People Power: Unarmed Resistance and Global Solidarity

by Howard Clark

Overview

Across the world, nonviolent movements are at the forefront of resistance against repression, imperial aggression and corporate abuse. However, it is often difficult for activists in other countries to know how best to assist such movements.

The contributors to People Power place nonviolent struggles in an international context where solidarity can play a crucial role. Yet they also warn that good intentions are not enough, solidarity has to listen to local movements.

Examining movements from Zimbabwe to Burma and Palestine, the contributors assess various forms of solidarity, arguing that a central role of solidarity is to strengthen the counter-power of those resisting domination and oppression.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780745329017
Publisher:	Pluto Press
Publication date:	10/20/2009
Pages:	256
Product dimensions:	5.90(w) x 9.00(h) x 0.60(d)

About the Author

As coordinator of War Resisters’ International, Howard Clark was involved in civil peace initiatives in Kosovo throughout the 1990s. He is also one of the founders of the Balkan Peace Team, an international volunteer project working for Serbian-Albanian dialogue.

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CHAPTER 1

SERBIA – NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF OTPOR

Danijela Nenadic and Nenad Belcevic

Otpor (Resistance) played an important role in the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic's regime in Serbia in October 2000. However, there are different views about the nature of Otpor and the importance of its contribution to Milosevic's downfall.

For some, Otpor was the revolution – a genuine populist movement successfully mobilising the energies of all those wishing to defeat the regime. Others, however, such as Vladimir Ilic, view Otpor as a tightly knit and centralised political organisation 'with a rather well-developed structure, a relatively secluded leadership, an invisible but efficient hierarchy and internal informal censorship' (Ilic 2001).

As former Otpor activists, our view is that Otpor was one among many actors in bringing down Milosevic. It played a crucial role in connecting the opposition political parties with the non-governmental sector, and in motivating people to vote in the September 2000 elections. However, we would not go so far as to argue that it was the most important player.

This chapter examines the origins of Otpor, its organisation and its sources of support before October 2000, its campaigning style and the repression used against it. Otpor was at the time seen as a heroic instigator of resistance, but has subsequently been criticised for getting support in training in nonviolent tactics from outside Serbia, and for foreign sources of funding. The validity of these criticisms is briefly assessed.

After October 2000, Otpor faced the common dilemma of movements that have achieved their proclaimed goals. This analysis therefore touches on Otpor's final transformation into a political party in November 2003, when it contested parliamentary elections and tried unsuccessfully to open a window of opportunity into 'high politics'.

The political context

Serbia faced many problems by the late 1990s. The multi-national Yugoslav federation had disintegrated in economic crisis and war – the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia had gained independence, thus reducing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to Serbia and Montenegro – and Montenegro was beginning the process of secession (it declared independence in 2006). The province of Kosovo nominally remained part of the FRY but after NATO's bombings in 1999 was a territory under international mandate. Internationally isolated and the target of international sanctions, Serbia was in a state of economic collapse while the black market and corruption flourished.

In February 1997, Milosevic was for the first time forced to bow to democratic pressure. He had tried to annul the municipal elections after the opposition Zajedno coalition won in 14 of the 15 largest municipalities in Serbia. However, after 12 weeks of daily demonstrations, he yielded. Zajedno's victory was short-lived: it could not stay together and Milosevic immediately began to reassert control, becoming president not only of Serbia but of the FRY and changing the constitution to extend the permitted term of office. By 1998, at the same time as Serbian police were mounting an offensive against Albanians in Kosovo, Milosevic was preparing new authoritarian measures for Serbia itself – especially directed against independent media and against the university and students who had played such a critical role in the daily demonstrations.

The end of the NATO bombings brought with it hope for the opposition parties that this was one defeat too many even for Milosevic, but the country seemed to be in a state of apathy and the opposition remained divided and unable to optimise the situation. The picture for Serbian society was indeed bleak, but some opportunities for organised action against the regime were present. It is exactly these small scale opportunities that the young people who formed Otpor saw and decided to exploit and to stand against the regime.

The origins, strategy and organisation of Otpor

Otpor was formed in the autumn of 1998 by a small group of Belgrade students, who had been active in the 1996–97 protests. The students' goal was the ending of Milosevic's rule. They formulated three primary demands:

1. free and fair general elections as soon as possible;

2. abolition of the law governing universities and new legal guarantees of autonomy and academic freedom;

3. abolition of the recent media law restricting freedom of expression, and an end to repression of independent media.

They adopted a clenched fist as their symbol, to represent their determination to persist until victory and the commitment to bring about change.

Initially Otpor was viewed as just another student organisation with no real political influence, and neither the regime nor the opposition parties paid much attention to it. By the time the regime realised the strength, impact and significance of Otpor, it was too late to stop the momentum of resistance.

