ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE - Book 3
Scanned, proofed and corrected from the original edition for your reading pleasure. (Worth every penny!)
***
An excerpt from the beginning of:
CHAPTER I.
WE may be satisfied, from the observations which follow, that there is no sense besides the five—besides, that is, Sight, Hearing, Smell, Taste, and Touch; for if Touch be the sense for every impression of which we are sensible, and if we have this sense, then, as all the conditions of whatever is tangible, in so far as tangible, are made perceptible to us by the Touch, it follows that, if any sensation be wanting, some sentient organ must be wanting to us also. Now, all the bodies which are perceived by touching are made sensible to us by the Touch which has been allotted to us; and all those which are perceived, not by touching but, through media, are made sensible to us by simple bodies—that is, by air and water. We are so constituted, in fact, that, if several objects, differing generically from one another, could be perceived through one medium, an individual, having a sentient organ such as that medium, would, necessarily, be sensible of impressions through both media—as if the sentient organ should be of air, then, as air is the medium for sound and colour, the individual would be sensible of both impressions through the same organ. Should there, however, be more than one medium for the transmission of the same impression, as air as well as water (since both are diaphanous,) serves for the transmission of colour, then an individual, having an organ constituted of either of those elements, would perceive impressions transmitted through them both. The sentient organs, however, are constituted of those two simple bodies, air and water, exclusively—for the pupil is of water, the hearing of air, and the smell either of one or other; but fire forms no part of any organ, or rather it is an element common to all, as there is nothing sentient without heat; and earth either does not enter at all into any sentient part, or it has been in some especial and peculiar manner combined with the Touch. Thus, there can remain only this conclusion, that, were there no air or water, there could be no sentient organ; and organs so constituted are actually possessed by animals now living. All the senses, in fact, are possessed by animals which are neither imperfect nor mutilated; for the mole appears to have eyes beneath its skin. So that, unless there is some kind of body hitherto unknown and some kind of impression unsuited to bodies here on earth, it may be affirmed that no sense can be wanting to us. But neither is it possible that there should be any special organ for the perception of common properties, (such as motion, rest, magnitude, form, number and unity), of which we are made sensible, by each special sense, accidentally; for we perceive all such by motion as we do magnitude, and as we do form, as form is a kind of magnitude; the state of rest we are sensible of by the absence of motion, and number we perceive by the want of continuity and by particular senses, for each sense is perceptive of unity. So that, evidently, there cannot be a peculiar sense for the perception of any one of those properties, as motion, for instance; with respect to which we shall be ever situated as we now are, when, by sight, we judge of something sweet. And this we are able to do from our happening to possess a sense which is perceptive of double impressions, and by the way in which those impressions coincide, we recognise what the thing is; were this not the case, then, in no wise, except by chance, could we perceive that the thing was sweet, any more than we could tell that an individual is the son of Cleon, not because he is really so, but because he is fair; and fairness is an accident pertaining to the son of Cleon. And yet we have a common sense for the perception of common properties and that not casually, although it is not a peculiar sense; for, were it so, then in no otherwise could we perceive those properties than, as has just been said, we see that an individual is the son of Cleon. The senses, however, do perceive, casually, the special qualities of each other; but then they do so, not as distinct senses but, as becoming one sense, as when double impressions may be made simultaneously upon the same organ, as by bile, which is bitter and yellow. But as it belongs not to either sense to say that both qualities belong to one substance, we are exposed to error, and led to think that if a fluid be yellow it must be bile.
"1029713839"
***
An excerpt from the beginning of:
CHAPTER I.
