive, discouraging desertion and armed resistance and supporting electoral participation. But, in what would become a pattern, Archbishop Antonijs Springovics signaled subtle distance from the regime by referring to desertion rather than the Soviet term "banditism," and by authorizing his subordinate, Stanislavs Vaikuls, to issue such pronouncements; many priests in fact sympathized with the armed resistance.
The Regime's Evaluation of the Churches
The state's internal evaluation of the religious situation belied this relatively conciliatory policy. Its views of the Baltic churches, as toward all religion and churches, were certainly filtered through the lens of Marxist materialism and Leninist antireligious policy: religion was a reactionary belief system, destined along with the churches to die out with the construction of socialism. But the early view of the churches' role was also informed by the regime's interpretation of the interwar period and Nazi occupation. In 1942–1943 Agitprop proposals for propaganda actions to undermine support for the German occupation, there is no mention of German repression of religion (except in the case of the Orthodox churches and to a limited extent Lithuanian Catholics) or of potential religious leaders who might be used in such appeals, reflecting the milder religious policy of the Germans. As a result, the Lutherans in Estonia and Latvia were largely viewed by both Moscow and republic officials as linked to interwar authoritarian movements and compromised by the German occupation. In Estonia, the state saw the Lutheran churches as frustrated by the secular-liberal orientation of the interwar government and more comfortable with the authoritarian regime of Konstantin Päts, who became president after a coup in 1938. In this view, the Päts regime pursued a restorationist policy, promoting the Lutheran Church as a state church. Referring to the Free Estonian movement that resisted German occupation and sought to restore an independent Estonia, Estonian commissioner Johannes Kivi attacked the Lutheran Church, charging that "the major portion of the pastors attached themselves to the Vabist movement and turned their churches into tribunes for the propaganda of Vabism." In fact the Baltic Lutherans had long been dominated by Germans and in the interwar period sought to establish a separate profile. But, in a view shared by some modern scholars, to Kivi "an Estonian church, as such, never existed in the full sense of the word. It was merely a German church, with German views and thoughts, just in the Estonian language."
Given this historical analysis it is not surprising that the state viewed the Lutheran churches as essentially a reactionary force. Kivi concluded that "the Lutheran church never sought cooperation with social and politically progressive movements, but tied itself with all its capabilities to the reactionary forces and elements." Only six Estonian pastors had fought in the Red Army, an important yardstick of political loyalty to the regime; few had engaged in "antifascist activity"; 50 percent of Estonian clergy and 40 percent of Latvian clergy had fled with the Germans and no more than five spoke out against the armed guerrillas. Estonian officials were nuanced enough to discern that historically the Lutheran Church had hardly been monolithic, and that it included confessional, conservative, and liberal wings. However, such differences were now overshadowed, it was argued, by the Church's generalized antipathy toward communism.
The regime's view of the Latvian Lutheran legacy varied little from its view of the Estonian churches. Despite ordering compliance with the Soviet laws on registration of parishes, acting Bishop Irbe was tarred with the German legacy, his interwar parliamentary activity, and association with the authoritarian leader, President Karlis Ulmanis. The Latvian Lutheran clergy was seen as overwhelmingly oppositional, and the archival records suggest that Irbe was hardly given a chance to demonstrate otherwise: he was viewed as strongly anticommunist already in 1944–1945. Irbe refused to write pro-Soviet statements for journalists or hold special services on Soviet holidays. Irbe's ambiguity regarding the forest brother guerillas — his 1945 Advent appeal regretted that "many brothers of our people still are not in a position to return to their means of existence and productive work" — reinforced the regime's antipathy to him.
The Latvian Lutheran leadership suffered from comparison with the large Latvian Catholic Church, which the state viewed more positively, largely due to its perception of Archbishop Antonijs Springovics and the negative stance of his Lithuanian co-confessionals. The Latvian commissioner emphasized his progressive views: his refusal to heed the German order of evacuation, his missives to clergy proclaiming that "Soviet power does not think of repressing religion and the church" and calling for an end to armed resistance to Soviet rule, his criticism of Pope Pius for pro-fascist leanings, and his support of land reform in Latvia. Though he had experienced Soviet repression in 1940–1941, he was seen as a realist. According to the Latvian commissioner, "externally the Catholic clergy formally declare their desire to cooperate with Soviet power. The biggest proponent of this view is Springovics himself." Characterizing him as "trustworthy and progressive" in October 1945, the Latvian commissioner supported Springovics' demand for a seminary in Riga and pressed for Moscow's approval. In an important analysis of the churches sent to Molotov in December 1945, CARC concurred: it conceded the "anti-Soviet orientation" of the Catholic clergy in the "complexity of Soviet power returning to the Baltics," but argued that "this is not a uniform external expression," viewing Springovics more positively than the Lithuanian and Uniate Catholic leaders. To strengthen relations with him, CARC requested gifts be given to Springovics, while pointedly ignoring the Lutheran bishops. In an effort to profile him as head of the Soviet Catholic Church, CARC offered him a comfortable trip to Moscow in November 1945, but he declined, citing poor health. This relatively favorable view of Springovics did give him some room to maneuver in the early Stalin period, but the growing Soviet tension with the Vatican and Lutheran accommodation to the regime after 1948 would erode this advantage in the 1950s.
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Excerpted from "Soviet Religious Policy in Estonia and Latvia"
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Copyright © 2018 Robert F. Goeckel.
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