Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982

by Lawrence Freedman, Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse

Overview

The 1982 Falklands War was not only one of the most extraordinary military confrontations of recent years but also a turning point in the politics of Britain and Argentina. This unusual book makes it possible for us to follow the development of the war from both sides, as two leading experts from the belligerents present an integrated, authoritative, and engrossing account of its origins and course. The work unravels the complex series of events leading to the occupation of the Falkland Islands on April 2, 1982 by Argentine forces and then follows the conflict through to their surrender to the British on June 14. The authors weave together the development of the military confrontation with the attempts by Americans, Peruvians, and the United Nations to help find solutions.

Originally published in 1991.

The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780691636160
Publisher:	Princeton University Press
Publication date:	04/19/2016
Series:	Princeton Legacy Library , #1143
Pages:	514
Product dimensions:	6.20(w) x 9.30(h) x 1.60(d)

Read an Excerpt

Signals of War

The Falklands Conflict of 1982

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By Lawrence Freedman, Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 1991 Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-07890-8

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CHAPTER 1

ARGENTINE FRUSTRATION

On 5 January 1982 Argentina's new military Junta met at the Navy's Libertad building to review the state of the bilateral talks with the United Kingdom concerning the claim to the Falkland Islands, in the context of the Junta's broad approach to foreign policy. This was the Junta's second meeting on the subject. The first had taken place on 18 December, ten days after the new Junta had come to power.

General Leopoldo Galtieri, the Army Commander, was now President, having been Commander-in-Chief of the Army since the previous March. He was to run the country with the head of the Navy, Jorge Anaya, and of the Air Force, Lami Dozo. Though the lineup in the new Junta made it likely that the Malvinas issue would be high on the agenda, this had not been the reason for the Navy and Air Force's support of Galtieri when he pushed General Viola aside from the Presidency. Rather, it was a disagreement on Viola's economic policies during 1980 and 1981. The new members of the Junta knew each other well, particularly Anaya and Galtieri, who had been schoolmates in the past.

One of the first appointments was Dr Nicanor Costa Mendez, who became Foreign Minister. He had long experience with the Falklands issue, having been closely involved in the early Anglo-Argentine talks of 1966–8. During this time he believed great progress to have been made towards a transfer of sovereignty, only for the effort to be thwarted by the emergence of an organized Falklands lobby in London. He now returned to his desk at the Foreign Ministry to find matters more or less as he had left them. This keen sense of the history of the negotiations, and in particular of Britain's lack of flexibility, was to play a critical role in shaping Argentine strategy for the first months of 1982. He had briefed the Junta when it met on 18 December as to the dismal state of negotiations with Britain and the need to develop a policy prior to the resumption of talks in the coming February.

With or without Anaya running the Navy or Costa Mendez at the Foreign Office the issue would have come to the fore in 1982; 3 January 1983 would be the 159th anniversary of the visit of the Clio and the British occupation of the Islands. The symbolic importance of this anniversary meant that there would be pressure within Argentina demanding strong action by the government of the day in Buenos Aires. The demands often came from civilian politicians and academics who dared the Military Government to use force in support of valid national 'aspirations' related to 'territorial integrity' rather than in the name of internal politics and security.

Lastly, there were powerful domestic and international reasons for action. The Junta's inheritance was uncomfortable. Its predecessors had made themselves unpopular through severe political repression combined with the steady deterioration of the economy, largely as a result of the policies of the first military Junta under General Videla, who had overthrown the Peronist Government in 1976. Internationally, widespread condemnation of human-rights abuses combined with unfavourable papal mediation over a long-standing dispute with Chile over islands south of the Beagle Channel. The Falklands issue was coming to be seen as central to Argentina's future position in the South Atlantic, as well as being the only major foreign policy issue upon which it could act in 1982.

