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Overview
It would be easy to cheat someone on eBay. However, an essential characteristic of the site prevents this from happening: buyer and seller reviews form what amounts to an "index of reputation." The availability of such an index provides a strong incentive to be an honest trader.
Reputation-Based Governance melds concepts from businesses like eBay with politics. Author Lucio Picci uses interdisciplinary tools to argue that the intelligent use of widely available Internet technologies can strengthen reputational mechanisms and significantly improve public governance. Based on this notion, the book proposes a governance model that leans on the concept of reputational incentives while discussing the pivotal role of reputation in politics today. Picci argues that a continuous, distributed process of assessing policy outcomes, enabled by an appropriate information system, would contribute to a governance model characterized by effectiveness, efficiency, and a minimum amount of rent-seeking activity. Moreover, if citizens were also allowed to express their views on prospective policies, then reputation-based governance would provide a platform on which to develop advanced forms of participative democracy.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780804777438 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Stanford Economics and Finance |
| Publication date: | 02/22/2011 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 240 |
| File size: | 1 MB |
About the Author
Read an Excerpt
REPUTATION-BASED GOVERNANCE
By Lucio Picci
Stanford University Press
Copyright © 2011 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior UniversityAll right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8047-7329-4
Chapter One
Introduction
Today we work for a reputation. Tomorrow our reputation will work for us. Russian saying
EBay and Other Stories
EBay's electronic market is one of the most successful Internet applications, generating 15 million new listings on the average day and allowing more than 90 million users worldwide to buy and sell all sorts of new and secondhand items (eBay 2009, 2010). On eBay, traders almost invariably do not know each other and usually will not have an encounter more than once. It would be easy to cheat on eBay—for example, you could fail to send the merchandise after having received the requested payment, or send a product of lower value than the one advertised, or change your mind on a purchase and not follow it through. If dishonesty were widespread, people would not trust each other and would not use the market. Beyond a certain level of mutual mistrust, eBay would not function.
However, an essential characteristic of eBay prevents this from happening. At the end of a transaction, both buyer and seller may (and often do) write a "feedback" (as it is called) on each other, which can be positive, neutral, or negative. The sum of each type of feedback received by each participant during the previous six months forms what amounts to an "index of reputation" that is visible to all. The availability of such an index provides a strong incentive to be honest: a seller who receives negative feedbacks from previous buyers would find it difficult to continue trading, because prospective buyers would be wary of doing business with him. A buyer would also have a hard time doing his shopping, because sellers would not believe in his resolve. On eBay, fear of acquiring a bad reputation represents a strong incentive to be honest and efficient, and the observed outcome is that most people, in fact, honestly describe the merchandise that they plan to sell, ship it quickly, and pay their bills. The result is the success of eBay, one of the poster cases of the Internet age.
Beyond what may be concluded from impressionistic observations, rigorous studies have assessed the role of reputational effects, using data on eBay transactions together with appropriate econometric techniques. Resnick et al. (2006, table 1) summarize fifteen such studies. The broad picture that emerges is one where such effects exist and are relevant. More recent research also points in the same direction. For example, Resnick et al. (2006) set up an experiment where an established dealer with a good reputation is compared with a new dealer, with no reputation at all. They both provide exactly the same good and quality of ser vice. The authors find that the seller with an established reputation enjoys a significant price premium. Cabral and Hortaçsu (2010) find that when a seller receives a negative feedback for the first time, his sales drop significantly, and they conclude that overall "the eBay reputation system gives way to noticeable strategic responses from both buyers and sellers."
The case of eBay is a good starting point for our inquiry into the role of reputation in public governance. True, the outcome that we observe—a viable and thriving market— does not apply to public governance but to the private domain. It also turns out that there are more examples available of private governance where reputation plays an important role. One of the main theses of this book is that this divergence occurs precisely because the role of reputational considerations in public governance today is not as important as it could, and should, be. However, the eBay example does hint at two issues that we will encounter over and over again in our reasoning on public governance. First, reputational considerations may induce people to act in useful ways even without the presence of a formal institution threatening to punish them should they misbehave. What induces most users of eBay to be honest is not the fear of the police knocking at their door, should they cheat. For many, and possibly for most, an interiorized sense of honesty may certainly play a role in this respect. However, the presence of eBay's widely visible feedbacks, and their consequent reputational effects, has a much more compelling role in guaranteeing the viability of eBay as a marketplace.