Otpor's approach was to emphasise that above all it embodied an idea of resistance and of taking personal responsibility, and that ideas are impossible to suppress. Members of Otpor presented an example of how to resist the regime: activists were often arrested, beaten up and subjected to all kinds of repression. Otpor, with its clear and simple messages, gained popularity among ordinary citizens who were not only fed up with the regime but also deeply disappointed in the opposition parties.

Throughout its development, Otpor insisted on the idea of nonviolent resistance. Aware of the historic importance of nonviolent strategy in earlier movements, for example, in the US Civil Rights campaign, Otpor members chose nonviolent, or civil, resistance as one aspect of their struggle. They rightly perceived that it is not necessary to invent completely new strategies and tactics, but to make clever use of available models, adjusting them to their own circumstances.

Otpor moved beyond being purely a student movement in February 1999, when it held its first congress in the Belgrade Youth Centre, at the same time as Milosevic's ruling Socialist Party held its official congress. Otpor then decided to broaden its membership to include well-known public figures who wanted to support it, and to welcome anyone committed to defeat Milosevic. Therefore they mobilised from all sections of society, workers and peasants as well as students and intellectuals, and from across the political spectrum – monarchists and nationalists to republicans, leftists and feminists. Otpor stated that it was aware of the problems of holding together such a diverse coalition – and in the event it would not last beyond the overthrow of Milosevic.

Otpor strengthened its organisational structure at the beginning of 2000. At the time it appeared an unusual organisation, with no leader or vertical organisation. This made it difficult to point to any particular individual, and there were no obvious leaders for the police to arrest. Activists claimed that they had an invisible structure, which was constantly changing to prevent infiltration. They also took precautions by using different people for actions and avoiding repetition.

But the absence of obvious leaders did not mean that there were none. It is fair to argue that Otpor's leadership was personified in a small group of those who had the power to decide on the most important things. Moreover, it is quite clear in retrospect that, while Otpor presented an illusion of fluid organisation and ad hoc decisions, in practice it was well organised but decentralised.

Firstly, Otpor created branches throughout the country and made national calls for coordinated action. Every branch, however, was autonomous and could plan how to carry its own actions to fit local circumstances. There was also a clear division of labour: in every town where Otpor was strong there were sections for finance, relations with the press and organising volunteers. However, there was also a governing body of Otpor composed of well-known personalities that coordinated the activities of branches and sections. According to Otpor members there were, however, only two centralised activities: relations with international bodies and international fund-raising.

Recruitment and activism

Starting with a small group of students, Otpor grew to number over 30,000 supporters and activists by September 2000. People who joined had varied motives. Some said they joined owing to 'hatred of the regime', others stressed 'the need to get things going' or they mentioned 'the idea that together young people can bring about the democratisation of Serbia' (Ilic 2001: 41).

Subsequently some Otpor activists have spoken in advertising terms of the importance of 'branding'. Certainly Otpor was skilful at getting media attention, framing the issues and keeping their movement in the public eye. Activists knew how to use the media, and especially the internet, for recruiting new supporters and informing not only domestic but also international opinion. They attracted media attention also by organising symbolic actions demonstrating the situation that existed in Serbia, and they used the media for immediate announcement of arrests and to organise quick responses.

From the outset Otpor organised many different types of activity all over the country, including petitions, distributing leaflets, holding rallies and workshops, street theatre and concerts. Actions were mostly provocative and designed to raise public consciousness, making people aware of the need to change the regime and mobilising them to join the struggle. Sometimes Otpor activities had a theatrical or carnival dimension. At other times protests were more aggressive and posed a direct challenge to the system.

Otpor's most serious campaign centred on the general elections set for 24 September 2000, and attempted to convince everyone that their vote was crucial and could oust Milosevic, who had decided to call an early election to the Yugoslav presidency at the same time as the Serbian legislative and local elections. The 18 opposition parties had been persuaded by Otpor to form a coalition, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, and to nominate one agreed candidate to run against Milosevic for the presidency. Otpor promised to mobilise at least 500,000 votes for this opposition candidate.

The campaign was called 'He is finished' and activists toured the country. Their message on leaflets was: 'The 24th September is not only election day – but also a very important day in our history. It is YOU who will defeat Milosevic on that day. Make sure that you vote, and that your family and friends vote too – and He is finished!' Otpor promoted the formula 'MASSIVE TURNOUT = BALLOT CONTROL = VICTORY'.

It can be argued that Otpor's greatest accomplishment was to persuade people to take part in the elections against a background of apathy and fear, and to persuade them that a peaceful change of regime was possible.

Otpor's analytical centre set out the framework for mobilising the vote through three campaigns:

1. To activate the 'third sector' (non-governmental organisations) to take part in the election campaign;

2. To get as many people as possible to the polls to increase the opposition's chances of success and decrease the effect of government manipulation of elections;

3. The 'He is Finished' campaign designed to hammer home a strong anti-Milosevic message that left no possibility for hesitation or compromise.

