Pragmatism ( A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking )
Preface
The lectures that follow were delivered at the Lowell Institute in
Boston in November and December, 1906, and in January, 1907, at
Columbia University, in New York. They are printed as delivered,
without developments or notes. The pragmatic movement, so-called--I
do not like the name, but apparently it is too late to change it--
seems to have rather suddenly precipitated itself out of the air. A
number of tendencies that have always existed in philosophy have all
at once become conscious of themselves collectively, and of their
combined mission; and this has occurred in so many countries, and
from so many different points of view, that much unconcerted
statement has resulted. I have sought to unify the picture as it
presents itself to my own eyes, dealing in broad strokes, and
avoiding minute controversy. Much futile controversy might have been
avoided, I believe, if our critics had been willing to wait until we
got our message fairly out.
If my lectures interest any reader in the general subject, he will
doubtless wish to read farther. I therefore give him a few
references.
In America, John Dewey's 'Studies in Logical Theory' are the
foundation. Read also by Dewey the articles in the Philosophical
Review, vol. xv, pp. 113 and 465, in Mind, vol. xv, p. 293, and in
the Journal of Philosophy, vol. iv, p. 197.
Probably the best statements to begin with however, are F. C. S.
Schiller's in his 'Studies in Humanism,' especially the essays
numbered i, v, vi, vii, xviii and xix. His previous essays and in
general the polemic literature of the subject are fully referred to
in his footnotes.
Furthermore, see G. Milhaud: le Rationnel, 1898, and the fine
articles by Le Roy in the Revue de Metaphysique, vols. 7, 8 and 9.
Also articles by Blondel and de Sailly in the Annales de Philosophie
Chretienne, 4me Serie, vols. 2 and 3. Papini announces a book on
Pragmatism, in the French language, to be published very soon.
To avoid one misunderstanding at least, let me say that there is no
logical connection between pragmatism, as I understand it, and a
doctrine which I have recently set forth as 'radical empiricism.'
The latter stands on its own feet. One may entirely reject it and
still be a pragmatist.
Harvard University, April, 1907.
1114755789
The lectures that follow were delivered at the Lowell Institute in
Boston in November and December, 1906, and in January, 1907, at
Columbia University, in New York. They are printed as delivered,
without developments or notes. The pragmatic movement, so-called--I
do not like the name, but apparently it is too late to change it--
seems to have rather suddenly precipitated itself out of the air. A
number of tendencies that have always existed in philosophy have all
at once become conscious of themselves collectively, and of their
combined mission; and this has occurred in so many countries, and
from so many different points of view, that much unconcerted
statement has resulted. I have sought to unify the picture as it
presents itself to my own eyes, dealing in broad strokes, and
avoiding minute controversy. Much futile controversy might have been
avoided, I believe, if our critics had been willing to wait until we
got our message fairly out.
If my lectures interest any reader in the general subject, he will
doubtless wish to read farther. I therefore give him a few
references.
In America, John Dewey's 'Studies in Logical Theory' are the
foundation. Read also by Dewey the articles in the Philosophical
Review, vol. xv, pp. 113 and 465, in Mind, vol. xv, p. 293, and in
the Journal of Philosophy, vol. iv, p. 197.
Probably the best statements to begin with however, are F. C. S.
Schiller's in his 'Studies in Humanism,' especially the essays
numbered i, v, vi, vii, xviii and xix. His previous essays and in
general the polemic literature of the subject are fully referred to
in his footnotes.
Furthermore, see G. Milhaud: le Rationnel, 1898, and the fine
articles by Le Roy in the Revue de Metaphysique, vols. 7, 8 and 9.
Also articles by Blondel and de Sailly in the Annales de Philosophie
Chretienne, 4me Serie, vols. 2 and 3. Papini announces a book on
Pragmatism, in the French language, to be published very soon.
To avoid one misunderstanding at least, let me say that there is no
logical connection between pragmatism, as I understand it, and a
doctrine which I have recently set forth as 'radical empiricism.'
The latter stands on its own feet. One may entirely reject it and
still be a pragmatist.
Harvard University, April, 1907.
