Miller's Children: Why Giving Teenage Killers a Second Chance Matters for All of Us
216
Miller's Children: Why Giving Teenage Killers a Second Chance Matters for All of Us
216Paperback(First Edition)
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Overview
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780520295681 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | University of California Press |
| Publication date: | 02/27/2018 |
| Edition description: | First Edition |
| Pages: | 216 |
| Sales rank: | 696,259 |
| Product dimensions: | 5.90(w) x 8.90(h) x 0.60(d) |
About the Author
Read an Excerpt
CHAPTER 1
Adolescence Squared
WHY ARE KIDS WHO KILL DIFFERENT?
This chapter outlines how the Supreme Court ruling in Miller v. Alabama in 2012 (and the follow-up decisions that made this ruling universally retroactive) changed the lives of juvenile murderers originally sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. I also look at how it changed my own life.
COOK COUNTY COURT, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS: Two decades ago, seventeen-year-old Javell Ivory, fifteen-year-old Darnell Foxx, and two other members of a gang called the Mafia Insane Vice Lords stole a van to transport them on a mission of retaliation. Days earlier, a member of their gang had been shot by their archenemies — the Gangster Disciples — who controlled the adjacent territory. Now it was time to restore the balance of power, avenge their loss, and uphold their honor. The four "soldiers" carried three weapons among them on their mission — two pistols and a semiautomatic rifle. Crossing Cicero Avenue on Chicago's South Side, they entered into "enemy territory" and zeroed in on a gas station, where they identified someone they thought was an appropriate target: twenty-one-year-old Joshua Thomas (who, it was later reported, was not a member of the rival gang). While Javell (who was carrying a .22 caliber pistol) sat in the van, both Darnell and one of the other "soldiers" opened fire in classic drive-by-shooting style. Joshua Thomas was killed in a hail of bullets, but he was not the only victim. Standing next to him was twenty-four-year-old Salada Smith, six months pregnant with her second child. She, too, was killed in the fusillade. Two other innocent bystanders, both male, were also hit but survived. Thus, as is sometimes the case in such attacks, the "collateral damage" exceeded the "intended damage." Within days, Javell and his three companions were identified and arrested. They soon confessed. Javell was tried for murder, despite the fact that he did not fire a shot in the fatal attack, under the legal principle of "felony murder" (which considers everyone involved in a felony in which homicide occurs accountable for the crime and guilty of murder, regardless of whether they wielded the weapon). Under the law in effect at the time, although they were juveniles, Javell and Darnell received mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole. Now, two decades later, both of them sat in a courtroom in the Cook County Courthouse for a resentencing hearing. They hoped for a decision that would open the prison door for eventual release if presiding judge James Obbish imposed a limited number of years, rather than the existing sentence that would have them dying in prison.
I have served as a psychological expert witness in murder cases since 1994, focusing on issues of child and adolescent development (as chronicled in my 1999 book Lost Boys and my 2015 book Listening to Killers). As a result, I was asked to serve as a psychological expert witness for Javell Ivory. In court on May 24, 2016, my testimony focused on the immature brains and behavior of juveniles, the power of peer influence on teenagers, the destructive impact of growing up in a socially toxic family and community environment, and the reality of rehabilitation and transformation that exist in the minds and hearts of adolescent killers despite the severity of the crimes they commit. I prepared a twenty-four-page, single-spaced report, in which I laid out a developmental analysis of the life that brought Javell to that terrible day in 1997. This analysis included his experience with childhood trauma in an urban "war zone," the effects of that experience on his judgment and feelings (what I called the "war zone mentality"), and the larger picture of abuse, neglect, social deprivation, drug abuse, and crime that shaped his life. I also laid out the evidence that he had become rehabilitated and transformed during his twenty years in prison. I summarized my conclusions in this way:
All of these factors must be understood in the context of him being a seventeen-yearold adolescent from a traumatic and unsupportive social environment when he committed the crime for which he is being sentenced, and thus plagued by the kind of developmental immaturity characteristic of teenagers in general, and most especially of teenagers with traumatic histories. ... What is more, he exemplifies the principle that because of the "malleability" of even adult brains, there are possibilities for rehabilitation inherent in juveniles, even juveniles with traumatic life experiences and who grew up in social environments loaded with trauma and antisocial influences.
