Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument From Analogy

by Christopher Cowie

Overview

Moral judgments attempt to describe a reality that does not exist, so they are all false. This is the moral error theory, a deeply troubling yet plausible view that is now one of the canonical positions in moral philosophy. The most compelling argument against it is the argument from analogy. According to this, the moral error theory should be rejected because it would seriously compromise our practice of making epistemic judgments-judgments about how we ought to form and revise our beliefs in light of our evidence-and could undermine systematic thought and reason themselves. Christopher Cowie provides a novel assessment of the recent attention paid to this topic in moral philosophy and epistemology. He reasons that the argument from analogy fails because moral judgments are unlike judgments about how we ought to form and revise our beliefs in light of our evidence. On that basis, a moral error theory does not compromise the practice of making epistemic judgments. The moral error theory may be true after all, Cowie concludes, and if it is then we will simply have to live with its concerning consequences.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780198842736
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Publication date:	12/17/2019
Pages:	246
Product dimensions:	8.60(w) x 5.50(h) x 0.90(d)

About the Author

Christopher Cowie, University of Durham

Christopher Cowie obtained his PhD from the University of Cambridge in 2014. He subsequently worked as a Research Fellow at Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge. Cowie is currently Assistant Professor in Philosophy at the University of Durham.

Table of Contents

IntroductionPart I. The Argument From Analogy1. Moral Error Theory2. The AnalogyPart II. Against the Analogy3. Against Internalism-Parity4. Against Internalism-Parity: A Supplementary Argument5. Against Irreducibility-ParityPart III. Elaboration6. The Conventionalism Criticism7. Simple Veritism8. The Normativity of EvidencePart IV. Fall-Backs and Loose-Ends9. Error Theory and Thought10. A Puzzling Combination11. Conclusion

Editorial Reviews

"Readers interested in meta-normativity would do well to read it both to navigate the explosion of meta-normativity literature and as an example of numerous authorial virtues — clarity, precision, thoroughness and more." — Alex Murphy, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

From the Publisher