Political Character of Adolescence: The Influence of Families and Schools

by M. Kent Jennings, Richard G. Niemi

Overview

This book shows how specific agents shape the political character of adolescents, how response to these agents varies according to sex, race, and other factors, and how political learning changes through the life-cycle and across generations.

Originally published in 1974.

The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780691617589
Publisher:	Princeton University Press
Publication date:	03/08/2015
Series:	Princeton Legacy Library , #1788
Pages:	372
Product dimensions:	6.10(w) x 9.10(h) x 0.80(d)

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The Political Character of Adolescence

The Influence of Families and Schools

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By M. Kent Jennings, Richard G. Niemi

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 1974 Princeton University Press
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-09362-8

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CHAPTER 1

Political Learning, Individual Behavior, and the Political System

The summer of 1971 witnessed a signal event in American political history. With the ratification of the twenty-sixth amendment, full-scale national suffrage became a reality for eighteen-year-olds. Just what the electoral consequences of that enfranchisement would be no one could be sure. Nor was there certainty about the form and magnitude of other political, legal, and social ramifications which would probably follow in the wake of the extension. If nothing else, however, the action had great symbolic importance for it indicated to both young and old that the age of political maturity had dropped and that the eighteen- to twenty-year-olds were now a legitimate part of the electoral process.

The events and discussions leading up to the constitutional change also brought into sharp focus questions of immense importance to the polity. What kind of preparation have young people had for political participation? Of what shape and intensity are their political values? What sorts of skills and pieces of information do they bring with them? Where and how do they acquire these values and skills? Do the youngsters embody a continuation of the previous generation's values and skills or are there vivid discontinuities? And what is the place of that mammoth training ground of American society — the educational system — in shaping these newly enfranchised voters?

Most such questions are, of course, not new to this period or to this society. Political philosophers and political rulers have been aware of them for centuries. But it is only within the last decade that much systematic thought and research have gone into this topic. To date this attention has led to numerous research proposals, an even greater number of suggested studies, varieties of hypotheses, an expanding bibliography, not a few arguments, and even several reliable findings. Our aim here is to contribute minimally to most of the listed categories, but at least to double or triple the last-named category. To do so we have gathered systematic information from not only a target population of high school seniors, but from parents, teachers, peers, and others. The resulting analysis is long, but we hope rewarding.

Any study of this magnitude must begin by indicating why such an investigation should be undertaken in the first place as well as some of the perspectives which guided the authors in the design, data collection, and analysis stages. This we do in the rest of this chapter. The first two sections hinge on the question of why the political socialization process is important. Despite the widespread concern outlined above, the case for studying socialization at all is not open and shut. Moreover, precisely why political socialization is important is a matter of debate.

The second two sections convey some of our thoughts on how socialization should be studied, especially with an eye toward theoretical perspectives. The final pair of sections gives an overview of the remainder of the book as well as outlining the nature of the data base.

Political Change and Stability

In cultures where change occurs slowly the presumptive case for the power of socialization is strong. Value constellations and behavioral patterns would seem to emanate in large part from what one generation learns from the other. Similarly, when particular modes of behavior and feeling within a culture change only with glacial speed, the presumptive case is strong. If institutions, role definitions, and the larger environment remain relatively stable, succeeding generations can be successfully socialized into an existing, unchanging mold. This process is said to characterize the cultures of times past and those which are today in a pre-industrial state. Even in the past, however, periods of drastic change occurred. If one thinks only of Western societies, such movements as the introduction of Christianity, the rise of the nation-state, the Protestant Reformation, and the Industrial Revolution had profound effects on the social and political order. Since discontinuities of social and political behavior were thereby introduced, the traditional socialization techniques and outcomes were altered.

Still change came infrequently, and in most other non-Western societies it was even more infrequent. One may imagine a step movement in which the introduction of social, economic, or political structural changes set in motion certain socialization changes. These resultant modes of socialization then rested on a plateau lasting perhaps for several generations or more until another dramatic structural change came about. Physical isolation and the insulation of a culture from foreign practices historically helped preserve traditional ways of doing things. Barring outside influences, changes had to be self-generative.

In an era when transportation and communication devices have broken down virtually all barriers, culture enclaves are more difficult to maintain. Interdependencies and diffusion now abound. Given the rapid rates of technological change, complex social structures, and intercultural penetration, how is the socialization process to prepare people for living out their political lives?