It worked. Here's how the Chicago Tribune reported on the resentencing decision handed down by Judge Obbish, which replaced life without parole with eventual release dates:
Obbish said he weighed several factors before returning the new sentences, including the men's impoverished upbringing and early initiation into street gangs. The judge also said he took into consideration what Foxx and Ivory have accomplished during their incarcerations. Both men earned high school equivalency diplomas and completed a program that seeks to teach young offenders to appreciate the consequences of their actions. Obbish also cited a growing body of scientific evidence suggesting that teenage brains aren't fully developed and therefore lack the impulse control and the understanding of consequences that come with maturation. ... "I think by and large both of these men have displayed serious potential for rehabilitation," Obbish said Monday.
But why were Javell Ivory and Darnell Foxx in court for a resentencing hearing in the first place? After all, they had been sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. They weren't seeking clemency or a pardon. They were in court that day for resentencing because of the U.S. Supreme Court's 2012 Miller v. Alabama decision, in which the justices ruled 5–4 that mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole for juveniles who commit murder are unconstitutional. This was one of a series of rulings by the court that recognized juveniles as a class of defendants who merit special attention in the criminal justice system. These cases are outlined in box 1.
The Miller v. Alabama decision set in motion the process that brought me to the courtroom to testify on behalf of Javell, and it stimulated the writing of this book. As psychologist-lawyers Tom Grisso and Antoinette Kavanaugh wrote in 2016, in their excellent review of the legal and psychological issues arising in and from the Miller v. Alabama decision and its follow-up legal and policy development:
Developmental science now faces a new challenge. Its research served well to provide normative information with which the U.S. Supreme Court distinguished adolescence as an immature class. Now we must consider what role developmental science can play when applied, case by case, to describe legally relevant developmental characteristics of young people as evidence for individual mitigation in Miller sentencing and resentencing cases.
This book arose from my work to do that case-by-case application of developmental science, which includes forty such individual cases at the time of this writing.
A year before I testified on behalf of Javell Ivory, the first resentencing hearing of this kind was held in Illinois, and the judge in that case, Angela Petrone, reimposed the sentence of life without the possibility of parole upon Adolfo Davis, who, at age fourteen, was involved in a gang-related double murder. I didn't participate in that case. As for Darnell Foxx, although I wasn't a witness for him, since his and Javell's cases were heard by the same judge simultaneously, it seems likely that whatever influence I had on him in considering Javell's fate probably spilled over to his sentencing of Darnell.
After the judge delivered his verdict, I received this email from David Owens, the lead attorney working on Javell's behalf:
Today Judge Obbish issued his decision. ... He ultimately sentenced Javell to 30 years for the 2 murders and 12 for each aggravated battery, which were required to be consecutive, giving him a total sentence of 54 years. That's at 50–50 time, so it's a total sentence of 27 years and he's served 19 already. It's probably best to describe this as bittersweet. One thing is clear: the Judge was deeply influenced by, and took to account, your testimony. He pointed to it repeatedly during his decision. It was crucial to this result.
I quote this message not to draw attention to myself, but to highlight the point that when the "adolescent development" case is made, it is possible for judges to hear it and incorporate it into their thinking as they make these weighty decisions (which, as we will see, has even led to some of these juvenile offenders walking out of prison soon after their resentencing hearings with "time served"). That, in turn, leads to a more complete report of the Supreme Court's thinking in the decision that put David Owens, Javell Ivory, and me in Judge Obbish's court and opened the door for thousands of others. It created a new legal category that I call "Miller's Children."
MILLER V. ALABAMA
The Supreme Court decision in the case of Miller v. Alabama specifically dealt with the case of Evan Miller, a fourteen-year-old boy who had been subject to an Alabama law that provided for an automatic sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a murder he committed in 2003. Along with a friend, Miller beat up his neighbor and set fire to his trailer after an evening of drinking and drug use. The neighbor died. Miller was originally charged as a juvenile, but his case was removed to adult court, where he was charged with murder in the course of arson, while his friend pled guilty to a lesser crime.
Although it is the Miller case that has given the name to the decision banning mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile killers, there were actually two cases considered by the court in reaching its landmark decision. The other (Jackson v. Hobbs) came out of Arkansas, where fourteen-year-old Kuntrell Jackson accompanied two other boys (one of whom was his cousin) to a video store to commit a robbery. On the way to the store, he learned that one of the boys was carrying a shotgun. Jackson stayed outside the store for most of the robbery, but after he entered, one of his co-conspirators shot and killed the store clerk. Arkansas charged Jackson as an adult with capital felony murder, as Illinois had done with Javell Ivory. The jury convicted Jackson of both murder and aggravated robbery, and this resulted in a statutorily mandated sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole.
