Limits of Persuasion: Germany and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1991-1992

Limits of Persuasion: Germany and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1991-1992

by Donald D. Halstead, Michael Libal
Limits of Persuasion: Germany and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1991-1992

Limits of Persuasion: Germany and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1991-1992

by Donald D. Halstead, Michael Libal

Hardcover

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Overview

This book provides both a unique, first-hand account of German and European diplomacy in the early stages of the Yugoslav crisis and a detailed analysis of the major issues. By correcting the many misperceptions and misjudgments about that period, the book will put the debate on Western involvement in the former Yugoslavia on a new and more solid basis.

This book presents both a detailed historical account of German diplomacy in the first year of the Yugoslav crisis and a thorough analysis of the issues that Germany and the international community faced at the time. Written by the German diplomat responsible for the conduct of German policy on the working level, the book is a compelling, first-hand view of the motives, perceptions, and actions of the German government.

Part I is a chronological treatment of the responses of the European Community and of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to developments on the ground—in particular, the military conflict in Croatia and the German role in shaping these responses. Part II provides a systematic treatment of the causes of the conflict and the major issues raised by the Yugoslav crisis, such as questions concerning self-determination, frontiers, the role of history, and the recognition of successor states. Taken together, the two parts provide a comprehensive analysis of the origins of international involvement in the Bosnian war. This book will interest scholars, researchers, and policymakers involved with the Bosnian conflict and contemporary German and international relations.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780275957988
Publisher: Bloomsbury Academic
Publication date: 11/20/1997
Pages: 224
Product dimensions: 6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 0.62(d)

About the Author

MICHAEL LIBAL is Ambassador, Head of the Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to Georgia. An historian and political scientist by training, he has studied and taught at American universities. As a diplomat, he has specialized in Russian and Eastern European Affairs. From 1991 to 1995, he headed the German Foreign Ministry's department dealing with the Yugoslav crisis, and in 1995-1996 he was a Fellow of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.

Table of Contents

Preface
Germany and Yugoslavia: The Story, 1991-1992
Germany and Yugoslavia Before the Summer of 1991
The Crisis Breaks: 23 June-7 July 1991
Serbia Launches a New Balkan War: July-August 1991
Birth of the Peace Conference: August-September 1991
The Death of Yugoslavia: September-October 1991
Struggling with Serb Obstinacy: October-November 1991
The Road to Recognition: November-December 1991
The War Spreads to Bosnia: January-June 1992
The London Conference: July-August 1992
Germany and Yugoslavia: 1991-1992: The Issues
On Values and Interests
Between Self-Determination and Institutional Legitimacy: On the Dangers and Limits of Political Rhetoric
Shadows of the Past: Did Germany Re-enact History?
A New Balkan War: On the Nature and Origins of the Conflicts in Yugoslavia
States and Frontiers: On the Dialectic of Unity and Diversity in the Yugoslav Realm
Resisting False Claims: Why Serbia Is Not Yugoslavia (and Never Was)
Recognition: The Myth of Prematureness
Recognition: The Legend of Unilateralism
Conclusions
Correct Insights and Sound Principles Cannot Cure Behavioral Weaknesses
Notes
Chronology of Events
Glossary
Annotated Bibliography
Index

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