Table of Contents
About the Author v
Annotation vii
Introduction ix
1 Electromagnetic pulse-a parcel from the past 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 History of HEMP 1
1.3 The issues of theoretical physics 9
1.4 People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) as the primary "designer" of the first Soviet nuclear explosive 12
1.5 Thermonuclear bombs 29
1.6 Nuclear test explosions 36
1.7 Th e status of HEMP protection 53
Bibliography 59
2 A contemporary view of HEMP for electrical engineers 60
2.1 Is the contemporary view up to date? 60
2.2 The basic physical processes 60
Bibliography 77
3 HEMP simulators 79
3.1 HEMP simulators: principle of operation 79
3.2 Classification of HEMP simulators 81
3.3 Foreign HEMP simulators 82
3.4 HEMP simulators available in Russia and Ukraine 88
3.5 Portable HEMP simulators 93
4 The vulnerability of electronic equipment to HEMP 95
4.1 Electronic equipment is the most important component of the modern infrastructure 95
4.2 The vulnerability of discrete electronic components to HEMP 96
4.3 Vulnerability of integral circuits (microchips) to HEMP 99
4.4 Vulnerability of microprocessors to HEMP 104
4.5 Vulnerability of computers to HEMP 107
4.6 Conclusions 108
Bibliography 109
5 Electronic components for HEMP protection system 110
5.1 Testing of low-power protective components under the low pulse voltages 110
5.2 Testing of low-power protective components under the high pulse voltages 114
5.3 Testing of powerful protective components under conditions close to reality 118
5.4 Conclusions 125
Bibliography 126
6 External protection of power systems' electronic equipment from HEMP 128
6.1 Introduction 128
6.2 Analysis of capability of conventional building materials to weaken electromagnetic emission 128
6.3 Composite construction materials with improved electrical conductivity 132
6.4 Materials absorbing electromagnetic emission 138
6.5 Another method for depression of HEMP electromagnetic field strength inside the power industry facilities containing the electronics 142
6.6 Reducing electronic equipment vulnerability to HEMP with architectural solutions 145
6.7 Conclusions 146
Bibliography 146
7 The issues of electronic equipment grounding at the power facilities 149
7.1 Types of electromagnetic interference at power facilities 149
7.2 Challenges of the conventional grounding systems 150
7.3 Differences between lightning and HEMP 154
7.4 Grounding of electrical equipment as the main protective means for HEMP 160
7.5 Protection devices for HEMP 161
7.6 New method for grounding electronic equipment mounted inside the cabinets 162
Bibliography 169
8 The issue of control cables selection for HEMP-protected electric facilities 171
8.1 Introduction 171
8.2 Designs and features of shielded control cables 171
8.3 Evaluation of control-cable shielding effectiveness 175
8.4 Choosing control cables 177
8.5 Conclusion 178
Bibliography 178
9 Grounding of control-cable shields 179
9.1 Introduction 179
9.2 Shielding principles 179
9.3 Interference types and grounding options for cable shields 180
9.4 Problems and contradictions 181
9.5 Factors impacting the effectiveness of shield groundings 182
9.6 The suggested method of shield grounding 185
Bibliography 187
10 HEMP filters 189
10.1 Introduction 189
10.2 Do the filters really protect from an electromagnetic pulse? 189
10.3 The frequency range of filters 193
10.4 Feasibility of HEMP equipment protection with filters 193
10.5 Protection of equipment from HEMP high-frequency noise 195
10.6 Protection of the equipment from the HEMP-generated pulse overvoltage 196
10.7 Ferrite filters 197
10.8 Conclusions 210
Bibliography 211
11 High-voltage insulation interfaces 212
11.1 Introduction 212
11.2 High-voltage link for transmitting discrete commands in relay protection, automation and control systems 212
11.3 Usage reed-switch-based high-voltage interfaces in HEMP susceptibility tests 218
11.4 Design features of high-voltage isolation interfaces 219
Bibliography 221
12 Improvement of the resilience of industrial cabinet-installed electronic equipment to HEMP Impact 222
12.1 Introduction 222
12.2 New cabinets for electronic equipment 222
12.3 Retrofitting existing cabinets equipped with glass doors 225
12.4 Enhancement of the cabinet cable entries 228
12.5 Voltage pulse suppression 233
12.6 Retrofitting grounding systems of electric cabinets 236
12.7 Conclusion 237
Bibliography 237
13 Basic principles of direct-current auxiliary-power system (DCAPS) protection 238
13.1 Introduction 238
13.2 Protection of DCAPS operating equipment from HEMP 238
13.3 Backup-power supplies for DCAPS systems 240
13.4 Mobile substations and features to protect their DCAPS from HEMP 245
13.5 Direct-current auxiliary-power systems of power plants 251
Bibliography 252
14 Protection of telecommunication systems in electric power facilities from HEMP 253
14.1 Introduction 253
14.2 Ways to solve the problem 254
14.3 The use of fiber-optic communication lines 254
14.4 Protection telecommunication equipment with galvanic couplings 255
14.5 New devices for protecting existing telecommunication equipment 260
14.6 Protection of the communication cabinets 263
14.7 The general concept for communication-equipment protection 265
14.8 Retrofitting grounding systems of cabinets containing the electronic equipment 266
14.9 Retrofitting open-patch panels 267
14.10 Protection of the power supply system 267
14.11 Retrofitting the facility (room) containing the critical kinds of communication equipment 267
14.12 Conclusion 268
Bibliography 268
15 Improvement of HEMP resilience of automatic fire-suppression systems 269
15.1 Introduction 269
15.2 Firefighting systems for power facilities 269
15.3 Improvement of automatic firefighting system's resilience to HEMP 273
15.4 Conclusion 278
Bibliography 278
16 Protection of diesel generators from HEMP 279
16.1 Introduction 279
16.2 Increasing resilience of medium- and high-capacity DGs 279
16.3 Protection of DGs stored and de-energized outdoors 280
16.4 Protection of DGs connected to consumer network 284
16.5 Active protection method for diesel-generator controller 288
16.6 Conclusion 295
Bibliography 295
17 Features of HEMP resilience-test methods for power system electronics 296
17.1 Introduction 296
17.2 Features of testing equipment on a HEMP simulator 296
17.3 Test objectives 297
17.4 Features of the test procedure 298
17.5 Test modes and test-pulse parameters 300
17.6 Performance criteria 302
17.7 Conclusion 303
Bibliography 304
18 Methods and means of evaluation of the effectiveness of HEMP protection of the Installed power-system 305
18.1 Introduction 305
18.2 Testing of equipment resilience to direct impact of the HEMP electrical field (El-component) 305
18.3 Equipment for HEMP filter testing 307
18.4 Equipment designed for evaluation of the effectiveness of building, room and cabinet shielding 311
18.5 Pulse voltage generators 313
18.6 Conclusion 315
Bibliography 315
19 Features of testing digital protective relays resilience to HEMP 317
19.1 Use of performance criterion during the electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) test of electronic equipment 317
19.2 Features of using performance criterion during the HEMP resilience test of digital protective relays (DPR) 317
19.3 Criticism of the DPR testing method used 318
19.4 Analysis of the result of the second independent trial of the same type of DPR 320
19.5 Analysis of the result of the third independent trial of the same type of DPR 323
19.6 Conclusions 331
Bibliography 332
20 Establishment of inventory of electronic equipment's replacement modules as a way to improve survivability of the power system 334
20.1 Optimization of inventory of electronic equipment replacement modules 334
20.2 The problem of the traditional mode of SPTA storage 335
20.3 Requirements for protective containers 336
20.4 Protective containers available on the market 337
20.5 Conclusion 340
Bibliography 341
21 The problem of impact of geomagnetically induced currents on power transformers and it solution 342
21.1 Geomagnetically induced currents generated by solar storms 342
21.2 Geomagnetically induced currents generated by HEMP 352
21.3 The effect of the E3 component of HEMP on electric power equipment 353
21.4 Protection of power equipment from geomagnetically induced currents 354
21.5 Conclusions 362
Bibliography 363
A Standards on HEMP 365
A.l Standards of International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 365
A.2 Standards of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 366
A.3 Standards of European Commission 366
A.4 Standards of International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 366
A.5 Military Standards (USA) 366
A.6 NATO Standards 367
B EMP and its impact on Power System (List of Reports) 369
B.l EMP Theory 369
B.2 Geomagnetically Induced Currents and its Impact on Power System 369
B.3 EMP Impact on Power System 370
C European Projects related to Protection against HEMP 375
Index 377