WE may be satisfied, from the observations which follow, that there is no sense besides the five—besides, that is, Sight, Hearing, Smell, Taste, and Touch; for if Touch be the sense for every impression of which we are sensible, and if we have this sense, then, as all the conditions of whatever is tangible, in so far as tangible, are made perceptible to us by the Touch, it follows that, if any sensation be wanting, some sentient organ must be wanting to us also. Now, all the bodies which are perceived by touching are made sensible to us by the Touch which has been allotted to us; and all those which are perceived, not by touching but, through media, are made sensible to us by simple bodies—that is, by air and water. We are so constituted, in fact, that, if several objects, differing generically from one another, could be perceived through one medium, an individual, having a sentient organ such as that medium, would, necessarily, be sensible of impressions through both media—as if the sentient organ should be of air, then, as air is the medium for sound and colour, the individual would be sensible of both impressions through the same organ. Should there, however, be more than one medium for the transmission of the same impression, as air as well as water (since both are diaphanous,) serves for the transmission of colour, then an individual, having an organ constituted of either of those elements, would perceive impressions transmitted through them both. The sentient organs, however, are constituted of those two simple bodies, air and water, exclusively—for the pupil is of water, the hearing of air, and the smell either of one or other; but fire forms no part of any organ, or rather it is an element common to all, as there is nothing sentient without heat; and earth either does not enter at all into any sentient part, or it has been in some especial and peculiar manner combined with the Touch. Thus, there can remain only this conclusion, that, were there no air or water, there could be no sentient organ; and organs so constituted are actually possessed by animals now living. All the senses, in fact, are possessed by animals which are neither imperfect nor mutilated; for the mole appears to have eyes beneath its skin. So that, unless there is some kind of body hitherto unknown and some kind of impression unsuited to bodies here on earth, it may be affirmed that no sense can be wanting to us. But neither is it possible that there should be any special organ for the perception of common properties, (such as motion, rest, magnitude, form, number and unity), of which we are made sensible, by each special sense, accidentally; for we perceive all such by motion as we do magnitude, and as we do form, as form is a kind of magnitude; the state of rest we are sensible of by the absence of motion, and number we perceive by the want of continuity and by particular senses, for each sense is perceptive of unity. So that, evidently, there cannot be a peculiar sense for the perception of any one of those properties, as motion, for instance; with respect to which we shall be ever situated as we now are, when, by sight, we judge of something sweet. And this we are able to do from our happening to possess a sense which is perceptive of double impressions, and by the way in which those impressions coincide, we recognise what the thing is; were this not the case, then, in no wise, except by chance, could we perceive that the thing was sweet, any more than we could tell that an individual is the son of Cleon, not because he is really so, but because he is fair; and fairness is an accident pertaining to the son of Cleon. And yet we have a common sense for the perception of common properties and that not casually, although it is not a peculiar sense; for, were it so, then in no otherwise could we perceive those properties than, as has just been said, we see that an individual is the son of Cleon. The senses, however, do perceive, casually, the special qualities of each other; but then they do so, not as distinct senses but, as becoming one sense, as when double impressions may be made simultaneously upon the same organ, as by bile, which is bitter and yellow. But as it belongs not to either sense to say that both qualities belong to one substance, we are exposed to error, and led to think that if a fluid be yellow it must be bile.
ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE - Book 3
Scanned, proofed and corrected from the original edition for your reading pleasure. (Worth every penny!)
***
An excerpt from the beginning of:
CHAPTER I.
WE may be satisfied, from the observations which follow, that there is no sense besides the five—besides, that is, Sight, Hearing, Smell, Taste, and Touch; for if Touch be the sense for every impression of which we are sensible, and if we have this sense, then, as all the conditions of whatever is tangible, in so far as tangible, are made perceptible to us by the Touch, it follows that, if any sensation be wanting, some sentient organ must be wanting to us also. Now, all the bodies which are perceived by touching are made sensible to us by the Touch which has been allotted to us; and all those which are perceived, not by touching but, through media, are made sensible to us by simple bodies—that is, by air and water. We are so constituted, in fact, that, if several objects, differing generically from one another, could be perceived through one medium, an individual, having a sentient organ such as that medium, would, necessarily, be sensible of impressions through both media—as if the sentient organ should be of air, then, as air is the medium for sound and colour, the individual would be sensible of both impressions through the same organ. Should there, however, be more than one medium for the transmission of the same impression, as air as well as water (since both are diaphanous,) serves for the transmission of colour, then an individual, having an organ constituted of either of those elements, would perceive impressions transmitted through them both. The sentient organs, however, are constituted of those two simple bodies, air and water, exclusively—for the pupil is of water, the hearing of air, and the smell either of one or other; but fire forms no part of any organ, or rather it is an element common to all, as there is nothing sentient without heat; and earth either does not enter at all into any sentient part, or it has been in some especial and peculiar manner combined with the Touch. Thus, there can remain only this conclusion, that, were there no air or water, there could be no sentient organ; and organs so constituted are actually possessed by animals now living. All the senses, in fact, are possessed by animals which are neither imperfect nor mutilated; for the mole appears to have eyes beneath its skin. So that, unless there is some kind of body hitherto unknown and some kind of impression unsuited to bodies here on earth, it may be affirmed that no sense can be wanting to us. But neither is it possible that there should be any special organ for the perception of common properties, (such as motion, rest, magnitude, form, number and unity), of which we are made sensible, by each special sense, accidentally; for we perceive all such by motion as we do magnitude, and as we do form, as form is a kind of magnitude; the state of rest we are sensible of by the absence of motion, and number we perceive by the want of continuity and by particular senses, for each sense is perceptive of unity. So that, evidently, there cannot be a peculiar sense for the perception of any one of those properties, as motion, for instance; with respect to which we shall be ever situated as we now are, when, by sight, we judge of something sweet. And this we are able to do from our happening to possess a sense which is perceptive of double impressions, and by the way in which those impressions coincide, we recognise what the thing is; were this not the case, then, in no wise, except by chance, could we perceive that the thing was sweet, any more than we could tell that an individual is the son of Cleon, not because he is really so, but because he is fair; and fairness is an accident pertaining to the son of Cleon. And yet we have a common sense for the perception of common properties and that not casually, although it is not a peculiar sense; for, were it so, then in no otherwise could we perceive those properties than, as has just been said, we see that an individual is the son of Cleon. The senses, however, do perceive, casually, the special qualities of each other; but then they do so, not as distinct senses but, as becoming one sense, as when double impressions may be made simultaneously upon the same organ, as by bile, which is bitter and yellow. But as it belongs not to either sense to say that both qualities belong to one substance, we are exposed to error, and led to think that if a fluid be yellow it must be bile.