The Geopolitical Perspective

The pre-eminent role of the military in Argentine political life reinforced the nationalistic tendencies that might have anyway bubbled to the surface at a time of economic and political turmoil. Nationalism, in turn, encouraged a focus on territorial disputes, with the particular twist provided by a geopolitical perspective popular in South America. This helped to give the Falklands issue an importance beyond the symbolic and linked it in with the development and modernization of the economy.

Geopolitics relates control over critical parts of the earth's surface to security and prosperity. According to the Argentine geopolitical school, and indeed that of Brazil and Chile, control of the South Atlantic and a firm presence in the Antarctic region was bound up with the 'strategic triangle' of the Southern Cone: the Malvinas, Tierra del Fuego (The Drake Passage) and the periphery of the Antarctic Peninsula.

Central to this geopolitical appreciation is Antarctica. In 1959 a number of territorial claimants to this region, including Argentina, Chile and Great Britain, signed the Antarctic Treaty. This froze the competing claims for as long as the Treaty remained in force and demilitarized the Antarctic. Once the competing claims could not be resolved within Antarctica itself, they tended to be projected over the surrounding waters. This was encouraged by technological developments that make possible the exploration (and eventual exploitation) of resources in this inhospitable region. Thus future income and trade could well depend on the quality of the maritime presence maintained in the area. For military regimes this meant that if only internal order could be restored, access to maritime resources would permit rapid development. With all eyes on the review of the Antarctic Treaty in 1991, the competition was hotting up. This was seen, for example, in the Brazilian and Uruguayan efforts to establish bases in the White Continent and their acquisition of polar vessels.

Within Argentina this perspective suggested an alteration in the relative value of national territory. The focus shifted from the Pampas and the northern territories, seen in the past to be central in terms of both economic potential and control of the insurgency movements, to Patagonia, the Sub-Antarctic and the South Atlantic.

This shift was reflected in improved relations with Argentina's northern neighbours. Since 1980 there had been a rapprochement within the military regimes in Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. The co-operative impulse was far less strong with Chile and the United Kingdom, for with each there was a territorial dispute with a long history and an intense symbolism. Bilateral relations were inadequate to cope with these disputes. If they were to be handled peacefully it was necessary to opt for either mediation (Chile) or the use of fora such as the United Nations (Britain). In both cases, when the negotiations failed to yield satisfactory results, Argentina had in the past threatened military action.

In 1978 the country had been on the verge of war with Chile as a result of a dispute over the territory south of the Beagle Channel. A timely offer of mediation from the Vatican had helped restore calm. In December 1980 the Vatican had made its first proposal which, following previous recommendations, favoured Chile. Argentina was unhappy with this and put in a counterclaim.

As the Junta met in January 1982 it awaited the second papal decision. In a move that was to deplete the Argentine representation in Britain during the March crisis, the Argentine Ambassador to Britain, Ortiz de Rozas, was put in charge of negotiations with the Vatican, though not relinquishing his post in London. However, the Junta had few grounds for optimism that the initial papal support for Chile's claims would be reversed. This threatened Argentina's overall position in the South Atlantic.

There was little diplomatically and militarily that could be done to improve this position except by taking a more forceful line on the Malvinas. The 1959 Treaty forbade any attempt to reinforce the Argentine presence in Antarctica itself; it would be difficult to challenge the papal position on the Beagle Channel. Only with the Falklands and its dependencies of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands was there much hope of a positive negotiation.

Here the Argentine claim had been put clearly and forcefully to the international and regional community and it had obtained a sympathetic response. Links with the Islands had been established since the Communications Agreement of 1971 and Britain had, at times, appeared prepared to negotiate seriously over the transfer of sovereignty.

Britain was far away from the South Atlantic. From the perspective of Buenos Aires it had no substantial strategic or economic interest in the Falklands, while the local population was small and declining. The Islands seemed to fall exactly into the category of old colonies that had been abandoned in the previous few decades. So, although Britain was still a major power, and militarily more capable than Chile, the issues at stake for London were far less vital than they were for Santiago.

