Nuclear Security: The Nexus Among Science, Technology and Policy

by Michael Nacht, Michael Frank, Stanley Prussin

Overview

This textbook is the first comprehensive and systematic account of the science, technology and policy issues associated with nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. Throughout their account of the evolution of nuclear policy, from its origin to the early Trump presidency, the authors interweave clear technical expositions of the science and technology that underpin and constrain it. The book begins by tracing the early work in atomic physics, the discovery of fission, and the developments that led to the Manhattan Project and the delivery of atomic bombs against Japan that ended World War II. It follows the initial failed attempts at nuclear disarmament, the onset of the Cold War nuclear arms competition, and the development of light water reactors to harness nuclear energy for electric power generation. The authors thoroughly unpack the problem of nuclear proliferation, examining the strategy and incentives for states that have and have not pursued nuclear weapons, and providing an overview of the nuclear arsenals of the current nuclear weapon states. They trace the technical, political and strategic evolution of deterrence, arms control and disarmament policies from the first attempts for an Outer Space Treaty in 1957 through the new START treaty of 2009. At critical junctures in the narrative, the authors explain the relevant nuclear science and technology including nuclear fission and criticality; nuclear materials and enrichment; nuclear detonation and nuclear weapons effects; nuclear weapons skpile constraints, stewardship and surveillance; nuclear fusion and thermonuclear weapons; technologies for monitoring, verification and proliferation; and nuclear forensics. They conclude with an assessment of contemporary issues ranging from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action reached to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons development program, to the threat of nuclear terrorism, the perceived nuclear weapons policies of Russia and China, and the US efforts to provide disincentives for its allies to acquire their own nuclear weapons by maintaining credible security guarantees.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9783030750848
Publisher:	Springer International Publishing
Publication date:	11/20/2021
Edition description:	1st ed. 2021
Pages:	340
Product dimensions:	6.10(w) x 9.25(h) x (d)

About the Author

Michael Nacht is the Thomas and Alison Schneider Professor of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley. He is co-author and co-editor of Strategic Latency and World Power (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 2014), the author of The Age of Vulnerability: Threats to the Nuclear Stalemate (Brookings, 1985) and more than eighty journal articles (in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Survival, Daedalus and others) and book chapters. He has twice served in US Senate-confirmed positions associated with nuclear weapons policy. He was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs (2009-2010) for which he received the Distinguished Public Service Medal, the Department’s highest civilian honor. Previously he was Assistant Director for Strategic and Eurasian Affairs of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1994-1997) for which he received the Distinguished Honor Award, the Agency’s highest honor. He received a B.S. in Aeronautics and Astronautics and an M.S. in Operations Research from New York University and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.

Michael Frank is a design physicist at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory who splits his time between work related to the nuclear weapons skpile and countering nuclear terrorism. He worked previously for a decade on nuclear threat assessment and incident response. Dr. Frank received a B.S.E. in Aerospace Engineering from Princeton University, an M.P.P. from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, and a Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of California, Berkeley. He and Dr. Nacht have taught the course on which the book is based at the University of California, Berkeley.

Professor Stanley Prussin was a faculty member in the University of California, Berkeley Department of Nuclear Engineering from 1966-2015. For many years he taught the Department's courses in nuclear physics for applications and engineering science applications of nuclear medicine, among many others. His research interests were in low-energy nuclear physics and nuclear forensics, for which he was internationally noted. He received the Humboldt Senior Scientist Award, among many others. Professor Prussin received his B.S. degree in Chemistry from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and his M.S. and Ph.D. in Chemistry from the University of Michigan. Professor Prussin helped conceptualize the proposed volume and drafted initial technical sections. He passed away from cancer in 2015.

