Reviewing Delegation: An Analysis of the Congressional Reauthorization Process / Edition 1

by James H. Cox

Overview

Members of Congress often delegate power to bureaucratic experts, but they fear losing permanent control of the policy. One way Congress has dealt with this problem is to require reauthorization of the program or policy. Cox argues that Congress uses this power selectively, and is more likely to require reauthorization when policy is complex or they do not trust the executive branch. By contrast, reauthorization is less likely to be required when there are large disagreements about policy within Congress. In the process, Cox shows that committees are important independent actors in the legislative process, and that committees with homogenous policy preferences may have an advantage in getting their bills through Congress.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780275978525
Publisher:	Bloomsbury Academic
Publication date:	04/30/2004
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	176
Product dimensions:	6.14(w) x 9.21(h) x 0.44(d)

About the Author

JAMES H. COX is Assistant Professor, Department of Government, California State University, Sacramento.

Table of Contents

Preface
List of Abbreviations
List of Figures
List of Tables
Understanding Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy
Four Models of Agenda Control
Toward a Tradeoff Explanation of Control
The Authorization Process
Case Studies of the Choice to Use Temporary Authorization
Comparing the Success of Passing Reauthorization Legislation across Agencies
A Quantitative Assessment of Transaction Cost Theory
Conclusion
Appendix