Physicalism, or Something Near Enough

by Jaegwon Kim

Overview

Contemporary discussions in philosophy of mind have largely been shaped by physicalism, the doctrine that all phenomena are ultimately physical. Here, Jaegwon Kim presents the most comprehensive and systematic presentation yet of his influential ideas on the mind-body problem. He seeks to determine, after half a century of debate: What kind of (or "how much") physicalism can we lay claim to? He begins by laying out mental causation and consciousness as the two principal challenges to contemporary physicalism. How can minds exercise their causal powers in a physical world? Is a physicalist account of consciousness possible?


The book's starting point is the "supervenience" argument (sometimes called the "exclusion" argument), which Kim reformulates in an extended defense. This argument shows that the contemporary physicalist faces a stark choice between reductionism (the idea that mental phenomena are physically reducible) and epiphenomenalism (the view that mental phenomena are causally impotent). Along the way, Kim presents a novel argument showing that Cartesian substance dualism offers no help with mental causation.


Mind-body reduction, therefore, is required to save mental causation. But are minds physically reducible? Kim argues that all but one type of mental phenomena are reducible, including intentional mental phenomena, such as beliefs and desires. The apparent exceptions are the intrinsic, felt qualities of conscious experiences ("qualia"). Kim argues, however, that certain relational properties of qualia, in particular their similarities and differences, are behaviorally manifest and hence in principle reducible, and that it is these relational properties of qualia that are central to their cognitive roles. The causal efficacy of qualia, therefore, is not entirely lost.


According to Kim, then, while physicalism is not the whole truth, it is the truth near enough.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780691133850
Publisher:	Princeton University Press
Publication date:	12/23/2007
Series:	Princeton Monographs in Philosophy , #19
Pages:	200
Product dimensions:	5.50(w) x 8.50(h) x (d)

About the Author

Jaegwon Kim is William Herbert Perry Faunce Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. His previous books include Mind in a Physical World, Philosophy of Mind, and Supervenience and Mind.

Table of Contents

Preface xi

Synopsis of the Arguments 1

CHAPTER 1: Mental Causation and Consciousness: Our Two Mind-Body Problems 7

Mental Causation and Consciousness 8

The Supervenience/Exclusion Argument 13

Can We Reduce Qualia? 22

The Two World-Knots 29

CHAPTER 2: The Supervenience Argument Motivated, Clarified, and Defended 32

Nonreductive Physicalism 33

The Fundamental Idea 36

The Supervenience Argument Refined and Clarified 39

Is Overdetermination an Option? 46

The Generalization Argument 52

Block's Causal Drainage Argument 57

CHAPTER 3: The Rejection of Immaterial Minds: A Causal Argument 70

Cartesian Dualism and Mental Causation 72

Causation and the "Pairing" Problem 78

Causality and Space 85

Why Not Locate Souls in Space? 88

Concluding Remarks 91

CHAPTER 4: Reduction, Reductive Explanation, and Closing the "Gap" 93

Reduction and Reductive Explanation 95

Bridge-Law Reduction and Functional Reduction 98

Explanatory Ascent and Constraint (R) 103

Functional Reduction and Reductive Explanation 108

Kripkean Identities and Reductive Explanation 113

Remarks about Block and Stalnaker's Proposal 117

CHAPTER 5: Explanatory Arguments for Type Physicalism and Why They Don't Work 121

Are There Positive Arguments for Type Physicalism? 123

Hill's and McLaughlin's Explanatory Argument 126

Do Psychoneural Identities Explain Psychoneural Correlations? 131

Block and Stalnaker's Explanatory Argument 139

Another Way of Looking at the Two Explanatory Arguments 146

CHAPTER 6: Physicalism, or Something Near Enough 149

Taking Stock 150

Physicalism at a Crossroads 156

Reducing Minds 161

Living with the Mental Residue 170

Where We Are at Last with the Mind-Body Problem 173

References 175

Index 181

What People are Saying About This

Karen Bennett

This is a fine volume that clarifies, defends, and moves beyond the views that Kim presented in Mind in a Physical World. Chapter by chapter, it is philosophically interesting and engagingly written.
— Karen Bennett, Princeton University

From the Publisher

"This is a fine volume that clarifies, defends, and moves beyond the views that Kim presented in Mind in a Physical World. Chapter by chapter, it is philosophically interesting and engagingly written."—Karen Bennett, Princeton University

Editorial Reviews

"In this compact and readable book, Jaegwon Kim provides an overview of his considered position on the mind-body problem, updating and refining several familiar arguments as well as introducing newer material to round out his map of the terrain. The position 'near enough' to physicalism endorsed at the end holds that, with the exception of the intrinsic features of phenomenal states, mental properties are physically reducible via functional analysis."—-D. Gene Witmer, Mind

"This is an excellent book by one of the world's best philosophers working on the metaphysics of mind. Nobody who is interested in the mind-body problem . . . should miss the opportunity to study this book carefully."—-Jesper Kallestrup, Philosophical Quarterly

"Kim's Physicalism, or Something Near Enough presents philosophy at its best. The arguments contained in it are interesting and stimulating, and the discussion of opposed views is fair and highly productive. I enjoyed reading this book. It deserves to be read by anyone interested in the metaphysics of consciousness and mind."—-Yaron Senderowicz, Pragmatics & Cognition

"Physicalism: Or Something Near Enough is vintage Kim, and well worth reading for anyone interested in physicalism in the philosophy of mind."—-Thomas W. Smythe, Philosophical Psychology

From the Publisher

Physicalism: Or Something Near Enough is vintage Kim, and well worth reading for anyone interested in physicalism in the philosophy of mind.

Philosophical Psychology - Thomas W. Smythe

Kim's Physicalism, or Something Near Enough presents philosophy at its best. The arguments contained in it are interesting and stimulating, and the discussion of opposed views is fair and highly productive. I enjoyed reading this book. It deserves to be read by anyone interested in the metaphysics of consciousness and mind.

Pragmatics & Cognition - Yaron Senderowicz

This is an excellent book by one of the world's best philosophers working on the metaphysics of mind. Nobody who is interested in the mind-body problem . . . should miss the opportunity to study this book carefully.

Philosophical Quarterly - Jesper Kallestrup

In this compact and readable book, Jaegwon Kim provides an overview of his considered position on the mind-body problem, updating and refining several familiar arguments as well as introducing newer material to round out his map of the terrain. The position 'near enough' to physicalism endorsed at the end holds that, with the exception of the intrinsic features of phenomenal states, mental properties are physically reducible via functional analysis.

Mind - D. Gene Witmer

Physicalism: Or Something Near Enough is vintage Kim, and well worth reading for anyone interested in physicalism in the philosophy of mind.
— Thomas W. Smythe

Philosophical Psychology

Kim's Physicalism, or Something Near Enough presents philosophy at its best. The arguments contained in it are interesting and stimulating, and the discussion of opposed views is fair and highly productive. I enjoyed reading this book. It deserves to be read by anyone interested in the metaphysics of consciousness and mind.
— Yaron Senderowicz

Pragmatics & Cognition

This is an excellent book by one of the world's best philosophers working on the metaphysics of mind. Nobody who is interested in the mind-body problem . . . should miss the opportunity to study this book carefully.
— Jesper Kallestrup

Philosophical Quarterly

In this compact and readable book, Jaegwon Kim provides an overview of his considered position on the mind-body problem, updating and refining several familiar arguments as well as introducing newer material to round out his map of the terrain. The position 'near enough' to physicalism endorsed at the end holds that, with the exception of the intrinsic features of phenomenal states, mental properties are physically reducible via functional analysis.
— D. Gene Witmer

Mind