Table of Contents

1. Early days

1.1. Development of atomic physics

1.2. Origins of nuclear fission – Great Britain and continental Europe

1.3. Nuclear science I – fission and criticality

1.3.1. Fission, criticality and the fission chain

1.3.1.1. Decay and half-life

1.3.2. Energy scale of nuclear reactions relative to chemical reactions

1.3.3. Nuclear reactions and cross sections

1.3.4. Neutrons basics

1.3.4.1. Neutrons from fission (nu-bar)

1.3.4.2. Neutron energy and moderation concepts

1.3.5. Critical mass, chain reactions, ene

rgy and fission products

1.3.6. Enrichment and production

1.3.7. Worked example – Chicago Pile

1.4. The Manhattan Project

1.4.1. Organization

1.4.2. Key personnel

1.4.3. Technical obstacles

1.4.4. The path to success

1.5. Nuclear science II- materials and enrichment

1.5.1. Uranium enrichment

1.5.2. Reactor basics and plutonium production

1.5.3. Overview of proliferation-resistant fuel cycles and reactors

1.5.4. Worked example – centrifuge versus gaseous diffusion

1.6. Truman’s decision to drop two atomic bombs

1.6.1. Policy options, alter

native targets

1.6.2. Threat assessment

1.6.3. Strategic and tactical considerations

1.6.4. Key players and the decision

1.6.5. Alternative explanations

1.7. Effects of the detonations

1.7.1. Blast

1.7.2. Radiation

1.7.3. Shock waves

1.7.4. Electromagnetic pulse

1.7.5. Estimates of prompt and delayed fatalities

1.8. Nuclear science III – nuclear weapons and their effects

1.8.1. Basic design concepts

1.8.2. Weapon effects

1.8.3. Blast and pressure

1.8.4. Thermal Effects

1.8.5. &n

bsp; Radiation effects

1.8.6. Other (EMP, delayed fatalities, impact on climate change)

1.8.7. Radiation effects on biological systems

1.8.8. Weapons effects in military planning

1.8.9. Comparison to conventional weapons and their uses

1.8.10. Accuracy and effectiveness

1.8.11. Hardening and survivability

1.8.12. Worked example – Hiroshima blast and radiation effects

2. Postwar expansion (1946-1968)

2.1. National security act, 1947

2.1.1. National security council

2.1.2. US Air Force

2.1.3. Central Intelligence Agency

2.1.4. Other consequences

2.2. Atomic Energy

Commission

2.2.1. Thermonuclear weapons debate

2.2.2. Concern of Soviet weapons capability

2.3. Nuclear science IV– fusion and thermonuclear weapons

2.3.1. Basics of nuclear fusion

2.3.2. Thermonuclear concepts

2.3.3. Worked example – to be determined

2.4. Failed arms control and onset of the Cold War

2.4.1. Acheson-Lillienthal report

2.4.2. Failure of the Baruch plan

2.4.3. Soviet resistance

2.4.4. Korean War (1950-53)

2.4.4.1. Role of nuclear weapons

2.4.4.2. Beginnings of extended deterre

nce

2.5. Nuclear proliferation begins

2.5.1. Mirror Imaging: USSR program, Kurchatov, espionage from Manhattan project

2.5.2. USSR weapons test (1949)

2.5.3. The UK program and test (1952)

2.6. Nuclear arms competition between the US and the USSR

2.6.1. The Hydrogen Bomb

2.6.1.1. Oppenheimer vs. Teller

2.6.1.2. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

2.6.2. Early nuclear weapon strategy development

2.6.2.1. Massive retaliation and its critics

2.6.2.2. Deterrence and Secure 2^nd Str

ike

2.6.2.3. Strategic bombers, missiles, the Navy (SSBNS, SLBNS)

2.6.2.4. Intercontinental delivery

2.6.3. Soviet responses

2.7. Nuclear Science V– modern weapons and the skpile

2.7.1. Constraints and weapon size and mass

2.7.2. Constraints on weapon efficiency and yield

2.7.3. Materials properties and equations of state

2.7.4. Skpile surveillance - assessing reliability

2.7.5. Worked example – yield and efficiency

3. The problem of nuclear proliferation

3.1. The International Atomic Energy Agency

3.1.1. &

nbsp; Application of nuclear energy for electric power generation

3.1.2. Efforts to forestall proliferation

3.1.2.1. Nuclear suppliers group

3.1.2.2. Zangger committee

3.2. Nuclear proliferation builds

3.2.1. France – 1960

3.2.2. China – 1964

3.2.3. Israel – 1965

3.2.4. Sweden – ended in 1968

3.3. First arms control measures

3.3.1. Distinction between disarmament and arms control

3.3.2. Outer Space Treaty – 1957

3.3.3. Impact of Cuban Missile Crisis - 1962

3.3.4. Limited Test Ban

Treaty - 1963

3.4. Nuclear science VI– skpile safety and security

3.4.1. Use control concepts

3.4.2. Skpile aging and reliability

3.4.3. One-point safety

3.4.4. Worked example - decay and aging of weapons material

4. Technical, political and strategic evolution of deterrence and arms control

4.1. Declaratory policies

4.2. Deterrence policy

4.2.1. Red and blue

4.2.2. “No First Use” versus “Use to De-escalate”

