Skepticism and the Veil of Perception / Edition 1

by Michael Huemer

Overview

Since Descartes, one of the central questions of Western philosophy has been that of how we know that the objects we seem to perceive are real. Philosophical skeptics claim that we know no such thing. Representationalists claim that we can gain such knowledge only by inference, by showing that the hypothesis of a real world is the best explanation for the kind of sensations and mental images we experience. Both accept the doctrine of a 'veil of perception:' that perception can only give us direct awareness of images or representations of objects, not the external objects themselves. In contrast, Huemer develops a theory of perceptual awareness in which perception gives us direct awareness of real objects, not mental representations, and we have non-inferential knowledge of the properties of these objects. Further, Huemer confronts the four main arguments for philosophical skepticism, showing that they are powerless against this kind of theory of perceptual knowledge.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780742512535
Publisher:	Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Publication date:	07/17/2001
Series:	Studies in Epistemology and Cognitive Theory Series
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	232
Product dimensions:	6.09(w) x 9.12(h) x 0.55(d)

About the Author

Michael Huemer is assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Colorado at Boulder.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 Analytical Contents Chapter 2 Figures Chapter 3 Preface Chapter 4 Introduction: The Problem of Perceptual Knowledge Chapter 5 The Lure of Radical Skepticism Chapter 6 Easy Answers to Skepticism Chapter 7 A Version of Direct Realism Chapter 8 A Version of Foundationalism Chapter 9 Objections to Direct Realism Chapter 10 An Objection to Indirect Realism: The Problem of Spatial Properties Chapter 11 The Direct Realist's Answer to Skepticism

Editorial Reviews

This essay is useful for its clear, accessible discussion of standard skeptical arguments and its critical review of the major arguments for sense-data. Huemer's discussion of those matters is comprehensive and engaging.--Mind: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy

From the Publisher

This essay is useful for its clear, accessible discussion of standard skeptical arguments and its critical review of the major arguments for sense-data. Huemer's discussion of those matters is comprehensive and engaging.

Mind

In opposition to both skeptics and representationalists, Huemer (philosophy, U. of Colorado, Boulder) presents a theory of perceptual awareness, according to which perception gives us direct awareness of real objects and non-inferential knowledge of the properties of these objects. He responds to the major arguments for skepticism, including the infinite regress argument, the problem of the criterion, the brain in the vat, and the impossibility of verification. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

Booknews

This essay is useful for its clear, accessible discussion of standard skeptical arguments and its critical review of the major arguments for sense-data. Huemer's discussion of those matters is comprehensive and engaging.

Mind: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy