Silence in Second Language Learning: A Psychoanalytic Reading

Silence in Second Language Learning: A Psychoanalytic Reading

by Colette A. Granger
Silence in Second Language Learning: A Psychoanalytic Reading

Silence in Second Language Learning: A Psychoanalytic Reading

by Colette A. Granger

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Overview

Granger (education, York U., Toronto, Canada) examines the relationship of identity and the silent period in second language learning. She argues that some aspects of language learning and acquisition are psychical in nature, that the silent period is a manifestation of the psychical characteristics and their functioning, and that psychoanalytical theory--particularly with regard to making, and remaking, an identity--offers conceptual and methodological tools for identifying, describing, and investigating the problems and processes involved. For classroom teachers, linguists, and students, academics, and researchers in psychoanalysis and fields concerned with identity. Annotation ©2004 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781788920407
Publisher: Multilingual Matters Ltd.
Publication date: 02/16/2004
Series: Second Language Acquisition , #6
Sold by: Barnes & Noble
Format: eBook
Pages: 152
File size: 299 KB

About the Author

Colette Granger works in the Faculty of Education at York University in Toronto, Canada. Her research explores issues in several areas of education, including second language learning, teacher education and new technologies. Guiding all her work is an overarching question about the ways in which broad social goals, institutional and curricular objectives, and the internal worlds of the individual participants in education collide and at times disrupt one another. This is her first book.

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CHAPTER 1

Averting the Gaze: Silence in Second Language Acquisition Research

We live inside the act of discourse. But we should not assume that a verbal matrix is the only one in which the articulations and conduct of the mind are conceivable. There are modes of intellectual and sensuous reality founded not on language ... [and] there are actions of the spirit rooted in silence. It is difficult to speak of these, for how should speech justly convey the shape and vitality of silence?

George Steiner The Retreat from the Word, 1970

Even silence speaks. Hausa proverb

Defining Silence

The problem of silence in second language acquisition begins with a problem of language itself, specifically a question of meaning: what is silence, and more precisely what is the silent period, within the second language acquisition process? The terms are not as transparent, nor is the question as easily answered, as they at first appear. There are clues within SLA research itself about the elusiveness of the silent period as a subject of study, but second language research has reached no clear consensus on the more specific issue of the meaning of the term silent period, or on the larger question of what actually constitutes silence in the context of second language acquisition. This lack of consensus has the potential to be problematic for, while difference among different researchers is not unusual – since research, like much of human endeavour, is an interpretive act – to undertake an investigation without setting out what is being investigated would be to flounder immediately. And so I begin this chapter with an exploration of some of the ways in which the silent period is constructed by language acquisition researchers, and some of the problematic aspects of those constructions, followed by an examination of the question of silence writ large in language learning.

Like its progeny silent period, the term silence seems at first blush quite unambiguous. Silence in general is simply the absence of sound; in language it is the absence of speech. The silent period must therefore be a span of time where there is no talking. Can it be otherwise? Certainly for some linguists it cannot. However, for others silence is a much less clear concept. Let us examine these conflicting views.

It is apparent that a categorically silent period occurs in at least some second-language learners. Kenji Hakuta's (1976) observation of a silent period in a Japanese child learning English, and the autobiography of Richard Rodriguez (1988), in which he recounts his own silent period, are but two documented examples of the occurrence of precisely such a silence. And the anecdote told at the beginning of the introduction to this book narrates a moment at which an utterly silent period ended. Indeed, that first excited shouting, in his new language, of the young newcomer to Toronto and to English, which shattered a previously unbroken silence of several months' duration, appears initially to be an archetypal example of the concept of the silent period. For months that child did not speak at all; then he spoke suddenly, articulately, passionately, and without hesitation. Certainly such a story must fit even the most unyielding definition of silence. Paradigmatic though that example might seem, however, it would be a mistake to assume that it is entirely representative. Not all manifestations of silence in second language acquisition are as apparently unambiguous, tidy and well behaved – and it is this very messiness that invites the conflicting interpretations that inform, and arise from, linguists' attempts to understand and explain the phenomenon.

The debate concerning precisely what constitutes silence and the silent period in second language acquisition seems to coalesce around differing valuations of certain types of speech act. Specifically, some linguists draw a distinction between creative speech production on one hand, and the repetition of words and/or formulaic – essentially holophrastic – expressions on the other. They argue that a silent period is one in which the latter may occur, with varying frequency, but the former does not. Others note the distinction, but apply it differently. And still others draw no such distinction: for them, any oral language production, of any kind, ends silence, thereby nullifying the silent period. The first of these positions is articulated by Dulay et al. (1982), Krashen (1982, 1985) and others; the second is articulated by Saville-Troike (1988), and the third by Gibbons (1985).

In their discussion of the process of second language acquisition in children, Dulay et al. (1982: 22–23) initially describe the silent period as one during which learners 'concentrate on comprehension and opt for one-way or restricted two-way communication'. Later they elaborate:

... [C]hildren in natural host language contexts have been observed to go through a silent period of two or three months, during which they limit their speech to brief imitations and a few routines. The silent period is believed to help build up some competence through listening – enough to permit some spontaneous speech production without relying on the first language. (Dulay et al., 1982: 108–109)

Neither of these observations appears to hold any suggestion that the silent period is ended by the occurrence within it of limited speech. Rather, the authors seem to recognise implicitly that 'brief imitations' and 'routines' are qualitatively different from 'spontaneous speech production'. This distinction hints at the possibility that silence in language acquisition is a more complex notion than the primary denotation of the word might indicate: not only that silence can be absolute or relative, but that a lack of absolute silence may not, in itself, signify the presence of original language production.

The same distinction, between imitative and creative language production, holds in Krashen's comparison of intra- and post-silent-period English production on the part of J. Huang's research subject Paul, a five year old whose first language was Chinese (Huang, 1970; Huang & Hatch, 1978). Paul's initial production of English was limited to sentences he had memorised, such as 'Get out of here', which he recited holophrastically; it was only later that creative language production began. Krashen (1982: 26) remarks that this later production 'looked very much like first language development, with short, simple sentences such as "This kite" ...' for 'This is a kite'. Krashen later uses his input hypothesis both to sum up the silent period as '[a] period of time during which the acquirer does not have enough competence to speak [and which may] vary from a few hours to several months ...' (Krashen, 1985: 103), and to explain his interpretation of the concept more thoroughly:

The Input Hypothesis also accounts for the silent period, a phenomenon that is very noticeable in child second-language acquisition. Very typically, children in a new country, faced with a new language, are silent for a long period of time, their output being limited to a set number of memorized phrases and sentences that they hear frequently and whose meaning they do not understand completely. 'True' second-language production may not emerge for several months; a silent period of six months' duration is not unusual. (Krashen, 1985: 9)

As in Dulay et al. (1982), Krashen's own writing distinguishes between formulaic, rote-learned language, reproduced imitatively, and 'true' production of the second language. Here the differentiation is grounded in his hypothesis that creative language production begins only when a certain level of comprehension has been reached; during the silent period, comprehension is at best partial. Most importantly for the purpose of the present study, Krashen's understanding of the silent period is in no way inconsistent with the presence of some second language output, albeit perhaps in very limited amounts.

The distinction between imitative and creative language output is a significant one; certainly it is one that other researchers have considered. Specifically, Edith Hanania and Harry Gradman, in their work with the second language acquisition process of an adult learner, distinguish for the purpose of analysis 'between memorized utterances and constructed utterances that were created by the subject' (Hanania & Gradman, 1977: 78). While their reasons for drawing this distinction are outside the purview of my project, the fact that they make the distinction at all speaks to the legitimacy of recognising qualitative differences between imitative and creative language.

Like the researchers discussed above, Saville-Troike (1988) distinguishes between the 'repetition of others' utterances [and] recall and practice' as one kind of speech act, and the 'creation of new linguistic forms' as another. But she applies the distinction differently. For Saville-Troike, the differences between these two types of utterance, while present and noteworthy, are not the salient feature of the silent period. For her, the term silent period refers to a phase 'early in the course of second language development, during which [certain learners] largely cease verbal communication with speakers of the second language' (Saville-Troike 1988: 567). Her study, which categorises children as outer- or inner-directed language learners, finds that those identified as inner-directed engage in a great deal of private speech (including various strategies, among which are both imitative and creative utterances) during the silent period. She elaborates:

Rather than being assertive in social communication, inner-directed learners by contrast typically go through a period during which they refrain from initiating interaction with speakers of the new language, and produce little if any overt social verbalization in the second language. The fact that [their] utterances ... have been found to be relatively complex when they resume communicating in the second language clearly indicates there has been no major gap in the process of their linguistic development, but that it has 'gone underground', so to speak. (Saville-Troike, 1988: 568)

Curious, but nonetheless consistent with the recognition of the silent period as idiosyncratic, is Saville-Troike's (1988) finding that the complexity of learners' utterances seems to keep apace with their exposure to the second language. It contrasts with Krashen's (1982) assertion concerning Huang's (1970) subject Paul, whose second language acquisition process following a period of silence substantially resembled that of first language acquisition. But what is also of particular interest is that although, for Saville-Troike, both imitative and creative speech acts can occur within the silent period, she does not argue against the use of the term. Instead, she amends its description: 'As defined on the basis of this study, the "silent" period is not necessarily one of categorical silence, but its onset is marked by a dramatic drop in language directed to speakers of the second language' (1988: 577).

