Learning from Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War / Edition 1

by Richard D. Downie

Overview

Why have militaries so often failed to learn from conflict and war? Why, for example, despite years of unsuccessful counterinsurgency experiences in Vietnam and El Salvador and repeated recommendations from official Army studies, has the U.S. Army not changed its doctrine for counterinsurgency? Writing for scholars as well as military professionals and policymakers, Downie examines the sources of doctrinal change and innovation from a theoretical perspective and derives practical and relevant policy recommendations.

Contrasting with other findings in this field, Downie provides case studies showing that neither external pressure on a military nor institutional recognition of the requirement for doctrinal change is sufficient to explain the process of doctrinal change. A military innovates when it learns, by proceeding through a learning cycle that includes achieving an organizational consensus that permits adoption of new approaches that respond to factors that make existing doctrine deficient. When that process is blocked, militaries are left with outmoded doctrinal approaches that constrain military performance and lead to defeat. This is an important study for military leaders, civilian policymakers, and scholars and researchers dealing with contemporary U.S. military issues.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780275960100
Publisher:	Bloomsbury Academic
Publication date:	06/18/1998
Pages:	312
Product dimensions:	6.14(w) x 9.21(h) x 0.75(d)

About the Author

RICHARD DUNCAN DOWNIE is currently Chief of the North and Central America Branch in the office of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Strategy, Policy and Plans Directorate. He is also currently serving on the U.S. Delegation negotiating a possible U.S. presence in Panama after 1999. He has held a variety of command and staff positions and has written in scholarly and professional jourbanals.

Table of Contents

Preface and Reader's Guide
Abbreviations
Introduction and Theoretical Overview
Overview and Background
The Sources of Doctrinal Change: Structuring Contending Explanations
Development and Evolution of U.S. Doctrine for Counterinsurgency and LIC
Case Study 1: Analyzing Change to Published Doctrine for Counterinsurgency in the Post-Vietnam War Era
Official Army Studies on Counterinsurgency and Identifying Shortcomings
Counterinsurgency Doctrine in the Post-Vietnam War Era: Has There Been Conceptual Change?
Did the U.S. Army Learn?: Assessing the Doctrinal Evidence
Case Study 2: Testing for Doctrinal Continuity: The U.S. Counterinsurgency Assistance Effort in El Salvador
"Drawing the Line" in Central America: U.S. Counterinsurgency Assistance in El Salvador
Counterinsurgency from Vietnam to El Salvador: Testing for Doctrinal Continuity
Why Didn't Counterinsurgency Doctrine Change After the Vietnam War: Testing Hypotheses
Case Study 3: Testing for Doctrinal Change or Continuity: The Drug War in the Andean Ridge
Fighting The Drug War on the Andean Ridge
Explaining Doctrinal Change: The Drug War on the Andean Ridge
Conclusions and Recommendations
Theoretical Conclusions
Recommendations: LIC and Military Organizations as Learning Institutions
Appendix: Measuring Change in Doctrine for Counterinsurgency
Selected Bibliography
Index

Editorial Reviews

Seeks to determine if the US military learned from its mistakes during the Vietnam War and other low intensity conflicts (LICs) by examining whether and how the military applied learning in subsequent conflicts. Part I offers background information on case studies and the evolution of concepts underpinning the Army's doctrine for LIC. Case studies in Parts II-IV examine how various factors influence or fail to influence change in military doctrine. For policy makers, academics, military historians, and general readers. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.

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