Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Stability in South Asia

by Devin T. Hagerty

Overview

This book examines the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, two highly antagonistic South Asian neighbors who recently moved into their third decade of overt nuclear weaponization. It assesses the stability of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence and argues that, while deterrence dampens the likelihood of escalation to conventional—and possibly nuclear—war, the chronically embittered relations between New Delhi and Islamabad mean that deterrence failure resulting in major warfare cannot be ruled out. Through an empirical examination of the effects of nuclear weapons during five crises between India and Pakistan since 1998, as well as a discussion of the theoretical logic of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence, the book offers suggestions for enhancing deterrence stability between these two countries.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9783030213978
Publisher:	Springer International Publishing
Publication date:	06/26/2019
Edition description:	1st ed. 2020
Pages:	134
Product dimensions:	5.83(w) x 8.27(h) x 0.00(d)

About the Author

Devin T. Hagerty is Professor of Political Science at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, USA.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 Introduction

The India-Pakistan Nuclear Arms Competition in 2019
The Political Context
Main Arguments and Chapter Plan

Chapter 2 India-Pakistan Crises, 1999-2016
The Kargil ConflictThe “Twin Peaks” Crisis
The 26/11 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks
The Uri Attack and Indian “Surgical Strikes”

Chapter 3 Explaining Indian Moderation During Crises, 1999-2016
Nuclear Deterrence
U.S. Crisis Management
Poor Conventional Military Options
Strategic Restraint
Conclusion

Chapter 4 Deterrence Stability in South Asia Today
The Concept of Deterrence Stability
India-Pakistan Relations after the February 2019 Crisis
Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons: Capabilities, Doctrine, Command and Control
The Nature of “Ugly Stability” between India and Pakistan
The Theoretical Logic of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence
Conclusion: Deterrence Stability in South Asia?

Chapter 5 Enhancing India-Pakistan Deterrence Stability
TrendsMeasures to Enhance Deterrence Stability
The U.S. Role