***
An excerpt from the beginning of:
CHAPTER I.
WE may be satisfied, from the observations which follow, that there is no sense besides the five—besides, that is, Sight, Hearing, Smell, Taste, and Touch; for if Touch be the sense for every impression of which we are sensible, and if we have this sense, then, as all the conditions of whatever is tangible, in so far as tangible, are made perceptible to us by the Touch, it follows that, if any sensation be wanting, some sentient organ must be wanting to us also. Now, all the bodies which are perceived by touching are made sensible to us by the Touch which has been allotted to us; and all those which are perceived, not by touching but, through media, are made sensible to us by simple bodies—that is, by air and water. We are so constituted, in fact, that, if several objects, differing generically from one another, could be perceived through one medium, an individual, having a sentient organ such as that medium, would, necessarily, be sensible of impressions through both media—as if the sentient organ should be of air, then, as air is the medium for sound and colour, the individual would be sensible of both impressions through the same organ. Should there, however, be more than one medium for the transmission of the same impression, as air as well as water (since both are diaphanous,) serves for the transmission of colour, then an individual, having an organ constituted of either of those elements, would perceive impressions transmitted through them both. The sentient organs, however, are constituted of those two simple bodies, air and water, exclusively—for the pupil is of water, the hearing of air, and the smell either of one or other; but fire forms no part of any organ, or rather it is an element common to all, as there is nothing sentient without heat; and earth either does not enter at all into any sentient part, or it has been in some especial and peculiar manner combined with the Touch. Thus, there can remain only this conclusion, that, were there no air or water, there could be no sentient organ; and organs so constituted are actually possessed by animals now living. All the senses, in fact, are possessed by animals which are neither imperfect nor mutilated; for the mole appears to have eyes beneath its skin. So that, unless there is some kind of body hitherto unknown and some kind of impression unsuited to bodies here on earth, it may be affirmed that no sense can be wanting to us. But neither is it possible that there should be any special organ for the perception of common properties, (such as motion, rest, magnitude, form, number and unity), of which we are made sensible, by each special sense, accidentally; for we perceive all such by motion as we do magnitude, and as we do form, as form is a kind of magnitude; the state of rest we are sensible of by the absence of motion, and number we perceive by the want of continuity and by particular senses, for each sense is perceptive of unity. So that, evidently, there cannot be a peculiar sense for the perception of any one of those properties, as motion, for instance; with respect to which we shall be ever situated as we now are, when, by sight, we judge of something sweet. And this we are able to do from our happening to possess a sense which is perceptive of double impressions, and by the way in which those impressions coincide, we recognise what the thing is; were this not the case, then, in no wise, except by chance, could we perceive that the thing was sweet, any more than we could tell that an individual is the son of Cleon, not because he is really so, but because he is fair; and fairness is an accident pertaining to the son of Cleon. And yet we have a common sense for the perception of common properties and that not casually, although it is not a peculiar sense; for, were it so, then in no otherwise could we perceive those properties than, as has just been said, we see that an individual is the son of Cleon. The senses, however, do perceive, casually, the special qualities of each other; but then they do so, not as distinct senses but, as becoming one sense, as when double impressions may be made simultaneously upon the same organ, as by bile, which is bitter and yellow. But as it belongs not to either sense to say that both qualities belong to one substance, we are exposed to error, and led to think that if a fluid be yellow it must be bile.
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ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE - Book 3
ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE - Book 3
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Product Details
| BN ID: | 2940012086259 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | OGB |
| Publication date: | 01/19/2011 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| File size: | 246 KB |
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