We typically assume that the standard for what is beautiful lies in the
eye of the beholder. Yet this is not the case when we consider
morality; what we deem morally good is not usually a matter of opinion.
Such thoughts push us toward being realists about moral properties, but
a cogent theory of moral realism has long been an elusive philosophical
goal.
Paul Bloomfield here offers a rigorous defense of moral realism,
developing an ontology for morality that models the property of being
morally good on the property of being physically healthy. The model is
assembled systematically; it first presents the metaphysics of
healthiness and goodness, then explains our epistemic access to
properties such as these, adds a complementary analysis of the semantics and syntax of moral discourse, and finishes with a discussion of how we become motivated to act morally. Bloomfield closely attends to the traditional challenges facing moral realism, and the discussion nimbly ranges from modern medical theory to ancient theories of virtue, and from animal navigation to the nature of normativity.
Maintaining a highly readable style throughout, Moral Reality yields
one of the most compelling theories of moral realism to date and will
appeal to philosophers working on issues in metaphysics or moral
philosophy.