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Overview
Dale Herspring analyzes three key periods of change in civil-military relations in the Soviet Union and postcommunist Russia: the Bolshevik construction of the communist Red Army in the 1920s; the era of perestroika, when Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to implement a more benign military doctrine and force posture; and the Yeltsin era, when a new civilian and military leadership set out to restructure civil-military relations. The book concludes with a timely discussion of the relationship of the military to the current political struggle in Russia.
“The history is both fascinating and timely.” —European Security
“When military reform returns to its deservedly prominent place in the Russian political agenda, Herspring’s book will offer invaluable guidance.” —Mark von Hagen, American military historian
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780253028433 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Indiana University Press |
| Publication date: | 12/22/2021 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 256 |
| File size: | 670 KB |
| Age Range: | 18 Years |
About the Author
DALE R. HERSPRING is Professor in the Department of Political Science at Kansas State University. A former Foreign Service Officer, he is author of The Soviet High Command, 1967–1989: Personalities and Politics and East German Civil-Military Relations: The Impact of Technology.
Read an Excerpt
Russian Civil-Military Relations
By Dale R. Herspring
Indiana University Press
Copyright © 1996 Dale R. HerspringAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-253-02843-3
CHAPTER 1
DEVISING A NEW MILITARY DOCTRINE
OFFENSE VS. DEFENSE
A strategy of attrition in no way renounces in principle the destruction of enemy personnel as a goal of an operation. But in this it sees only a part of the mission of the armed front rather than its entire mission.
Col. Aleksandr Svechin
As in the past, superiority lies with the offense, which includes the possibility of delivering in a specific direction overwhelming concentrations of organized strikes, and thereby inflicting a serious defeat.
Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky
The Problem
When they came to power in 1917, the Bolsheviks faced a dilemma. On the one hand, they needed a new doctrine more in accord with their revolutionary goals and beliefs. From a doctrinal standpoint, this meant an offensive strategy because an offensive strategy would permit the Bolsheviks to portray themselves as moving forward, climbing new mountains, conquering new heights, exporting the revolution to other parts of the world. Positional warfare, characteristic of World War I, was the type of strategy followed by capitalist armies. Given its revolutionary, unique nature, the Bolsheviks needed a new strategy to distinguish themselves from others in the world.
The Nature of Doctrine. The problem that faced the Bolsheviks at that time was that the majority of the officers from the old army, who played a key role in the new Red Army, believed that an offensive strategy required a high degree of mechanization, close coordination between troops, the presence of armored forces as well as an air force, and a large, well-trained army equipped with the latest in modern technology. They argued that such a force structure was expensive and required a strong industrial base.
On the other hand, these officers claimed that a defensive strategy was much cheaper. History had shown that fighting a defensive war did not require the high degree of mechanization, technical training, modern equipment, and coordination of an offensive strategy. In essence, Soviet troops would occupy a series of defensive positions and wait for an opponent to wear itself out (in terms of casualties and the loss of weapons). Once the enemy was exhausted, the Red Army would then be in a position to expel the invader and perhaps even export the revolution abroad. This strategy did not require a large standing army and the demands on the technological training of those in the military were much lower — an important consideration, given the illiteracy that pervaded the Soviet Union. It would be costly in terms of the destruction that the Soviet Union would suffer, but the former Tsarist officers believed that the USSR had little choice. The country was in chaos. Not only was the economy a mess, the political and social situation was also disastrous. These officers argued that ideology would have to take a backseat to historical, economic, and social realities. In the 1920s it was a luxury the country could not afford — politicizing military doctrine would threaten the country's security.
An Open Discussion? A second, closely related issue was how to define military doctrine. On the one hand, those who were out to politicize military doctrine argued for a very tight, comprehensive definition, one which would guide the future of Soviet force structure, and provide the leaders of the Red Army with a vehicle for socializing the new army's recruits and officers. Officers from the old army, on the other hand, feared that if doctrine were comprehensively defined it would lead to stagnation in the intellectual thought process. Such a definition would not only include a number of key variables, it would also exclude others. History, for example, would be very selectively interpreted. The possibility of using it as the basis for an open discussion of these questions would be gone. Given the dynamic, changing nature of military affairs, and the danger that ideological orthodoxy could intrude into this area, opponents maintained that a working definition which permitted a free and open use of the past was the best approach.
The Civil War — The Basis for a "New" Doctrine?
The Civil War differed significantly from the positional type of warfare characteristic of World War I. Instead of two giant military machines facing each other across a no-man's land, fronts in the Russian Civil War were more fluid. Troops lived off the land, made deep penetration raids into the enemy's rear, failed to coordinate attacks, and organization was weak. Once an attack or an offensive lost momentum, a counterattack would be launched, thereby forcing the formerly victorious army to retreat.
