Logistics in the Falklands War: A Case Study in Expeditionary Warfare

by Kenneth L. Privratsky

Overview

While many books have been written on the Falklands War, this is the first to focus on the vital aspect of logistics. The challenges were huge; the lack of preparation time; the urgency; the huge distances involved; the need to requisition ships from trade to name but four.

After a brief discussion of events leading to Argentina's invasion the book describes in detail the rush to re-organise and deploy forces, despatch a large task force, the innovative solutions needed to sustain the Task Force, the vital staging base at Ascension Island, the in-theatre resupply, the set-backs and finally the restoring of order after victory.

Had the logistics plan failed, victory would have been impossible and humiliation inevitable, with no food for the troops, no ammunition for the guns, no medical support for casualties etc.

The lessons learnt have never been more important with increasing numbers of out-of-area operations required in remote trouble spots at short notice. The Falklands experience is crucial for the education of new generations of military planners and fascinating for military buffs and this book fills an important gap.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781473899049
Publisher:	Pen and Sword
Publication date:	06/12/2017
Edition description:	Reprint
Pages:	304
Sales rank:	420,230
Product dimensions:	6.10(w) x 9.10(h) x 1.00(d)

About the Author

Born in Calcutta, Julian Thompson was educated at Sherborne School. He joined the Royal Marines aged 18 and served on seven continents over 34 years.

He commanded 40 Commando Royal Marines and then, during the Falklands War, 3 Commando Brigade which made the initial Landings and saw much of the action in the battles that followed.

Since retiring as a Major General he has pursued literary and academic interests. He is a Visiting Professor at the Department of War Studies, King’s College, London. Among his many published works are Ready For Anything; The Parachute Regiment at War 1940 – 1982, The Lifeblood of War: Logistics and Armed Conflict and The Royal Marines. He has published six books with the Imperial War Museum: Victory in Europe, The War at Sea: the Royal Navy in the Second World War, Behind Enemy Lines, Modern Warfare (ed), The War in Burma and The War at Sea 1914-1918.

Ken Privratsky spent 33 years in the U. S. Army before retiring in 2002 as a Major General. He served as an infantry platoon leader in combat in Vietnam and commanded units at all levels, including two worldwide joint organizations as a general officer. For the majority of his military career he specialized in logistics. He was responsible for the Army’s strategic mobility program in the Pentagon. He led supply distribution for the U. S. Department of Defense worldwide. In his final assignment he was responsible for surface transportation and military ocean terminal operations for Department of Defense worldwide. He has been awarded the highest service decorations from Department of Defense and the U. S. Army and received personal recognition from the Vice President of the United States for his revolutionary changes to military distribution operations. He was inducted into the Defense Logistics Hall of Fame in 2004. After leaving the military, Privratsky entered the ocean shipping business with the largest domestic shipping company in the U. S. He became responsible for operations spanning the Pacific, including terminal operations in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam and along the west coast of the U. S. He retired from industry in 2010. Ken has earned graduate degrees in English, Business, and Military Art and Science. He was a National Security Affairs Fellow at the Hoover Institution of War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University. As a young officer, he graduated from the Army’s Airborne and Ranger Schools.

Table of Contents

Foreword vi

Preface x

Acknowledgements xvii

Glossary of Terms and Acronyms xx

Maps xxiii

Chapter 1 Prelude to War 1

Chapter 2 Mobilization and Deployment 20

Chapter 3 Initial Planning and Preparation at Sea 43

Chapter 4 Support Operations at Ascension Island 60

Chapter 5 Final Preparation for the Amphibious Assault 83

Chapter 6 D-Day and the Struggle to Build up Logistics 102

Chapter 7 The Breakout and Fight for Goose Green 126

Chapter 8 More Forces and Challenges 147

Chapter 9 Problems at Fitzroy 169

Chapter 10 The Battle for Mountains Surrounding Stanley 189

Chapter 11 After the Surrender 215

Chapter 12 A Reflection on the British Experience 234

Notes 249

Bibliography 258

Index 263

Editorial Reviews

"highlights the importance of the integration of combat operations and logistics ..... argues convincingly that logistics was the center of gravity of the campaign... thorough research, including interviews leads to a comprehensive description of the combat operations and movement of supplies and equipment from the amphibious landing zone on the west shore of East Falkland on D-Day 21 May 1982, to the surrender on 14 June 1982... Privatsky's insights could also be applied to humanitarian affairs operations, especially if a natural disaster has destroyed piers or off loading equipment, or occurred in a remote location without pre positioned stores. Military operational planners and military history enthusiasts should add this book to their professional library"

Spring 2016 Naval War College Review

"a timely book that explores the logistical challenges of projecting decisive combat power across transoceanic distances. As America’s Joint force explores new ways of leveraging technology to counter aggression from a distance, this book dispels any misunderstanding about the magnitude of the challenges that supplying war across great distances creates. At the end of the day, projecting and sustaining combat power for conflict and post-conflict operations is a logistical undertaking requiring foresight, planning, C2, and extensive logistical preparation of the battle space. A country’s operational reach is ultimately determined by its’ military effectiveness in projecting and sustaining combat power—which is all about logistics."

Marine Corps Gazette

‘Logistics in the Falklands War’ is, in short, a thorough account of how the British hastily improvised a task force to recapture lost territory. It shows how doing that was achieved by coordinating civilian and military assets and integrating the civilian assets into a military organization; it reveals the complexities of managing logistics afloat and ashore and of integrating fundamentally different methodologies; finally, it demonstrates that expeditionary forces, in whatever environment they may deploy, must be self-sustaining, for the logistical line becomes more and more tenuous as the distance from the home base increases. As Privratsky presents the story, one may wonder at the British achievement but also draw discomforting lessons for the present.

Australian Naval Institute

With inadequate training, little intelligence, no contingency plan, a politically driven rush and at 8,000 miles, it is not surprising that logistics during Op CORPORATE were confusing and challenging. It has taken a US Army general to explain why. We should all be grateful.

Michael Clapp

"a very accurate report about the course of ‘The Conflict’, like the British call it. The book gives a good insight in the decision process, at the Argentinian as well as at the British side, which lead to the armed battle of these islands. What interested me most is how the British came to it to decide, almost overnight, to begin a war and also, within 48 hours (promised by the British Navy) actually sailed out... a broad, interesting and subtle picture of the events that took place"

Aviation Book Reviews

… should be mandatory reading for all those who will partake in instituting preparations, as well as implementation, of future ADF amphibious operations. “

Journal of Military and Veteran's Health

highlights the importance of the integration of combat operations and logistics ..... argues convincingly that logistics was the center of gravity of the campaign... thorough research, including interviews leads to a comprehensive description of the combat operations and movement of supplies and equipment from the amphibious landing zone on the west shore of East Falkland on D-Day 21 May 1982, to the surrender on 14 June 1982... Privatsky's insights could also be applied to humanitarian affairs operations, especially if a natural disaster has destroyed piers or off loading equipment, or occurred in a remote location without pre positioned stores. Military operational planners and military history enthusiasts should add this book to their professional library

Naval War College Review Spring 2016

With inadequate training, little intelligence, no contingency plan, a politically driven rush and at 8,000 miles, it is not surprising that logistics during Op CORPORATE were confusing and challenging. It has taken a US Army general to explain why. We should all be grateful.

Commander Amphibious Task Force Michael Clapp