Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, 1756-63

by J. Oliphant

Overview

While the Seven Years War pushed London towards a protective Native American policy, outcomes were determined by men on the spot. The savage Anglo-Cherokee war was resolved by Cherokee headmen willing to accept a dignified peace; and by the sympathy of the very man sent to crush them. Colonel James Grant forced his treaty upon South Carolina, demonstrated the value of imperial frontier management and started some Carolinians on the road to revolution.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781349417926
Publisher:	Palgrave Macmillan UK
Publication date:	02/02/2001
Edition description:	1st ed. 2001
Pages:	269
Product dimensions:	5.51(w) x 8.50(h) x 0.02(d)

About the Author

JOHN OLIPHANT is an independent scholar and a Member of the Institute of Historical Research, University of London. In his time he has been a successful school teacher, a clerk, and tax collector as well as scholar. He has contributed to the Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History.

Table of Contents

List of Maps Preface Abbreviations Long Canes Creek: Anglo-Cherokee Relations to 1756 'Two Brothers Falling Out': The Slide to War Lyttelton's Folly 'The Sweet Bond of Human Things' The Carpenter and the Colonel The Carpenter, the Corn Puller and the 'Town of Lyes' Epilogue Appendix: Prominent Cherokees Notes Bibliography Index

Editorial Reviews

By the mid-18th century, British policy reflected the premise that peace in North America depended on recognizing and adjusting claims of both whites and Indians, argues Oliphant, a University of London Institute of Historical Research scholar--provocatively and convincingly challenging the cultural studies models currently dominating analysis of Anglo/Amerindian relations. In the context of Anglo-Cherokee relations, claims adjustment meant questions of trade, land ownership and sovereignty: the pressures of the French and Indian War and the distances from London to North America and from the coasts to the frontier, Oliphant shows, precluded implementing coherent policies. Instead, local forces and individuals were able to shape events--usually to the detriment of all involved. Oliphant demonstrates that arrogance, misunderstanding and simple villainy were amply present on both sides and bade fair to create a state of permanent war on the Cherokee frontier in the Carolina Alleghanies. The tide turned, however, when a body of leaders took control of the situation and pursued a moderate solution: British Col. Richard Montgomery and Col. James Grant rebuilt Cherokee trust in British intentions. Cherokee statesmen like Attakullakulla and Connecorte, and war leaders like Seroweh--their names too often missing from mainstream history--risked their lives and their honor to conclude a peace, based on mutual respect and mutual interest, that endured until the American Revolution. A particular strength of Oliphant's work is its demonstration of a growing synergy between force and negotiation in both British and Cherokee approaches to policy. The Cherokee thereby emerge as a political society rather than a tribal one, fighting less by reflex, to defend a way of life, than from policy, to develop or improve negotiating positions. Oliphant's implied suggestion--that 18th-century European concepts of limited war for a compromise peace may have had promise in North American contexts--merits wide and serious consideration. (Oct.) Copyright 2000 Cahners Business Information.|

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