Table of Contents
Preface viii
Note on references xii
I Pyrrhonism: the Life without Belief 1
1 Introduction 1
2 Pyrrhonism: the elements 4
3 The modes 7
4 Dogma and appearance 11
5 Assertion and action 16
6 Conclusion: Pyrrhonism and philosophy 18
II The Legacy of Pyrrhonism 21
7 Introduction: how to resist Pyrrhonism 21
2 Rationalism and the good life 24
3 Rationalism and medicine 27
4 Scepticism, common sense and life 32
5 The rediscovery of Pyrrhonism 34
6 Constructive scepticism 37
III Descartes: the Deepest Scepticism 41
1 Making scepticism give birth to philosophical certainty 41
2 Levels of doubt 45
3 The dream argument 49
4 The demon 54
5 Cartesian doubt and the everyday criticism of belief 58
6 Conclusion: the external world 62
IV Descartes' Legacy: Science and Circularity 66
1 Introduction: foundations and the circle 66
2 Is there a circle? 70
3 Are there foundations? 75
4 Appearance and reality: Cartesian science 78
5 Inquiry and autonomous self-control 81
V Hume: Scepticism and the True Philosophy 86
1 Introduction: naturalism and scepticism 86
2 Hume's sceptical arguments 90
3 The external world: the natural history of philosophy 94
4 Mitigated scepticism 100
5 Humean Pyrrhonism 104
VI Common Sense and Legitimation 108
1 Introduction 108
2 Reid: common sense foundations 108
3 Common sense and legitimation 111
4 Legitimation 118
5 Carnap and Quine 22
6 Wittgenstein on certainty 125
VII Scepticism and Inquiry 130
1 Why is scepticism a problem? 130
2 Certainly, knowledge, justified belief 132
3 Some lessons of history 136
4 Scepticism and agency 137
5 Inquiry and responsibility 140
6 The challenge of scepticism: a suggestion 143
VIII Autonomy and Scepticism 146
1 Autonomy 146
2 Inquiries 151
3 Scepticism and determinism: the 'Epicurean argument' 154
4 Challenges 158
5 Sceptical challenges 163
6 Conclusion 167
IX Comparisons and Consequences 169
1 Introduction 169
2 Universalizability 169
3 Claims and challenges 173
4 Realism and the structure of reflection 177
5 The appeal of internalism 183
6 Foundations and coherence 187
7 Certainty and justified belief 188
X Why Knowledge Mailers 192
1 Introduction 192
2 'Knows' 195
3 The knowledge inference 198
4 Testimony: the third person case 204
5 The first person case 204
6 Knowledge and scepticism 207
7 Tracking and the avoidance of scepticism 210
XI Naturalism and Autonomy 215
1 Naturalistic epistemology 215
2 Normativity 218
3 Neurath's ship 222
4 Charity and the bruin-in-a-vat 224
5 Restricted inquiries and self-control 230
6 Levels of confidence 233
7 How to avoid scepticism 236
Bibliography 241
Index 247
