Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches

by Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Editor), Andreas Elpidorou (Editor), Walter Hopp (Editor)

Overview

This volume identifies and develops how philosophy of mind and phenomenology interact in both conceptual and empirically-informed ways. The objective is to demonstrate that phenomenology, as the first-personal study of the contents and structures of our mentality, can provide us with insights into the understanding of the mind and can complement strictly analytical or empirically informed approaches to the study of the mind. Insofar as phenomenology, as the study or science of phenomena, allows the mind to appear, this collection shows how the mind can reappear through a constructive dialogue between different ways—phenomenological, analytical, and empirical—of understanding mentality.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781134516346
Publisher:	Taylor & Francis
Publication date:	08/11/2015
Series:	Routledge Research in Phenomenology
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
Pages:	346
File size:	2 MB

About the Author

Daniel O. Dahlstrom is a Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Boston University, USA.

Andreas Elpidorou is Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Louisville, USA.

Walter Hopp is an Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Boston University, USA.

Table of Contents

Introduction Section I: Introspection and Phenomenal Consciousness 1. Cognitive Phenomenology David Woodruff Smith 2. For-me-ness: What It Is and What It Is Not Dan Zahavi and Uriah Kriegel Section II: Embodiment and Sociality 3. Lived Body, Intercorporeality, Intersubjectivity: The Body as a Phenomenological Theme Dermot Moran 4. The Body and Its Image in the Clinical Encounter Dorothée Legrand 5. Merleau-Ponty: Actions, Habits, and Skilled Expertise Komarine Romdenh-Romluc 6. The Minds of Others Shaun Gallagher Section III: Self-Awareness and Knowledge 7. Interoception and Self-Awareness: An Exploration in Interoceptive Phenomenology Daniel O. Dahlstrom 8. Knowing One’s Own Desires Jonathan Webber 9. Phenomenal Conservatism and the Principle of All Principles Walter Hopp Section IV: Perception and Dreams 10. Hearing, Seeing, and Music in the Middle Dan Lloyd 11. Eyes Wide Shut: Sartre’s Phenomenology of Dreaming Nicolas de Warren Section V: Affectivity 12. Defending a Heideggerian Account of Mood Lauren Freeman 13. The Significance of Boredom: A Sartrean Reading Andreas Elpidorou Section VI: Naturalism and Cognition 14. Prospects for a Naturalized Phenomenology Jeffrey Yoshimi 15. Bringing Philosophy Back: 4e Cognition and the Argument from Phenomenology Mark Rowlands

Editorial Reviews

"This volume on the philosophy of mind is stimulating. It will give readers with an interest in philosophy of mind a lot of ideas to consider. The volume as a whole makes a compelling case for integrating more phenomenology into mainstream work on the mind and cognitive science." —Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

"The book comprises essays by an impressive list of scholars and experts in phenomenology, both young and more established, male and female. The overall quality of the papers is very good, and the book offers a broad and rich portrait of some of the current research trends in the field ... I recommend the book to anyone with an interest in philosophy of mind, especially those approaching the topic from a phenomenological perspective." —Husserl Studies

"By bringing together phenomenology, analytic philosophy of mind, and recent empirical approaches to the mind, this text is eminently designed to address pressing questions in the philosophy of mind in a systematic manner. I recommend it unhesitantly to scholars working in the philosophical arena, particularly those who harbor interests in philosophy of mind." —Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology

"This is a volume that assembles a group of internationally leading scholars to pursue the intersections between the traditions of phenomenology and philosophy of mind; these intersections, although they have largely been passed over so far, appear to be crucial to the continued development of both traditions in their inquiries into the mind and its structure in the twenty-first century." —Paul Livingston, University of New Mexico, USA

From the Publisher