Another interpretation of the presence within this period of imitative and repetitive speech is found in the work of John Gibbons (1985). In his examination of prevalent linguistic and curricular perspectives regarding the usefulness of the silent period, Gibbons disputes the interpretation, articulated by Dulay et al. (1982), of the silent period as comprising comprehension without production. He concludes, on the contrary, that any observable silence on the part of a second-language learner is probably caused by a lack of understanding of the target language, or by psychological rather than linguistic withdrawal (Gibbons, 1985: 261). Further, and of more immediate relevance here, Gibbons clearly expresses discomfort with the paradoxical quality of the concept of a silent period as one that can involve speech, in a way analogous to Saville-Troike in terms of observation but quite different with respect to conclusion. Gibbons appears unconvinced by the distinction that other linguists have made, with respect to the silent period, between original, creative language production and holophrastic re-production of memorised utterances; indeed he is troubled by it. 'To regard routines and patterns as silence', he writes, 'is somewhat disconcerting' (Gibbons, 1985: 257). While both of Gibbons' propositions have relevance here, for the moment my response to his work engages his position on what he seems to argue is a paradox: speech occurring within the so-called silent period.

Notwithstanding the debates surrounding the issue of how silence is to be defined, there are methodological difficulties inherent in the study of silence that translate into logistical problems in the field. I refer in particular to Hakuta's (1976) case study of a Japanese-speaking child learning English, and to Gibbons' discussion of that study. Gibbons dismisses the Hakuta study as failing to offer evidence for a silent period. Arguing that 'Hakuta's study ... began three months after [the child] entered kindergarten, so she was already speaking English when the study began', Gibbons (1985: 256) finds it puzzling that the work is referred to as often as it is.

But Hakuta himself notes, with respect to his subject's silent period, that 'prior to the first sample, in fact from three months after her exposure to English began, I made repeated attempts to gather data, but she produced little speech' (Hakuta, 1976: 322). It seems, then, that the child in Hakuta's study did, in fact, undergo a silent period – at least as would be defined by Krashen – and that the researcher, who 'chose to let her begin speaking in a natural environment', simply found no usefulness in investigating her silence. This perceived lack of utility is interesting on its own, inasmuch as it exemplifies the tendency in research to overlook silence, by dint of the common-sense perception of it as an empty phenomenon rather than as an object of study. But of concern in the present context, with regard to Gibbons' disagreement with the concept of the silent period, is the fact that the study began when the subject's silence was coming to an end; this fact is evidence for, rather than against, a silent period.

Further, Gibbons does recognise the Huang (1970) study, although he argues that the discrepancy in duration of the silent periods of that study's subject may have been caused by distinct environmental influences or personality differences. Still, to argue for either of these possibilities is to acknowledge implicitly the presence of a period of silence. Clearly, while it is axiomatic to say that incomprehension must certainly be what informs that silence at the beginning of the second language acquisition process, it is worth remembering Saville-Troike's observation, noted above, that the complexity of learners' utterances 'when they resume communicating in the second language clearly indicates there has been no major gap in the process of their linguistic development' (Saville-Troike, 1988: 568). It seems somewhat counter-intuitive to suggest, as Gibbons appears to do, that a silent period, if one does exist, is a time of utter incomprehension followed by an instantaneous onset (presumably at the moment of the first creative utterance) of full comprehension and competent production.

To state that Gibbons equates creative and imitative language production would be to oversimplify his position, especially given that he argues for the value of 'routines and patterns as a facilitator of social interaction when productive rules have not yet been acquired' (Gibbons, 1985: 257), thereby ordering imitative and creative language production hierarchically with respect to complexity. Still, he does seem to be saying that where there is talk there cannot be silence. Of course, on one level this statement is patently true; for me, however, the reasoning informing the statement warrants scrutiny. On the face of it, the idea of a silent period that may not actually be silent is tricky, even uncomfortable. Initially I, like Gibbons, experience discomfort in labelling as silent a stage in which there is in fact sound. It seems that, if language is being produced, however rudimentary that language might be, the stage of production can hardly be called silent. But my concern here is with the quality of the silence (and relatedly, with the quality of the speech), rather than the simple fact of it. The silence that concerns me, and which subsequent chapters will both affirm and explore, is the silence, whether its imposition is conscious or unconscious, of the self. I therefore find compelling and helpful the distinction drawn by Krashen and Saville-Troike between language that expresses creatively and language that merely repeats.

(Continues…)


Excerpted from "Silence in Second Language Learning"
by .
Copyright © 2004 Colette A. Granger.
Excerpted by permission of Multilingual Matters.
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Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.

Table of Contents

Foreword, vi,
Acknowledgements, ix,
Silence in Second Language Learning: A Present Absence, 1,
1 Averting the Gaze: Silence in Second Language Acquisition Research, 14,
2 Changing the Subject: Psychoanalytic Theory, Silence and the Self, 40,
3 Looking and Looking Again: Memoirs of Second Language Learning, 64,
4 Reading Between the Lines: Language Learner Diaries, 89,
5 Taking the Hint: Working with Silence, 108,
References, 126,
Index, 135,

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