Pragmatism ( A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking )
Preface
The lectures that follow were delivered at the Lowell Institute in
Boston in November and December, 1906, and in January, 1907, at
Columbia University, in New York. They are printed as delivered,
without developments or notes. The pragmatic movement, so-called--I
do not like the name, but apparently it is too late to change it--
seems to have rather suddenly precipitated itself out of the air. A
number of tendencies that have always existed in philosophy have all
at once become conscious of themselves collectively, and of their
combined mission; and this has occurred in so many countries, and
from so many different points of view, that much unconcerted
statement has resulted. I have sought to unify the picture as it
presents itself to my own eyes, dealing in broad strokes, and
avoiding minute controversy. Much futile controversy might have been
avoided, I believe, if our critics had been willing to wait until we
got our message fairly out.
If my lectures interest any reader in the general subject, he will
doubtless wish to read farther. I therefore give him a few
references.
In America, John Dewey's 'Studies in Logical Theory' are the
foundation. Read also by Dewey the articles in the Philosophical
Review, vol. xv, pp. 113 and 465, in Mind, vol. xv, p. 293, and in
the Journal of Philosophy, vol. iv, p. 197.
Probably the best statements to begin with however, are F. C. S.
Schiller's in his 'Studies in Humanism,' especially the essays
numbered i, v, vi, vii, xviii and xix. His previous essays and in
general the polemic literature of the subject are fully referred to
in his footnotes.
Furthermore, see G. Milhaud: le Rationnel, 1898, and the fine
articles by Le Roy in the Revue de Metaphysique, vols. 7, 8 and 9.
Also articles by Blondel and de Sailly in the Annales de Philosophie
Chretienne, 4me Serie, vols. 2 and 3. Papini announces a book on
Pragmatism, in the French language, to be published very soon.
To avoid one misunderstanding at least, let me say that there is no
logical connection between pragmatism, as I understand it, and a
doctrine which I have recently set forth as 'radical empiricism.'
The latter stands on its own feet. One may entirely reject it and
still be a pragmatist.
Harvard University, April, 1907.
The lectures that follow were delivered at the Lowell Institute in
Boston in November and December, 1906, and in January, 1907, at
Columbia University, in New York. They are printed as delivered,
without developments or notes. The pragmatic movement, so-called--I
do not like the name, but apparently it is too late to change it--
seems to have rather suddenly precipitated itself out of the air. A
number of tendencies that have always existed in philosophy have all
at once become conscious of themselves collectively, and of their
combined mission; and this has occurred in so many countries, and
from so many different points of view, that much unconcerted
statement has resulted. I have sought to unify the picture as it
presents itself to my own eyes, dealing in broad strokes, and
avoiding minute controversy. Much futile controversy might have been
avoided, I believe, if our critics had been willing to wait until we
got our message fairly out.
If my lectures interest any reader in the general subject, he will
doubtless wish to read farther. I therefore give him a few
references.
In America, John Dewey's 'Studies in Logical Theory' are the
foundation. Read also by Dewey the articles in the Philosophical
Review, vol. xv, pp. 113 and 465, in Mind, vol. xv, p. 293, and in
the Journal of Philosophy, vol. iv, p. 197.
Probably the best statements to begin with however, are F. C. S.
Schiller's in his 'Studies in Humanism,' especially the essays
numbered i, v, vi, vii, xviii and xix. His previous essays and in
general the polemic literature of the subject are fully referred to
in his footnotes.
Furthermore, see G. Milhaud: le Rationnel, 1898, and the fine
articles by Le Roy in the Revue de Metaphysique, vols. 7, 8 and 9.
Also articles by Blondel and de Sailly in the Annales de Philosophie
Chretienne, 4me Serie, vols. 2 and 3. Papini announces a book on
Pragmatism, in the French language, to be published very soon.
To avoid one misunderstanding at least, let me say that there is no
logical connection between pragmatism, as I understand it, and a
doctrine which I have recently set forth as 'radical empiricism.'
The latter stands on its own feet. One may entirely reject it and
still be a pragmatist.
Harvard University, April, 1907.
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| BN ID: | 2940016378343 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | WDS Publishing |
| Publication date: | 03/03/2013 |
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