Among the newly converted Communists there were a large number who had fought in the Civil War, and who believed that the war had laid the foundation for a unique proletarian form of military science. As Fedotoff-White put it, "The young Red commanders, victorious in the field against their White enemies, thought they had discovered the foundations of a new revolutionary doctrine of the proletariat, which relegated to the scrap heap the theories of the old generals, based on the experience of World War I and the study of its history." These men believed that strategy and tactics were dependent on Marxist theory, not on historical precedent or traditional military science. In practice this meant putting primary emphasis on the offensive. Just as Red Army units avoided positional warfare during the Civil War, so should the future Soviet military. Ideological conviction, together with mobility and maneuverability, would be the cornerstones of the new military science. Defensive tactics, such as the construction of fortifications, had to be avoided at all costs.
Meanwhile, in good "Kolkowiczian" fashion, the majority of professional military officers resisted this effort to politicize military doctrine, arguing that while the Civil War led to some interesting changes in tactics, it did not seriously affect strategy and doctrine. Mikhail Tukhachevsky set out these two positions in a lecture in 1919:
One opinion maintains that the conditions under which the Civil War was conducted resulted in several special strategic concepts that must be mastered. The second position, which is juxtaposed to the first, argues that the laws of strategy are unshakable and for that reason there is nothing new in our Civil War and that if we master these laws, which were mastered earlier, then our actions will be completely correct and we will avoid mistakes.
During the early 1920s, these two points of view gave rise to three identifiable schools of thought. The first maintained that the Civil War had little relevance for Soviet military thought. Furthermore, representatives of this school — Aleksandr Svechin was the most famous — argued that given the country's dire economic situation, a defensive strategy was the only viable alternative. The second, headed by Mikhail Frunze, idealized the Civil War experience by placing primary emphasis on maneuverability and the offense. The third was Leon Trotsky's changing, non-dogmatic approach which tried to combine the two. For him, both ideology and history were important. In evaluating this situation, however, it is important to note, first, that a power struggle was going on between Stalin and Trotsky. Second, by the end of the 1920s the issue had become so politicized that much of the discussion had little to do with military strategy. And third, once the ideological veneer was wiped away, none of the positions were as simplistic as their opponents claimed. Svechin, for example, favored defense, but he also recognized the importance of the offense. Similarly, while Frunze emphasized the offense, he too realized that a war could not be won without a solid defense.
Framing the Issues
Frunze and S. I. Gusev fired the first salvo in the debate over the politicization of doctrine in the twenty-one theses, which they had planned to submit to the Tenth Party Congress (the first fifteen were written by Gusev, the last six by Frunze). While Trotsky's opposition prevented the presentation of these theses to the congress, they were important because they illustrated Frunze's early thinking.
Three of the theses presented by Gusev and Frunze dealt directly with military doctrine. Thesis ten stated that the military should pay more attention to "mounted" infantry because of its maneuverability. Thesis eleven stated that the Civil War showed the increased importance of cavalry in modern warfare — primarily because of its maneuverability. Close coordination of cavalry with other units would produce "tremendous fire-power and transform it into a new branch — armored cavalry." Finally, thesis nineteen argued that work toward the development of a "unified proletarian doctrine" should not be the preserve of officers from the former Tsarist Army. Rather, it could only be built by "the joint efforts of military specialists as well as all political workers who have sufficient background in the construction of the Red Army and its struggle to utilize the revolutionary experience of the masses as its base." The latter reference both attempted to legitimate non-military specialists and to politicize doctrine.
Frunze returned to the offensive in July 1921 with an article entitled "A Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army." Turning to the question of defining doctrine, Frunze argued for an all-encompassing definition. Otherwise, he argued, the Soviet military was faced with chaos. The new state required a comprehensive definition of doctrine not only because it needed to differentiate itself from the old order, but because without it the Kremlin's attempt to inculcate new values in the military would be hurt. As he put it,
It will above all point to the character of military clashes which we can expect. Should we accept the idea of passive defense of the country, not adopting or pursuing an active approach or should we keep the latter in mind. On the nature of the answer we give to this question will depend the entire character of the development of our armed forces, the character and system of training of individual soldiers and large military units. ...
In Frunze's eyes, doctrine would both determine the nature of the country's force structure and provide the sense of coherence needed to interrelate all of the factors involved. "It should above all explain the character of those combat encounters which await us." Frunze defined military doctrine as:
a unified set of teachings, accepted by an army of a given state, which fix the form of constructing the armed forces of that country, and the methods of training and directing the troops (militarily) on the basis of those views which predominate in the given state and on the basis of the methods of solving them which flow from the class essence of the state and the level of development of its productive forces.
Since the economic basis of the new state was different from all other existing states, its political and military structure and doctrine also had to be qualitatively different. Indeed, it was the interaction of the technical and political sides of military affairs that gave the USSR its unique military doctrine. This was why senior officers in the Red Army had to understand both political and military factors. Only then would they be able to construct a class-based military doctrine.
Turning to the issue of defense versus offense, Frunze argued that in view of the political (i.e., proletarian) nature of the new state, "Only he who finds in himself the resoluteness to attack will win; the side that always defends itself is inevitably doomed to defeat. The entire revolutionary historical process of the working class makes it necessary to go over to the offense when conditions are right." This made it important to educate the masses of soldiers in the spirit of the offensive. "The proletariat will attack and together with them as their main weapon will be the Red Army." In fact, Frunze not only saw the offense as the ideological basis of military, he also viewed it as the key to operational success.
