Revolt on the Tigris: The Al-Sadr Uprising and the Governing of Iraq
272Revolt on the Tigris: The Al-Sadr Uprising and the Governing of Iraq
272Hardcover
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Overview
Product Details
ISBN-13: | 9780801444517 |
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Publisher: | Cornell University Press |
Publication date: | 08/31/2005 |
Series: | Crises in World Politics |
Pages: | 272 |
Product dimensions: | 5.00(w) x 7.50(h) x 0.88(d) |
Age Range: | 18 Years |
About the Author
What People are Saying About This
Revolt on the Tigris is the best account from the ground of the high intent of many of those sent forth by Paul Bremer, the American proconsul of the hour, to set things straight in post-Saddam Iraq, and where it went wrongThat is up to mid last year. In the dying weeks of 2005, things are still not going right, and there are a whole range of different issues.
This important, detailed, evocative and revealing book is by a former Parachute Regiment officer who was awarded the CBE by the Foreign Office for his crucial and highly dangerous work in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion.... By not opposing the American decision to invade without proper plans for the reconstruction of Iraq, and then failing to insist upon sufficient troop levels for the far more difficult post-invasion phase, Blair risked hundreds of British lives. Etherington's work on the ground was obstructed and all but destroyed. The well-educated, moderate and potentially supportive Iraqi middle classes are paying the price but, as the ending of this excellent book argues, the dangerous work by brave people such as its author may yet succeed.
This is an extraordinary story, brilliantly told.... Etherington's courage, intelligence, empathy, intellectual rigour, scepticism and even idealism shine through. His understanding of the region, the reconstruction process and—crucially—the uses and limitations of military power, make him a superb guide through the complexities of occupied Iraq. Above all, one gets the sense that here is the right man in the right place at the right time, using decades of experience to make the best of a tricky brief, and somehow keeping his sense of humour amid the eating-soup-with-a-knife multinational reconstruction experience.... Etherington's equivocal success was a function of his energy, courage and integrity, but mostly Iraqi political will—an often inert force, sceptical of charlatans or adventurers, reluctant to be mobilised, often more evident through abstention than presence, but eventually ready, in small ways, to fashion political change. His account should be required reading for anyone who wants to understand the Iraq the headlines never cover.
Etherington is a hero of mine. I was a coalition deputy governor in two provinces neighboring his. We arrived and left on the same day; we were both besieged in our compounds by Sadr insurgents and we both handed over unstable provinces to our successors. He worked tirelessly and with real success and he writes with wit and powerful conviction.... Better plans, better people, more troops might, as Etherington argues, have given us a small advantage in 2003, but direct foreign rule was never going to turn Iraq into a liberal democracy.
In October of 2003, fresh from a Cambridge degree in international relations, ex-paratrooper and conflict management expert Etherington—who served with the European Community Monitor Force in the former Yugoslavia—was charged by the Coalition Provisional Authority with the nearly impossible task of governing the Wasit province in southern Iraq. Etherington's literate, stoic and dryly humorous prose echoes his self-acknowledged 'English sense of reserve' and his low-key management style, and is in sharply ironic contrast to the chaos, mismanagement, and physical danger he finds in postinvasion Iraq. His climactic account of the uprising that occurred under the leadership of Moqtada al-Sadr is a tour-de-force of war reporting; at times a comedy of errors and, at others, a terrifying drama of suspense, it brings the surrealism of the twenty-first-century battlefield sharply to life. Though a qualified supporter of the war, Etherington provides a measured and intelligent critique of almost every aspect of the coalition's postwar planning. Particularly devastating are his detailed descriptions of the chronic lack of security caused by too few troops and the influence that corporations had on operational planning. But Etherington's annoyance is neither cynical nor defeatist, and his faith in the ultimate viability of a renewed Iraqi state—with intelligent planning and support—is convincing no matter which way one stands on the invasion. Anyone seriously interested either in the future of that beleaguered nation or the possibilities of intelligent diplomacy would do well to read this firsthand account.