4.3. Extended deterrence and US nuclear deployments

4.4. Flexible response

4.5. Soviet and US buildup

4.6. The importance of missile defense

4.7. Nuclear arms contro

l and restraint

4.7.1. Nuclear non-proliferation treaty – 1968

4.7.2. SALT I– 1972

4.7.2.1. Importance of MIRVS

4.7.3. ABM treaty -1972

4.7.4. SALT II – 1979

4.7.5. Carter policy of deterring reprocessing of spent fuel - 1977

4.7.6. Additional proliferation activities

4.7.6.1. Indian test – 1974

4.7.6.2. Pakistani commitment

4.7.6.3. German-Brazilian deal

4.7.6.4. Taiwan, South Korea initiatives

4.7.7. &

nbsp; INF treaty – 1987

4.7.8. START – 1991

4.8. Nuclear science VII– monitoring, verification and proliferation

4.8.1. Detonation monitoring and detection

4.8.2. Safeguards technologies

4.8.3. Other measurement concepts and activities

4.8.4. Technologies for treaty verification and monitoring

4.8.5. Proliferation resistant reactors and fuel cycle

4.8.6. Worked example – signature detection

5. The second nuclear age (1992- present)

5.1. End of the Cold War

5.1.1. START II (1993)

5.1.2. Nunn-Lugar and cooperative threat reduction

5.2. Ukraine and Kaz

hakstan nuclear disarmament

5.3. Regional proliferation

5.3.1. Iraq

5.3.2. North Korea

5.3.3. Libya

5.3.4. India versus Pakistan

5.3.5. Iran

5.4. Counter-proliferation

5.4.1. Proliferation security initiative

5.4.2. Stuxnet

5.5. Nuclear disarmament

5.5.1. Disarmament and the legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime

5.5.2. Historical examples of nuclear disarmament

5.5.2.1. South Africa

5.5.2.2. Brazil and Argentina

5.5.2.3.

Former Soviet Union

5.6. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

5.6.1. Failed US. ratification

5.6.2. Efforts at START III and completion of Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty (2002)

5.6.3. US withdrawal from the ABM treaty and its significance

5.6.4. New START (2009)

5.7. Nuclear science VIII– skpile stewardship without nuclear testing

5.7.1. Contrast with skpile surveillance

5.7.2. High energy density physics experiments

5.7.3. Codes and supercomputers

5.7.4. Worked example – skpi

le surveillance

5.7.5. Worked example – computational demands of physics codes

6. Contemporary issues

6.1. The Obama nuclear initiatives and their legacy

6.1.1. Failed attempts to develop new nuclear weapons (RNEP and RRW)

6.1.2. Beyond life extension programs

6.1.3. The nuclear security initiatives

6.1.4. Strengthening the NPT

6.2. Russian adoption of “escalate to deescalate” doctrine

6.3. Nuclear weapons and China’s “anti-access/area denial” strategy

6.4. Cyber threats to nuclear command and control systems

6.5. Nuclear weapons and cross domain deterrence

6.5.1. Issues of proportionality and escalation control

6.6. Impact of economic sanctions as a counter-proliferation tool

6.7. The Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

6.7.1. Elements of the agreement

6.7.2. Strengths and weaknesses

6.7.3. Effects on others

6.7.4. Consequences

6.8. Threat of nuclear terrorism

6.8.1. Loss of control of a nuclear weapon

6.8.2. Loss of control of nuclear material

6.8.3. Loss of control of radioactive material and risks of radioactive dispersal devices

6.9. Challenges of attribution, prosecution and retaliation

6.9.1. Pre- and post-detonation attribution and forensics

6.9.2. Decision-making complexities of cross discipline assessments6.

9.3. Policy alternatives in response to nuclear weapon use

6.9.4. Accuracy and timeliness requirements

6.10. Nuclear science IX – Illicit material detection and forensic attribution

6.10.1. Radiation detection and analysis

6.10.1.1. Passive detection and spectroscopy

6.10.1.2. Activation

6.10.1.3. Radiography

6.10.2. Nuclear forensics and attribution

6.10.2.1. Decay products and chronometry

6.10.3. Worked example – standoff detection of special nuclear material

7. Conclusion – Will the “tradition of non-use” of nuclear weap

ons be sustained? If not, what are the potential consequences?