Secondly, the success of eBay hinges upon the presence of a communication technology: Internet and the Web. In general, all solutions to governance problems need appropriate technologies in order to function. For example, the Roman Empire would not have existed as we know it without its network of roads and an efficient postal system, allowing the transmission of information and orders from the capital to the legions stationed in the provinces. Today's aviation technology, which permits, for example, government representatives to meet frequently, is an integral part of the system of international relations. In the case of eBay in par tic u lar, the Internet is used to transmit information on the reputation of traders. Also, the eBay case illustrates that this reputational information typically has to be appropriately organized: though individual comments that people post on concluded transactions are accessible to all, it is the aggregation of information provided by a reputation index that is most useful.
We should exercise care when considering the role of technology within a governance model. If the Internet, or something similar to it, were not available, eBay could not exist. However, while being able to record information and to communicate is indispensable for reputation to play a role, obviously reputation information can also spread using different and much less sophisticated technologies. The following description of a well-studied historical episode serves as a convincing example of the relevance of informal reputation considerations in very different technological contexts.
In the early Middle Ages, a group of Jewish traders, originally based in Egypt, formed a coalition to better pursue their business (see Greif 1989 and 1993, on which this account is based). We know quite a lot about the dealings of the Maghribi traders, as they are known, because they are documented in an archive found in Fustat (Old Cairo, in Egypt), which contained letters and accounts of various types. The merchants lived scattered in several trade centers in the Muslim area of the western Mediterranean, and they helped one another in their work. Each trader could act either as a merchant or as a merchant's agent, in this case supplying the merchant with the ser vices needed to operate long-distance trade, such as loading and unloading the ship, paying customs and transportation fees, and so forth. Depending on the occasion, one member of the coalition acted as a merchant or as an agent. For a merchant, operating through agents had some important advantages over taking his own goods to market, because it kept costs down and reduced the overall risk, as many parallel undertakings could go on in different markets.
Where long-distance trade was administered through agents, however, there was ample opportunity for cheating, and the anticipation of widespread dishonesty would have been enough to discourage any trade. Just as eBay would be unviable as a market if potential participants did not trust each other enough, so it would have been for the activities of the Maghribi traders. As Avner Greif (1993) wrote, "To gain from cooperation, there was a need for an institution capable of surmounting this commitment problem, an institution through which an agent could commit himself ex-ante, before receiving the merchant's capital, to be honest ex post."
The legal system of the time was not capable of offering effective protection to merchants, and there was no formal institution that was capable of forcing agents to respect pacts. The solution the Maghribi traders came up with was to inflict a collective punishment in the form of a boycott on agents who cheated. Agents were also allowed to cheat those merchants who had been dishonest, without themselves being subject to collective punishment, thus reinforcing the threat to cheaters. The existence of this "reputational equilibrium," supported by historical documents, allowed the Maghribi traders to prosper.
The example of the Maghribi traders, to which we will return in the next chapter, illustrates that successful reputational mechanisms may use very different communication technologies. In fact, it has been suggested that the Internet "digitalizes word-of-mouth" (Dellarocas 2003), thus enhancing the possibilities of passing information (which traditionally was communicated informally) to others on the behavior of people or organizations. In the past, before choosing a restaurant or a hotel, we asked friends in the know for a tip, but now we access specialized Web sites providing ratings by former customers, such as www.zagat.com for restaurants or any of the many online hotel booking services available. In all cases, the presence of a communication channel, transmitting information about past performances, stimulates the provision of a good service.
However, if we simply relegate the Internet to the category of instruments that allow us to digitize activities that humans have always carried out—for example, exchanging information on the performance of people and institutions—we run the risk of missing the novelty that it represents in this and many other respects. Today, it is not only the availability of Internet technologies that permits the working of information systems, but also the fact that they treat digitized reputational information in a coherent manner, compute useful measures of reputation, and disseminate the relevant information to all concerned parties, all at negligible cost. Also, one distinctive trait of these systems is that they allow the gathering and processing of reputation information to be specifically designed, unlike the spontaneous informal arrangements of the past. Today, reputational systems may be engineered far more than before, because their working is mapped into the architectural characteristic of a technological artifact, an Internet-based information system. The emerging possibility of crafting reputational systems to serve particular governance goals is an important theme of this book to which we will dedicate much thought.
The example of the Maghribi traders is evidence of the fact that reputational considerations have always played an important role in governance and, more generally, in human affairs. We can distinguish between two main beneficial effects of reputation: one that we may call "static" and the other "dynamic." Let us start with the static effect. A good reputation, for the owner, is the result of past behavior and is analogous to a capital good, which can be kept and increased by respecting one's obligations, but also easily wasted when shortsightedness prevails. Rational individuals are constantly worried about their reputations, and such worries are reflected in the working of the governance institutions to which they contribute. We think twice before deciding to squander, in a moment of madness, a string of past investments in socially acceptable behavior. The ancient Romans understood this well when they crafted the adage semel in anno licet insanire, or "it is acceptable to be crazy once a year," which does grant the right to insanity, but only within well-specified limits on the number of transgressions allowed. In this respect, self-control, which in part is certainly motivated by reputational considerations, translates into predictability of human behavior, which in itself is an important prerequisite for most social intercourse.
