Moral Realism: A Defence / Edition 1

by Russ Shafer-Landau

Overview

Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. His central thesis, as well as the many novel supporting arguments used to defend it, will spark much controversy among those concerned with the foundations of ethics.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780199280209
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Publication date:	07/14/2005
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	334
Product dimensions:	9.20(w) x 6.26(h) x 0.73(d)

About the Author

University of Wisconsin-Madison

Table of Contents

I. REALISM AND ITS CRITICS1. The Non-cognitivist Challenge2. The Constructivist ChallengeII. MORAL METAPHYSICS3. Ethical Non-naturalism4. Supervenience and CausationIII. MORAL MOTIVATION5. Motivational Humeanism6. Motivational Judgement InternalismIV. MORAL REASONS7. Reasons Internalism8. Moral Rationalism9. Rationality and DisagreementV. MORAL KNOWLEDGE10. Moral Scepticism11. The Justification of Moral Principles12. The Justification of Verdictive BeliefsReferencesIndex

Editorial Reviews

"...a carefully developed defense of a nonnaturalistic moral realism. Shafer-Landau covers a wide range of material, presenting an impressive array of arguments both in providing positive support for his position and undermining opposing views...this book will be the focus of much attention in metaethical discussion." — The Review of Metaphysics

"A book of remarkable scope and ambition...clear and engaging throughout...[Shafer-Landau] develops a number of novel arguments for what is sure to be a controversial set of mutually supporting and philosophically interesting positions...very much worth reading. It is also accessible and engaging enough to be useful for teaching advanced undergraduates."—Michael Ridge, Australasian Journal of Philosophy

From the Publisher