Regulatory Politics and Electric Utilities: A Case Study in Political Economy
Traditional theories hold that regulatory agencies act mainly as champions of the interest they are meant to oversee. Anderson looks at regulation within the fast-changing environment. By adding the external political and internal bureaucratic variables he evaluates the capture theory.
1102642650
Regulatory Politics and Electric Utilities: A Case Study in Political Economy
Traditional theories hold that regulatory agencies act mainly as champions of the interest they are meant to oversee. Anderson looks at regulation within the fast-changing environment. By adding the external political and internal bureaucratic variables he evaluates the capture theory.
95.0
In Stock
5
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Regulatory Politics and Electric Utilities: A Case Study in Political Economy
208![Regulatory Politics and Electric Utilities: A Case Study in Political Economy](http://img.images-bn.com/static/redesign/srcs/images/grey-box.png?v11.11.4)
Regulatory Politics and Electric Utilities: A Case Study in Political Economy
208Hardcover
$95.00
95.0
In Stock
Product Details
ISBN-13: | 9780865690585 |
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Publisher: | Bloomsbury Academic |
Publication date: | 03/30/1981 |
Pages: | 208 |
Product dimensions: | 6.14(w) x 9.21(h) x 0.50(d) |
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