Implicit in the private calculations people make on what course of action to take is a weighing up of the short-term gain that they could obtain from dishonest and predatory behavior, with the long-term damage that would follow from losing the trust of their acquaintances. The more important reputational considerations are, the more likely it is that the balance will tilt in favor of virtuous behavior. When this happens, the individual actors of governance are better off, and often society as a whole also benefits. We can define this as a static effect of reputation, in the sense that it applies to a given situation, that is, to the relevant actors as they are at a given time.
Reputational incentives, however, also have a dynamic effect, in that over time they tend to cause an improvement in the characteristics of the relevant actors. They do so in two distinct ways.
By rewarding good performances, they encourage actors to invest resources in improving their skills. If professionals know they will move up the career ladder if they do well in the job, they may decide to spend evenings taking classes to learn new skills. On the other hand, if they know that all they need are good connections, then they are quite likely to spend their evenings in networking activities. One effect of the presence of reputational incentives is to curb unproductive, rent-seeking activities, as economists call them.
Another, more radical way in which reputational incentives have a dynamic effect on improving the quality of the actors of governance is by supporting a process of selection. Being able to observe past performances helps us to discriminate between high- and low-quality suppliers. For example, given a choice of movies with similar plots, we would probably choose one directed by Martin Scorsese rather than one directed by some unknown director. Similarly, we would rather buy a car manufactured by Audi than one produced by a less reputable firm, even though the appearance and price tags were similar. Such reputational effects set in motion selection forces that weed out the least fit from the competition. Film directors who are unable to secure an audience for their creations have to find new jobs, and uncompetitive firms lose importance and, eventually, go out of business.
One consequence of these static and dynamic effects is that they also lead to more predictable human interactions—if I can read the strategic considerations that inform the choices of others, I can predict them better. An alternative route to achieving better predictability of behavior is through contractualization, with courts intervening when necessary to force people to respect their obligations. Indeed, large parts of our lives are influenced by contracts of various types, as the high—and possibly increasing—litigiousness of our societies demonstrates. However, courtrooms and hefty lawyers' fees provide only a partial solution to the problem. Most relationships are not easily contractualized because they are fraught with unforeseeable contingencies and are simply too complex to be fully described in writing. Also, the transaction costs involved in a contract may be too high, and, last but not least, the courts may be unavailable, as we saw in the case of the Maghribi traders, or in effective. The desire to maintain and improve one's reputation, and to build or safeguard trusting relationships with others, in many instances constitutes an alternative to the contractualization of behavior, and in many others supplements the capacity of contracts and formal institutions to guarantee the necessary smoothness of human interactions.
An important theme of this book is that there is a complex relation between reputational incentives, their nature, and some key characteristics of governance. To clarify this point, we look at the example of open-source software production. In this production method, highly relevant reputational considerations go hand in hand with a mode of governance that is rather horizontal and nonhierarchic.
Open-source software is very different from proprietary software where the code cannot be modified, or even accessed. Often, it also reflects a specific mode of production, characterized by the presence of very little (apparent) structure, and of horizontal and nonhierarchical relationships among participants, within which collaborative effort and experimentation play an important role. The tight relationship between production and experimentation is shown by one of the slogans of the open-source community: "Deliver early, deliver often." There is no clear distinction between the planning and the production of a product and, in general, open-source software developers do not pay much attention to the codified tenets of the software-engineering discipline, which establish how software projects should be conducted and determine, among other things, that the requirements of the software to be developed should be analyzed formally and at length (Crowston et al. 2005). Open-source software development, on the other hand, often sets out to solve a problem faced by the developers themselves, and does not include a proper analysis of requirements.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from REPUTATION-BASED GOVERNANCE by Lucio Picci Copyright © 2011 by Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. Excerpted by permission of Stanford University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
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Table of Contents
Contents
Preface....................ix1 Introduction....................1
2 Reputation and Trust....................20
3 Reputation and Good Public Governance....................45
4 Entities, Roles, and Functions of Reputation-Based Governance....................57
5 Computing Measures of Reputation....................77
6 The Production of Statistical Information and the Analysis of Policies....................92
7 Managing Policies: Accountability, Rent-Seeking, and Corruption....................110
8 Applications of Reputation-Based Governance....................123
9 Interdependence Between the Choice and Execution of Policies....................144
10 Reputation-Based Democratic Participation....................160
11 Final Considerations....................176
Notes....................183
Bibliography....................199
Index....................213