A failure to settle the dispute with Britain satisfactorily over the coming year could, thereafter, see the Argentine position steadily worsen. Once Chile was confirmed in the Beagle Channel it could 'legally' offer logistics to the Falkland Islands should Argentina cut them off. Moreover, Chile could prove to be an attractive partner to Britain in maintaining a maritime presence in the South Atlantic, and this would come at the expense of Argentina. Thus, improved relations with Santiago could strengthen Britain's bargaining position.

If, however, Britain did agree to Argentina's terms for the negotiations then Argentina's loss of territory to Chile would not impinge drastically on its future presence in the South Atlantic and Sub-Antarctic regions. In fact close co-operation with the United Kingdom in patrolling this region and undertaking joint ventures was highly desirable because of the standing this would give Argentina in the international community.

Every geopolitical consideration therefore seemed to push the Argentine Government to make the resolution of the Falklands dispute its top priority for 1982.

Understanding British Procrastination

Unfortunately, Argentina had been trying to resolve this dispute since the mid-1960s without success. How could the British be persuaded to move towards a settlement now? To answer this question the Junta made an attempt to identify a 'British behavioural pattern' in their dealings with Argentina over the Falklands. This analysis of British attitudes and behaviour was critical to the events of the next few months.

In 1964 the UN Committee on decolonization had included the Islands in its list of territories that ought to be decolonized; it also accepted the inclusion of the Argentine designation 'Malvinas' following 'Falkland' in the official denomination of the Islands. Soon afterwards the existence of the dispute was recognized and both parties were asked to search for a negotiated settlement.

In September 1965, Argentina had invited Britain to negotiate; this had been accepted but with the exclusion of the issue of sovereignty. The question was then posed to the General Assembly of the UN who, with 45 votes in favour, none against and 14 abstentions approved Resolution 2065 on 16 December 1965. In this Resolution the Assembly recognized the existence of a dispute, invited the two governments to 'proceed without delay' with negotiations to find 'a peaceful solution to the problem, bearing in mind ... the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)'. In the semantics of the dispute the use of the word 'interests' rather than 'wishes' implied only a limited regard for whatever misgivings the islanders had about this idea. Although these resolutions were not binding, on 14 January 1966 Great Britain agreed to negotiate on those terms; sixteen years of bilateral talks followed.

From the Argentine perspective serious discussions, addressing the sovereignty issue, only took place for two short periods during these sixteen years: between 1966 and 1967, and from 1977 to 1980. For the rest of the time the Falkland Islands lobby undermined the flexibility of the Foreign Office in its conduct of the negotiations.

Initially there had been considerable progress. During the early stages of the negotiations a 'Memorandum of Understanding' was drafted which envisaged the eventual transfer of sovereignty to Argentina. However, this progress was cut short through effective lobbying by the Falkland Islands Committee in the Houses of Parliament in 1968. This resulted in Britain changing its negotiating position; now the 'wishes of the islanders' were to be critical.

Argentine governments had continued with the negotiations, ignoring demands by nationalists for immediate and drastic action. They were aware of the British Foreign Office's conviction that the development of the economic future of the Islands could not be carried out without the active assistance of Argentina. It was hoped to change the islanders' view of their position by making concessions designed to integrate the Islands with the continent. In 1969 the first steps were taken to open a line of communications with the Islands. The Communications Agreement of 1971 provided the introduction of a weekly air service with the mainland.

Argentine Frustration

However, in 1975 it appeared that Britain was even going back on this integrative trend when an expedition was sent to determine the economic potential of the Islands (the Shackleton Mission).

There were also military incidents such as that involving the RSS Shackleton in February 1976. Argentina had received the support of the Interamerican Juridical Committee, which had declared that the movements of British warships in the region 'constitute a threat to the peace and security of the continent'.