All three campaigns aimed to increase electoral turnout but were directed to different sectors of the population: the first to the cities (especially first-time voters); the second to the medium-sized towns and the third to the rural population.

How the regime fought Otpor

Milosevic and his allies had always feared the role of students, but had previously been able to control them. After the regime realised that Otpor differed from previous student movements, was well organised and rapidly gaining in influence, it decided to strike back. The government then did everything possible to frighten those who were active or supported the movement in an attempt to slow Otpor's growth and increasing popularity. Almost every protest ended with police intervention. The police interrogated a large number of activists about the leadership of the movement, funding and training. They also took photographs of demonstrators or fingerprinted them, opened criminal records, used arrests and detention, or beat up activists. Nearly half of the Otpor activists were detained at some time and ran into problems in their educational or family life.

After activists in Pozarevac (the birthplace of Milosevic and his wife) had been severely beaten by Milosevic's son and his gang for publicly supporting Otpor, regime repression became more brutal and open. The regime and the media under its control accused Otpor activists of being traitors paid by NATO, of being CIA agents and even fascists. The regime then drafted a law on terrorism, which meant that any member of an organisation not registered with the state was vulnerable to sweeping acts of repression, including life imprisonment. Since Otpor was denied recognition by the authorities, it was undoubtedly the main target of this new law. But increased repression, rather than frightening off supporters, backfired. Instead it motivated people (including those previously passive) to offer greater support.

The most obvious example of police brutality and misuse of authority occurred when policemen, armed to the teeth, broke into the offices of the 'It's time' campaign only 15 days before the September 2000 election. They arrested 25 activists and held them for many hours for interrogation by police and state security. In total the number arrested in connection with Otpor reached 1,559 by October 2000. But subsequently members of the Socialist Party have denied any resort to arrests or beatings, and its coalition partner, the Radical Party, has also denied any complicity in repression.

Demystifying Otpor and questions about foreign support

At the time when Otpor was struggling against Milosevic no one from the democratic bloc dared raise critical questions about its actions. Otpor activists were seen as 'heroes', politically uncorrupted but smart and determined young people who had finally taken matters into their own hands. To raise critical questions about Otpor then would have undermined people's last hope of overthrowing Milosevic after his many years in power. The somewhat idealised picture of Otpor that prevailed during the final struggle against Milosevic is now in need of some demystifying.

(Continues…)

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Copyright © 2009 Howard Clark.
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Table of Contents

Foreword
Introduction, by Howard Clark
Section I: Resisting Repression, Civil War and Exploitation 2000-2008: Analyses of Unarmed Struggle
1. Serbia - Nonviolent struggle for democracy: the role of Otpor
by Danijela Nenadic and Nenad Belcevic
1a. Serbia Eight Years After
by Ivan Franovic
2. Burma - Dialogue with the Generals: the sound of one hand clapping
by Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan
3. Zimbabwe - Unarmed resistance, civil society and the limits of international solidarity
by Janet Cherry
4. Nonviolent Movement for Peace in Colombia and International Solidarity
by Mauricio García Duran
5. India - MacroViolence and MicroResistance: Development Violence and Unarmed Grassroots Resistance
by Anand Mazgaonkar
Section II: Nonviolent Citizens' Intervention Across Borders
6. Making Accompaniment Effective
by Brian Martin
7. Developing Strategy for Accompaniment
by Luis Enrique Eguren
7a. With Peace Brigades International in Colombia
by Louise Winstanley
8. Civilian Peacekeeping: Providing Protection without sticks and carrots
by Christine Schweitzer
8a. Making Peace Practical with Nonviolent Peaceforce in Sri Lanka
by Rita Webb
9. Cross-border Nonviolent Advocacy during the second Palestinian intifada: the International Solidarity Movement
by Véronique Dudouet
9a. The work of the Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI)
by Ann Wright
9b. International Women's Peace Service in Palestine
by Angie Zelter
10. Voices in the Wilderness: Campaigning against Sanctions on Iraq 1995-2005
by Kathy Kelly and Milan Raid
Section III: Bases of Solidarity: Shared Identities, Interests and Beliefs
11. Feminist solidarity: Women in Black against War
by Cynthia Cockburn
12. Transnational solidarity and war resistance: the case of Turkey
by Andreas Speck
13. Solidarity based on Sexual Orientation: Regional Organising in Africa
by Chesterfield Samba
14. Diasporas: potential partners in struggle
by Andrew Rigby
15. Global Movements and Local Struggles: The Case of World Social Forum
by Stellan Vinthagen
16. Worker Solidarity and Civil Society cooperation: blocking the Chinese arms shipment to Zimbabwe, April 2008
Section IV: Controversies in transnational action
17. External Financing of Opposition Movements
by Jorgen Johansen
18. Nonviolence Training and Charges of Western Imperialism: a Guide for Worried Activists
by George Lakey
Afterword: the Chain of Nonviolence
Howard Clark
Works Cited
Index