Mons, an Artillery Battle

by David Hutchison

Overview

This book is a history of the Battle of Mons in August 1914. It diverges widely from the story enshrined as fact in the Official History, and by subsequent accounts dependent on it. It is based on an examination of the war diaries of almost every British unit involved in the battle, with particular reference to the artillery, thus illuminating the tactical intentions of all arms in every phase of the battle. The artillery had made tactical preparations for the handling of their guns in battle. All units in the British Army conformed to Field Service Regulations. The central role that both these played in the battle is explored.

In documenting the orders to, and subsequent actions of, junior units, many routinely referenced statements in even recent publications pertaining to the battle are challenged. The British went into battle without much of its field artillery. The German field artillery went into battle with totally defective ammunition. These two facts alone profoundly alter the conventional narrative. The primary importance of well-positioned artillery, supporting British army maneuvers, is explained. The routine protection that the guns supplied to their allocated infantry battalions is described; and the devastating effect of German howitzer fire on a number of British infantry and artillery units documented.

Each of the three senior British generals reacted differently to the stress of battle, and their anxieties can be followed and explored in detail. General French, in command of the British Expeditionary Force, remained in tighter control of events than is generally portrayed. General Smith-Dorrien, of II Corps, is confirmed as the main architect of the fighting on the day; and with luck on his side, fought an almost faultless campaign. Both were relying on General Haig, to bring his I Corps up in support II Corps. Not only did he disobey this order to advance, but he did not warn either General French or II Corps that he was withholding support. This breached Army Regulations, and endangered the whole force. The records reveal that he side-lined his staff, and issued such a series of orders and counter-orders, that he exasperated and demoralised his men. General Haig’s report on the battle is an oft-quoted primary source. From the day before the battle, it is so inaccurate as to be almost valueless as a summary of events. If the full details of his actions on the day had been known at the time, he could have been dismissed for incompetence. He might even have been court-martialled.

How each of the three generals perceived the role of the artillery under their command is also explored, from the point of view of their previous military experience. The origins of the poor use of artillery by the British Army later in the war can be traced back; partly to the professional army structure of 1914 and the qualities that would be lost as their casualties mounted; and partly to cavalry generals winning out over infantry generals in the direction of future campaigns of the British army.

The Battle of Mons was a dress-rehearsal for the war on the Western Front. It was of disproportionate importance in determining how the British army was handled in the future. It deserves to be better understood by students of the period.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781912390731
Publisher:	Helion and Company
Publication date:	01/18/2019
Pages:	184
Product dimensions:	6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x (d)

About the Author

David Hutchison is the pen-name of a recently retired Cambridge graduate who had a career in medicine. He has published several books, including ‘The Young Gunner, the Royal Field Artillery in the Great War’, and an article on the effectiveness of German field artillery at Mons in the Journal for Army Historical Research.

Table of Contents

List of illustrations vi

List of Maps vii

Summary of the Battle ix

Introduction 13

I.1 Gunners 13

I.2 The Artillery 14

I.3 Guns of the British Army 15

I.4 7.7 cm Feldkanone neuer Art 17

I.5 Artillery Tactical Development 20

I.6 Field Service Regulations 1912 22

I.7 Tactical Deployment at divisional level 25

I.8 Senior Command 29

1 The First Twenty Days of August 1914 31

1.1 Mobilisation 31

1.2 The Move to France 34

1.3 The Move towards Belgium 35

1.4 Events in Belgium and France 36

1.5 The German Armies 37

1.6 The British Concentration 38

2 The 21st & 22nd of August 1914 43

2.1 Advance of the British Expeditionary Force 43

2.2 Arrival of General Smith Dorrien 44

2.3 The British plan, as envisaged by I Corps for 23 August 48

2.4 The British plan, as envisaged by II Corps for 23 August 49

2.5 Geography 50

2.6 General Smith-Dorrien's Reconnaissance 51

2.7 5th Division Reconnaissance of the Frontline 51

2.8 3rd Division Reconnaissance of the Frontline 53

2.9 The British Plan as envisaged by GHQ for 23 August 54

2.10 Reaction to Events: I Corps 55

2.11 Summary of Plans for 23 August on evening of 22 August 61

3 The Day of Battle - 23 August 1914 62

3.1 I Corps Artillery 62

3.2 The Salient 63

3.3 The Conference of the Generals 64

3.4 Planning a Fighting Withdrawal 67

3.5 The Immediate Consequences of the Meetings 68

3.6 5th Division Artillery, II Corps 69

3.7 3rd Division Artillery, II Corps 72

3.8 Summary of II Corps Artillery Dispositions 74

3.9 The German Army and its Artillery 74

3.10 The British Artillery in the Salient, 3rd Division 77

3.11 The 4th (Guards) Brigade 82

3.12 General Haig's Account of I Corps Dispositions 84

3.13 British Artillery along the Canal, 5th Division 85

3.14 I Corps Artillery 89

3.15 First Request for Assistance by II Corps 91

3.16 2nd Division Artillery Dispositions 94

3.17 The Salient in late afternoon 95

3.18 I Corps Artillery in Action 96

3.19 Second Request for Assistance by II Corps 99

3.20 II Corps Retirement to Second Positions 103

3.21 I Corps on the evening of 23 August 104

3.22 GHQ Reaction to the events of 23 August 106

4 Second Day of Battle - 24 August 1914 107

4.1 GHQ Orders a Withdrawal 107

4.2 GHQ Orders to the left flank 108

4.3 German Intentions on 24 August 109

4.4 Withdrawal of I Corps 111

4.5 II Corps Prepares for Withdrawal 115

4.6 First German Infantry Advance 116

4.7 Rear-guard of 3rd Division 119

4.8 Second German Infantry Advance 120

4.9 Third German Infantry Advance 124

4.10 Left Wing of the BEF 125

4.11 The Retirement of the 3rd Division Howitzers 126

5 Consequences of Mons 128

5.1 Aftermath 128

5.2 Artillery Tactics at Mons 128

5.3 Impact of Field Service Regulations 131

5.4 The Generals 133

5.5 Potential Lessons of the Battle 137

5.6 Postscript 142

Appendices

I British Artillery Organisation, 1914 143

II BEF Orders of Battle, August 1914 145

III German Army General Structure, 1914 149

IV Lecture on Co-operation between Artillery and Infantry, August 1913 151

Bibliography 157

Index 163