After the 1976–7 crisis the British Government had appeared to be willing to negotiate seriously again. Argentina now understood that, whatever the private views of successive British governments with regard to the transfer of sovereignty, they were fearful of moving publicly because of the likely political reaction. The only possible approach that remained was that of a leaseback arrangement, by which Argentina would receive titular sovereignty but allow a British administration to continue. In 1977 bilateral negotiations resumed, a leaseback proposal was studied as well as possibilities for a joint Anglo-Argentine economic programme for the exploration, exploitation and development of the region.

The Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher continued with this approach through 1979 and 1980. But once again, as had been the case with the Memorandum of Understanding of 1968, fierce media and parliamentary opposition caused it to fail when Nicholas Ridley returned from the Islands in December 1980. The islanders obliged the Government to add their representatives to all future delegations discussing the Islands with Argentina and to freeze the sovereignty issue, thus channelling all bilateral (now trilateral) negotiations into exclusively peripheral matters.

This left the British Government 'talking for the sake of talking'. It was not difficult for Argentina to see through this approach. What was curious was that Britain was not backing it by providing for the development and defence of the Islands as demanded by the islanders. Of particular significance was the decision to withdraw HMS Endurance from service by April 1982. The Defence White Paper of June 1981 suggested abandoning the British naval presence in the South Atlantic and in Antarctica.

(Continues...)

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Excerpted from Signals of War by Lawrence Freedman, Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse. Copyright © 1991 Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse. Excerpted by permission of PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
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Table of Contents

• FrontMatter, pg. i
• CONTENTS, pg. vii
• ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS, pg. ix
• NOTE, pg. xi
• DRAMATIS PERSONALE, pg. xiii
• MAPS, pg. xxi
• INTRODUCTION, pg. xxxi
• Chapter One: Argentine Frustration, pg. 3
• Chapter Two: British Apprehension, pg. 14
• Chapter Three: Deadlock Again, pg. 23
• Chapter Four: Davidotrs Visits, pg. 39
• Chapter Five: Crisis over South Georgia, pg. 49
• Chapter Six: The Decision to Invade, pg. 65
• Chapter Seven: Diplomatic Endgame, pg. 84
• Chapter Eight: Operation Rosario, pg. 103
• Chapter Nine: The Response, pg. 121
• Chapter Ten: Resolution 502, pg. 134
• Chapter Eleven: Occupation, pg. 142
• Chapter Twelve: Allies, Friends and Mediators, pg. 150
• Chapter Thirteen: Haig's Shuttle: Round One, pg. 165
• Chapter Fourteen: Haig's Shuttle: Round Two, pg. 189
• Chapter Fifteen: Haig's Shuttle Concludes, pg. 218
• Chapter Sixteen: The Sinking of the Belgrano, pg. 247
• Chapter Seventeen: The Peruvian Initiative, pg. 272
• Chapter Eighteen: UN Mediation, pg. 292
• Chapter Nineteen: Build-up to San Carlos, pg. 323
• Chapter Twenty: Final Diplomacy, pg. 342
• Chapter Twenty-One: The Bridgehead and Beyond, pg. 357
• Chapter Twenty-Two: The Battle for Stanley, pg. 377
• Chapter Twenty-Three: Surrender, pg. 400
• Conclusion, pg. 413
• Order of Battle, pg. 418
• Notes, pg. 423
• Bibliography, pg. 452
• Index, pg. 463

Editorial Reviews

"The Falklands fracas . . . deserves [to be recorded as a] military-diplomatic history, replete with maps, lists of dramatis personae, and endless footnotes. Happily two noted military analysts, Britain's Lawrence Freedman and Argentina's Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse . . . have conspired to produce one."—The Washington Times

From the Publisher

"The Falklands fracas . . . deserves [to be recorded as a] military-diplomatic history, replete with maps, lists of dramatis personae, and endless footnotes. Happily two noted military analysts, Britain's Lawrence Freedman and Argentina's Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse . . . have conspired to produce one."

The Washington Times