Table of Contents
Series Editor's Preface x
Acknowledgments xii
Introduction: The Situation of Phenomenology 1
1 What Is Phenomenology? 7
1.1 Phenomenologies 7
1.2 Historical background and foreground 10
1.3 Death and reincarnation 13
1.4 A different phenomenology 16
1.5 Further reading 17
2 Naturalism, Transcendentalism and a New Naturalizing 19
2.1 Mathematics and psychology 19
2.2 Naturalistic and transcendental accounts 22
2.3 The new naturalism 28
2.4 Some natural ways of using phenomenology 33
2.4.1 Formalizing phenomenology 33
2.4.2 Neurophenomenology 36
2.4.3 Front-loaded phenomenology 37
2.5 Further reading 40
3 Phenomenological Methods and Some Retooling 41
3.1 The natural attitude 41
3.2 The epoché 43
3.3 The phenomenological reduction 47
3.4 Retooling the eidetic reduction 49
3.5 Some questions about the first person perspective and language 56
3.6 Further reading 60
4 Intentionalities 62
4.1 Husserl's theory of intentionality 63
4.2 Noesis-noema 67
4.3 Enactive intentionality 72
4.4 Further reading 80
5 Embodiment and the Hyletic Dimension 82
5.1 Hyle: a sensational concept 82
5.2 The critique of Husserl's theory 86
5.3 Hyle and quale 89
5.4 Embodiment and hyletic experience 93
5.5 Deepening the enactive interpretation 96
5.6 Further reading 99
6 Time and Time Again 100
6.1 Experiencing time 100
6.2 Husserl's analysis 103
6.3 The ubiquity of temporality 107
6.4 One more time: primal impression and enactive structure 114
6.5 Further reading 121
7 Self and First-Person Perspective 122
7.1 A tradition of disagreements 122
7.2 Pre-reflective and minimal aspects of self 127
7.3 The sense of ownership 131
7.3.1 Schizophrenia 136
7.3.2 Somatoparaphrenia 140
7.3.3 Rubber hand illusion and whole body displacement 143
7.3.4 The NASA robot experience 146
7.4 First-person perspective 148
7.5 Further reading 157
8 Lifeworld, Action, Narrative 159
8.1 The lifeworld 159
8.2 Turning the tables 164
8.3 Action and agency 168
8.4 The narrative scale 172
8.5 Further reading 181
9 Intersubjectivity and Second-Person Perspective 182
9.1 Transcendental intersubjectivity 182
9.2 Being-with others 187
9.3 Standard views of social cognition 191
9.4 Phenomenologial approaches to social cognition 193
9.4.1 Developmental studies 195
9.4.2 Behavioral and phenomenological evidence 198
9.4.3 Evidence from dynamic systems modeling 200
9.5 The narrative scale in social cognition 201
9.6 Revisiting transcendental intersubjectivity 202
9.7 Further reading 204
Notes 205
References 212
Index 233