In light of the USSR's boundless spaces, the maneuver principle was perfect for the Soviet Union. "Our command staff must teach the superiority of maneuver of a strategic character, and the entire Red Army must learn quickly this art and adopt the march-maneuver in a planned manner." Indeed, Frunze went so far as to argue that in the future defense in the form of fortresses "will be completely insignificant in our operations." Instead focus would be on field armies — especially the cavalry.
For his part, Svechin argued against what he considered to be party influence in military affairs, maintaining that military science exists independently of ideological considerations. He admitted that political authorities must be in control during a war: "A politics that would renounce the retention of its authority over the leadership of a war and acknowledge the primacy of military specialists and silently conform to their requirements would itself acknowledge its own bankruptcy." However, there was no such thing, he argued, as a "class-based" military science. There was only military science and history. To quote Svechin, "Doctrine is defined as that point of view that understands military history and incorporates its experience and lessons. Doctrine — that is the daughter of history." If the new Soviet state insisted on injecting Marxism into its military science, it ran the risk of politicizing an apolitical undertaking. To quote Fedotoff-White, "Svechin's idea was thus of a national, not a class army, subordinated to the government, of course, but left free to develop what he called the specifically soldierly viewpoint, instead of being permeated with political ideas and influences." Svechin also feared, correctly as it turned out, that the politicization of military science would dogmatize the study of strategy and history and penalize those who wanted to engage in independent analysis. What was needed was a willingness to adopt military doctrine to changing conditions; something that would be impossible if politics became the primary concern in devising doctrine. Svechin made this point in the preface to the first edition of his classic work, Strategiya, when he noted that "a particular strategic policy must be divined for every war; each war is a special case, which requires its own particular logic rather than any kind of stereotype or pattern, no matter how splendid it may be." Needless to say, Svechin's opposition to outside interference in military affairs was not popular among officers whose primary raison d'etat was their ideological commitment.
In responding to the positions articulated by Frunze and Svechin, Leon Trotsky criticized — and alienated — both sides. To the professional military officers he was an amateur interfering in military affairs, while to the Communists he was defending ideas and views which most of them considered reactionary and suspect.
To begin with, Trotsky rejected Svechin's attempt to depoliticize military doctrine. Soviet military doctrine was based on Marxism-Leninism. Marxism rejected the idea that any aspect of the socio-economic superstructure could be apolitical. At the same time, it was critical not to over-politicize society in general and military doctrine in particular. Marxist theory provided a basis for dealing with military problems. As he put it in December 1921, "Marxism does not supply ready-made prescriptions, least of all in the sphere of military construction. But here, too, it provides us with the method." Thus while the significance of Marxism could not be denied in military affairs, there was no need to develop a special Marxist military science. Politicizing military doctrine made no sense.
A military doctrine that declares "We'll crush our enemies beneath a barrage of red caps," is of no use to us. We must eradicate such bravado and revolutionary snobbery. Chaos results whenever strategy is developed from the standpoint of revolutionary youth.
Trotsky admitted that defining doctrine was important, but he maintained that the current search for a Marxist military doctrine in the Soviet Union was leading to silliness.
But under discussion is what kind of doctrine are we lacking? That is, what are these new principles, which must enter into the program of military construction, and just what is their content? And it is precisely here that the muddling begins. One individual makes the sensational discovery that the Red Army is a class army, the army of a proletarian dictatorship. Another one adds to this that inasmuch as the Red Army is a revolutionary, internationalist army, it must be an offensive army. A third proposes in behalf of the spirit of the offensive that we pay special attention to cavalry and aviation. And, finally, a fourth proposes that we don't forget to apply Makhno's hand-carts (tachanka). Around the world in a hand-cart — there is a doctrine for the Red Army!
In reality, Trotsky argued "it is useless to seek logical definitions" of military doctrine. The way out of this dead-end was to continue historically based analytical work while avoiding scholastic definitions. Indeed, Trotsky was beginning to sound like Svechin on this topic. For example, he argued that "the army should be an independent organism, be capable of critical thinking, and be able to evaluate the situation."
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Russian Civil-Military Relations by Dale R. Herspring. Copyright © 1996 Dale R. Herspring. Excerpted by permission of Indiana University Press.
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Table of Contents
Preface
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
Introduction
Part I. The 1920s
I. Devising a New Military Doctrine: Offense vs. Defense
II. Deciding on a Force Structure: The Debate about a Militia
III. How to Deal with Non-Russians: The Question of National Armies
IV. Red or Expert: Personnel Issues
Part II. The Gorbachev Period
V. Getting Control of Military Doctrine
VI. Restructuring the Armed Forces: How Professional a Military?
VII. The Revival of National Military Forces
VIII. Cadre and Party
Part III. Toward a Russian Army
IX. The Post-Coup Period and the Commonwealth of Independent States
X. The Russian Army Faces and Uncertain Future
Conclusion
Notes
Index