Scientific Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science / Edition 1

by Robert Klee

Overview

Scientific Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science features an impressive collection of classical and contemporary readings on a wide range of issues in the philosophy of science. The volume is organized into six sections, each with its own introduction, and includes a general introduction that situates the philosophy of science in relation to other areas of intellectual inquiry. The selections focus on the main issues in the field, including the structure of scientific theories, models of scientific explanation, reductionism, historicist challenges to the objectivity of science, and the dispute over the ontological interpretation of mature scientific theories. Both the positivist model of science and its competitors, including contemporary social constructivist models, are included. Ideal for introductory philosophy of science courses, Scientific Inquiry strives to provide students and other readers with a thorough knowledge of the philosophical complexity of modern science and an appreciation of its authoritative intellectual standing in contemporary life.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780195119763
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Publication date:	09/10/1998
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	368
Product dimensions:	9.22(w) x 6.16(h) x 0.71(d)

About the Author

Ithaca College

Table of Contents

AcknowledgmentsIntroductionPart I: The Positivist Model of Scientific Theories and Its ProblemsSection 1. Logic, Language, and the Observational/Theoretical Distinction1. Alexander Rosenberg, The Rise of Logical Positivism2. Frederick Suppe, The Positivist Model of Scientific Theories3. Hilary Putnam, Problems with the Observational/Theoretical Distinction4. Grover Maxwell, Theoretical Entities5. Bas Van Fraassen, A Defense of the Observational/Theoretical Distinction6. Technical Interlude: Carl Hempel, A Critique of OperationalismSection 2. The Underdetermination of Theory and Holism7. Pierre Dunhem, Physical Theory and Experiment8. Sir Karl Popper, Falsification9. W.V. Quine, Holism, Part 1: Two Dogmas of Empiricism10. W.V. Quine, Holism, Part 2: Posits and Reality11. Technical Interlude: Larry Laudan, A Critique of UnderdeterminationSection 3. Reductionism, Antireductionism, and Scientific Explanation12. Ernest Nagel, A Model of Intertheoretic Reduction13. Paul Oppenheim and Hilary Putnam, Unity of Science14. Jerry Fodor, A Critique of Physiological Reductionism15. Technical Interlude: Jaegwon Kim, The Nature of Supervenience16. Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, The Deductive-Nomological Model of Scientific Explanation17. Philip Kitcher, The Unification Model of Scientific Explanation18. Technical Interlude: Paul Humphreys, The Aleatory Model of Scientific ExplanationPart II: Historicism and Its AftermathSection 4. The Kuhnian Model of Science19. Thomas Kuhn, The Nature of Normal Science20. Thomas Kuhn, The Nature of Revolutionary Science21. Ian Hacking, The Rationality of Science After Kuhn22. Polemical Interlude: Paul Feyerabend, An Argument Against MethodSection 5. Social Constructivism and Feminism23. David Bloor, The Strong Programme in the Sociology of Science24. Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, A Social Constructivist Field Study25. James Robert Brown, A Critique of Social Constructivism26. Polemical Interlude: Paul Boghossian, The Sokal Hoax27. Sandra Harding, Feminist Science Criticism28. Cassandra Pinnick, Problems with Feminist Epistemology29. Polemical Interlude: Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt, A Critique of Feminist Science CriticismSection 6. Realism and Antirealism30. Hilary Putnam, Realism in Mathematics and Elsewhere31. Bas van Fraassen, Alternatives to Realism32. Philip Kitcher, Realism and Scientific Progress33. James Robert Brown, Realism, Antirealism, and NOA34. Polemical Interlude: Alan Musgrave, Idealism and Antirealism