Part of the answer to this question is strictly definitional. One of the most commonly accepted definitions of political socialization is that it deals with the acquisition of prevailing norms and modes of behavior. In this sense the "socialized" person is the one who has successfully internalized the prevailing norms of behavioral modes. Child development literature used socialization in this sense for decades. But this conceptualization is excessively narrow, especially when dealing with sociopolitical learning. In the first place virtually all societies have subcultural norms and behaviors. To this extent socialization has always been setting-specific and group-specific. Thus even if one were to accept the limited case of acquiring prevailing norms and behaviors this would still not necessarily mean that culture-wide uniformity was being passed on from generation to generation.

Let us concede, however, that some norms and behaviors are relatively pervasive in a society at a given point in time. A second problem with the argument that socialization processes are not compatible with change is that, as Greenstein says, "... some people grow up learning to reject, or simply depart from, existing norms. More generally, a person's behavior may be continuous or discontinuous with previous patterns of behavior whether his own or those of an earlier generation." The question which socialization inquiries must ask is, why do these departures and innovations occur? It is reasonable to assume that different sets of socialization experiences play some part in this process. These differential patterns are most easily observed in marginal, avant garde, and laggardly elements in a society. If departures from and rejections of the status quo are more or less fixed for a period of time it seems fair to say that they have been "learned" in the same sense that the prevailing ones are. Within the past few years we have witnessed systematic studies pointing out differential socialization patterns and consequences within racial, regional, and student groups.

Another argument may be raised against the assertion that political socialization inquiries inform us very little about political change. Some societies are more achieving than others, and McClelland has argued that levels of economic achievement are influenced by the levels of achievement motivation extant in the society. These motivations are primarily products of socialization practices. Some societies socialize their upcoming generations to have higher achievement motivations than others; this social-psychological attribute helps produce cross-country differences in rates of growth, according to McClelland's argument.

Although there is no comparable work on so monumental a scale in politics, it is not difficult to imagine similar processes at work. More to the point here, however, is that a willingness to accept and adapt to political change can be one of the messages of political socialization. Alternatively, rigid adherence and devotion to political forms can be emphasized. One thinks of theocratic, highly ritualistic societies in particular as ones which discourage the idea of change. Type of change is also a part of socialization. As Easton and Dennis point out, dispositions toward either peaceful or nonpeaceful means of political change can be passed on from one generation to the next.

All of this is not to say, of course, that political change can be adequately or even primarily understood in terms of political socialization. Natural disasters, technological innovations, military conquest, and drastic alterations in the legal system are four of the most common sources of micro and macro level political changes. Even without socialization practices changing appreciably, these four sources can induce political change in relatively quick order. Thus the initial source of changes often lies outside changing socialization practices. It is important to note, however, that modifications in political socialization will probably follow in the wake of upheavals of this order.

A recent case in point is that of the People's Republic of China. Accompanying the victory of the Communists over the Nationalists came large-scale changes at both the micro and macro levels of society. These were accomplished largely by a change in regime and the goals of sanction agents. It is extremely significant, however, that intensive attempts to inculcate a new set of norms and behavioral roles also emerged. A more than temporary change in political regime seems almost inevitably to be followed by such efforts at resocialization of the old and new patterns of socialization for the young. While this stems in part from an effort to establish diffuse support for the regime, more specific beliefs and practices are also part of the content. Assuming the socialization efforts are successful, the perpetuation likelihood of the regime is enhanced.

We see, then, another connection between changes and socialization. Instead of thinking of socialization leading to change, we can visualize wide-scale institutional change leading to changing socialization practices which are, in turn, designed to equip individuals for survival in that polity. Institutional changes need not be as drastic as regime change in order to bring about changes in socialization practices. The introduction of mass education is a type of political change which leads to profound differences in socialization content and processes.

Compliance Systems and Families as Agents of Change

Some sources of political change, such as natural disasters and technological innovations, are unpremeditated and their probable consequences largely unpredictable. Others consist of instruments more directly manipulable, and they are consciously employed for their expected impact. While both types are important, the latter are particularly salient to social and policy scientists because they represent societal efforts to encourage and discourage certain forms of behavior. We may think of most such sources as being embedded in compliance systems existing beyond the level of primary groups.

Compliance systems loom especially large in talking about political change, so much so that it has been argued that they make reliance on socialization processes unnecessary. A handy example, which illustrates the idea, concerns the public behavior of blacks in American society. Once legal sanctions were available and applied to the right of blacks to use public accommodations, to vote, and to engage in a variety of other public activities, sizeable elements of blacks took advantage of the sanction system and sizeable elements of whites acquiesced. There were and continue to be tests of the sanction system, but the important point is that major behavioral changes were induced with little or no alteration in socialization.

