Rationing the Constitution: How Judicial Capacity Shapes Supreme Court Decision-Making
In this groundbreaking analysis of Supreme Court decision-making, Andrew Coan explains how judicial caseload shapes the course of American constitutional law and the role of the Court in American society.

Compared with the vast machinery surrounding Congress and the president, the Supreme Court is a tiny institution that can resolve only a small fraction of the constitutional issues that arise in any given year. Rationing the Constitution shows that this simple yet frequently ignored fact is essential to understanding how the Supreme Court makes constitutional law.

Due to the structural organization of the judiciary and certain widely shared professional norms, the capacity of the Supreme Court to review lower-court decisions is severely limited. From this fact, Andrew Coan develops a novel and arresting theory of Supreme Court decision-making. In deciding cases, the Court must not invite more litigation than it can handle. On many of the most important constitutional questions—touching on federalism, the separation of powers, and individual rights—this constraint creates a strong pressure to adopt hard-edged categorical rules, or defer to the political process, or both.

The implications for U.S. constitutional law are profound. Lawyers, academics, and social activists pursuing social reform through the courts must consider whether their goals can be accomplished within the constraints of judicial capacity. Often the answer will be no. The limits of judicial capacity also substantially constrain the Court’s much touted—and frequently lamented—power to overrule democratic majorities. As Rationing the Constitution demonstrates, the Supreme Court is David, not Goliath.

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Rationing the Constitution: How Judicial Capacity Shapes Supreme Court Decision-Making
In this groundbreaking analysis of Supreme Court decision-making, Andrew Coan explains how judicial caseload shapes the course of American constitutional law and the role of the Court in American society.

Compared with the vast machinery surrounding Congress and the president, the Supreme Court is a tiny institution that can resolve only a small fraction of the constitutional issues that arise in any given year. Rationing the Constitution shows that this simple yet frequently ignored fact is essential to understanding how the Supreme Court makes constitutional law.

Due to the structural organization of the judiciary and certain widely shared professional norms, the capacity of the Supreme Court to review lower-court decisions is severely limited. From this fact, Andrew Coan develops a novel and arresting theory of Supreme Court decision-making. In deciding cases, the Court must not invite more litigation than it can handle. On many of the most important constitutional questions—touching on federalism, the separation of powers, and individual rights—this constraint creates a strong pressure to adopt hard-edged categorical rules, or defer to the political process, or both.

The implications for U.S. constitutional law are profound. Lawyers, academics, and social activists pursuing social reform through the courts must consider whether their goals can be accomplished within the constraints of judicial capacity. Often the answer will be no. The limits of judicial capacity also substantially constrain the Court’s much touted—and frequently lamented—power to overrule democratic majorities. As Rationing the Constitution demonstrates, the Supreme Court is David, not Goliath.

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Rationing the Constitution: How Judicial Capacity Shapes Supreme Court Decision-Making

Rationing the Constitution: How Judicial Capacity Shapes Supreme Court Decision-Making

by Andrew Coan
Rationing the Constitution: How Judicial Capacity Shapes Supreme Court Decision-Making

Rationing the Constitution: How Judicial Capacity Shapes Supreme Court Decision-Making

by Andrew Coan

Hardcover(New Edition)

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Overview

In this groundbreaking analysis of Supreme Court decision-making, Andrew Coan explains how judicial caseload shapes the course of American constitutional law and the role of the Court in American society.

Compared with the vast machinery surrounding Congress and the president, the Supreme Court is a tiny institution that can resolve only a small fraction of the constitutional issues that arise in any given year. Rationing the Constitution shows that this simple yet frequently ignored fact is essential to understanding how the Supreme Court makes constitutional law.

Due to the structural organization of the judiciary and certain widely shared professional norms, the capacity of the Supreme Court to review lower-court decisions is severely limited. From this fact, Andrew Coan develops a novel and arresting theory of Supreme Court decision-making. In deciding cases, the Court must not invite more litigation than it can handle. On many of the most important constitutional questions—touching on federalism, the separation of powers, and individual rights—this constraint creates a strong pressure to adopt hard-edged categorical rules, or defer to the political process, or both.

The implications for U.S. constitutional law are profound. Lawyers, academics, and social activists pursuing social reform through the courts must consider whether their goals can be accomplished within the constraints of judicial capacity. Often the answer will be no. The limits of judicial capacity also substantially constrain the Court’s much touted—and frequently lamented—power to overrule democratic majorities. As Rationing the Constitution demonstrates, the Supreme Court is David, not Goliath.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780674986954
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Publication date: 04/29/2019
Edition description: New Edition
Pages: 280
Product dimensions: 6.12(w) x 9.25(h) x 1.00(d)

About the Author

Andrew Coan is Associate Director of the William H. Rehnquist Center on Constitutional Structures of Government and Professor of Law at the University of Arizona. He served as a law clerk to Judge Richard A. Posner on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

Table of Contents

Introduction 1

I Understanding Judicial Capacity 11

1 Structural and Normative Underpinnings 13

2 The judicial Capacity Model 19

3 Refining the Model 32

4 Testing the Model 38

II The Judicial Capacity Model Applied 51

Federalism 55

5 The Commerce Power 57

6 The Spending Power 76

Separation of Powers 89

7 The Nondelegation Doctrine 91

8 Presidential Administration 100

Individual Rights 113

9 Equal Protection 116

10 Takings 137

III Positive and Normative Implications 163

11 Judicial Capacity and the Constitutional Choice Set 165

12 Judicial Capacity and judicial Competence 179

13 Judicial Capacity and Judicial Independence 190

Conclusion 208

Appendix: Methods 211

Notes 215

Acknowledgments 257

Index 261

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