Learning and Coordination: Inductive Deliberation, Equilibrium and Convention

by Peter Vanderschraaf

Overview

Vanderschraaf develops a new theory of game theory equilibrium selection in this book. The new theory defends general correlated equilibrium concepts and suggests a new analysis of convention.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781135725976
Publisher:	Taylor & Francis
Publication date:	01/02/2014
Series:	Studies in Ethics
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
Pages:	244
File size:	6 MB

About the Author

Peter Vanderschraaf is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Social and Decision Sciences at Carnegie Mellon University.

Table of Contents

1. Social Interactions and Principles of Rational Decision; 1.0 Introduction; 1.1 Examples of Social Coordination Problems; 1.2 Noncooperative Games; 1.3 Nash Equilibrium; 1.4 Examples Revisited; 1.5 Equilibrium-in-Beliefs; 1.6 Conclusions; 2. Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibrium Concepts; 2.0 Introduction; 2.1 Rationalizability; 2.3 Correlated Equilibrium Concepts; 3. Equilibrium Selection via Inductive Dynamic Deliberation; 3.0 Introduction; 3.1 The Dirichlet Rule; 3.2 Inductive Deliberation with Endogenous Correlation; 3.3 Correlating With Stages of the World; 3.4 Dirichlet Dynamics With Imperfect Memory; 3.5 Random Sampling Dirichlet Deliberation; 3.6 Deliberators With Variable States; 4. The Emergence of Social Convention; 4.0 Introduction; 4.1 Lewis' Characterization of Conventions; 4.2 Convention as Correlated Equilibrium; 4.3 Dynamical Explanations of Conventions; References; Index

Editorial Reviews

In this revision of his doctoral thesis (written at the U. of California at Irvine), Vanderschraaf provides a self-contained study to be used for a graduate course in game theory or as a resource for social scientists and philosophers who have a knowledge of game theory but are interested in convention and equilibrium selection. Social coordination problems and their solutions in conventions are discussed as background before moving to solution concepts in game theory and discussion of correlated equilibrium concepts. Inductive learning, with treatment of variants of fictitious play, is then described; the beginnings of an account of spontaneous convention conclude the volume. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

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