In Miller v. Alabama, the jury likewise found the defendant guilty, and the trial court likewise imposed statutorily mandated life without parole. The sentence was affirmed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. This decision was itself appealed and eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court. The court's 5–4 majority opinion struck down the Alabama law, reasoning thus:
Two strands of precedent reflecting the concern with proportionate punishment come together here. The first has adopted categorical bans on sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity of a penalty. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407. Several cases in this group have specially focused on juvenile offenders, because of their lesser culpability. Thus, Roper v. Simmons held that the Eighth Amendment bars capital punishment for children, and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. , concluded that the Amendment prohibits a sentence of life without parole for juveniles convicted of a non-homicide offense. Graham further likened life without parole of juveniles to the death penalty, thereby evoking a second line of cases. In those decisions, this Court has required sentencing authorities to consider the characteristics of a defendant and the details of his offense before sentencing him to death. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (plurality opinion). Here, the confluence of these two lines of precedent leads to the conclusion that mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment.
In addition to the legal arguments presented, the justices cited the scientific evidence presented to the court in Miller v. Alabama and in earlier, related decisions (such as Roper v. Simmons in 2005, which outlawed capital punishment for juveniles). This included an amicus brief by the American Psychological Association. It's important to note that the court ruled that mandatory (but not discretionary) sentences of life without the possibility of parole for murderers under the age of eighteen are unconstitutional. This is the loophole that permitted the Chicago judge in the Adolfo Davis hearing to simply "resentence" him to the sentence of life without parole that he started out with. As we will see, however, that too may be coming to an end.
In its 2016 ruling in the case of Tatum v. Arizona, the majority summarily reversed the convictions of five juveniles who had been sentenced to life without parole, writing: "On the record before us, none of the sentencing judges addressed the question Miller and Montgomery [v. Louisiana] require a sentencer to ask: whether the petitioner was among the very 'rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.'" In an opinion written by Sotomayor, the majority instructed:
It is clear after Montgomery that the Eighth Amendment requires more than mere consideration of a juvenile offender's age before the imposition of a sentence of life without parole. It requires that a sentencer decide whether the juvenile offender before it is a child "whose crimes reflect transient immaturity" or is one of "those rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption" for whom a life without parole sentence may be appropriate. ... There is thus a very meaningful task for the lower courts to carry out on remand.
Alito and Thomas dissented, but their dissent appears to make it clear that the court has now extended the principles articulated in both Miller v. Alabama and Graham v. Florida to all life-without-parole sentences for juveniles, not just such sentences when they are mandatory rather than discretionary. Alito wrote:
In any event, the Arizona decisions at issue are fully consistent with Miller's central holding, namely, that mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders is unconstitutional. ... A sentence of life without parole was imposed in each of these cases, not because Arizona law dictated such a sentence, but because a court, after taking the defendant's youth into account, found that life without parole was appropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the offender.
Alito goes on to say:
It is true that the Miller Court also opined that "life without parole is excessive for all but 'the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,'" ... but the record in the cases at issue provides ample support for the conclusion that these "children" fall into that category.
Then, of course, he highlights what he sees as the most egregious facts of each crime. By granting that even Alito thought that this was the issue (i.e., the nature of each individual juvenile's case), it appears that the court has made clear now that the sentencing court is required to make the "irreparable corruption" finding before imposing life without parole for any juvenile offender. This rule still leaves open the possibility of life-without-parole sentences for juveniles (which, I believe, is a wrong yet to be righted), but it effectively nullifies the mandatory/discretionary distinction. That's progress, even though it does leave the loophole that permits discretionary sentences of life without parole for juveniles.
MY HOPE
From my perspective, the loophole that allows teenage killers to receive discretionary sentences of life without the possibility of parole is why I hope the court will take the next steps in the process of the United States joining the rest of the "civilized" world in exempting all juveniles from life sentences without the possibility of parole. Amnesty International put it this way: "The United States is believed to stand alone in sentencing children to life without parole. Although several countries technically permit the practice, Amnesty International knows of no cases outside the United States where such a sentence has been imposed in recent years" (www.amnestyusa.org/).
(Continues…)
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