More generally the place of institutionally organized maintenance and sanction systems may be viewed as the prime determinant of ebbs and flows in modern societies. The place of pre-adult socialization agents, especially the family, is correspondingly reduced. Instead the various arms of the state — especially the law and its agents — and such institutions as educational and religious agencies become the prime purveyors both of stability and innovation. This argument was made especially forceful in an unpublished paper by Reiss. He argues that these institutions hold the keys to transmitting and changing values and behaviors because of the positive and negative sanctions they wield. Thus the behavior of the same individual will vary depending upon the complex of sanctioning agents. The by-now classic example is that of twentieth century Germany. Within the space of a single lifetime the same individual could function successfully under the Weimar Republic, the Nazi regime, and post-war Christian Democracy.

Reiss's argument is, therefore, especially compelling in times of rapid change. If change were simply a function of incremental alterations generated within the family, the societal change would be slow indeed and individual behavior would remain relatively constant. Thus if the major institutions demand and reinforce certain types of behavior, then that is the behavior which will, sooner or later, be observed. Nor is this necessarily a function of a police state and physical fear. Rather, behaviors and values will gravitate in the direction of the larger institutional incentives. And since these institutions are geared to overall societal needs and functions, they will vary their demands and sanctions as the situation dictates. Thus a different set of behaviors will be called for in times of political mobilization, economic stringency, external threat, inner turmoil, and so forth.

We will consider momentarily the implications of this theory for the family as socialization agent par excellence. First, however, let us consider the main arguments. One immediate response to the institutional supremacy view is that differential cross-culture and within-culture responses may be noted. If we take the case of the changing face of Germany, as an example, it could be argued that there is also an underlying thread of common socialization which enabled the German populace to perform successfully under the different regimes with their divergent requirements. Summarizing an assessment of Germany in their five nation study, Almond and Verba comment: "In Germany, then, the balance of the political culture is weighted in the direction of the subject role and of passive forms of participation. The government is viewed largely as an agency of administration. And the attachment to the political system is closely related to the ability of the government to satisfy pragmatic needs." More recently the cross-cultural studies of pre-adults by Adelson and his colleagues, though limited in terms of their general significance, provide evidence of similar strains among contemporary German youth compared with Britishers and Americans. Without wishing to push the argument too far, one might nevertheless introduce the competing explanation of socialization to compliance and pragmatism as a common theme throughout the past several decades of German experience. Both the acquiescence of the masses and the leadership of the elites could in part be explained by the socialization emphasis on these two traits.

The introduction of the elite provides another caveat to the institutional supremacy argument. That is, why do leaders of institutions in some countries behave in one fashion in response to stimuli while leaders of institutions in other countries behave in different fashion to similar stimuli? One answer, of course, is that the stimuli are only similar and not the same. Granting that point, it still appears that the leaders of institutions in democratic nations tend to behave differently than those in autocratic countries. Since the leaders are not vulnerable to institutional demands and rewards in the same sense as the masses, that alone cannot account for behavioral differences across elites. It would not seem unreasonable that the socialization of leaders differs among countries, that the norms and expectations applied to leaders differ, and that the leaders are aware of these norms. Thus military coups are de rigueur in some polities and never occur in others.

(Continues...)

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Excerpted from The Political Character of Adolescence by M. Kent Jennings, Richard G. Niemi. Copyright © 1974 Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission of PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
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Table of Contents

• Frontmatter, pg. i
• Contents, pg. v
• List of Illustrations, pg. vii
• List of Tables, pg. ix
• Preface, pg. xiii
• 1. Political Learning, Individual Behavior, and the Political System, pg. 3
• 2. Attachments to the Political Parties, pg. 37
• 3. Opinions on Public Policy Issues, pg. 63
• 4. Political Knowledge and Conceptual Sophistication, pg. 93
• 5. Citizenship Roles within the System, pg. 119
• 6. The Impact of Parental Agreement, pg. 153
• 7. Effects of the High School Civics Curriculum, pg. 181
• 8. Social Studies Teachers and Their Pupils, pg. 207
• 9. The Political Texture of Peer Groups, pg. 229
• 10. Political Development over the Life Cycle, pg. 251
• 11. Re-Creation and Change of the Political Culture, pg. 285
• 12. Political Learning in Perspective, pg. 319
• Appendix: Study Design and Execution, pg. 337
• Index, pg. 349