Table of Contents
Introduction 1
Part I The Nature of Law
1 The Nature of Legal Philosophy 7
I The Nature of Philosophy 7
II Pre-Understanding and Arguments 9
III Three Problems 10
IV Four Theses 11
V Entities and Concepts 12
VI Necessary Properties 13
VII Law and Morality 15
2 On the Concept and the Nature of Law 18
I The Practical and Theoretical Significance of the Debate 18
A Statutory Injustice and the Radbruch Formula 18
B Law's Open Texture and the Self-Understanding of Jurists 19
C The Concept of Law as a Concept of a Non-Natural Kind 20
II Positivism and Non-Positivism 21
A Separation Thesis and Connection Thesis 21
B Exclusive and Inclusive Positivism 22
C Exclusive, Inclusive, and Super-Inclusive Non-Positivism 23
III Concept and Nature 27
A Nature 27
B Concept 28
IV The Dual Nature of Law 29
A Coercion 30
B Correctness 31
V What the Law Is and What It Ought to Be 33
3 The Dual Nature of Law 36
I The Ideal 36
A The Claim to Correctness 36
B Discourse Theory 40
II The Real 42
III The Reconciliation of the Ideal and the Real 43
A Outermost Border 44
B Democratic Constitutionalism 47
4 Law, Morality, and the Existence of Human Rights 51
I Positivism, Non-Positivism, and the Existence Problem 51
A Three Elements and Two Dimensions 52
B Two Forms of Positivism 52
C Three Forms of Non-Positivism 53
D Inclusive Non-Positivism and the Existence Problem 56
II The Existence of Human Rights 57
A Human Rights as Moral Elements 58
B The Concept of Human Rights 59
C The Justifiability of Human Rights 60
5 An Answer to Joseph Raz 64
I Separation Thesis 64
A Kelsen's Statement 66
B The Idea of a Definition of Law 68
C Necessary Connections 69
II Participants and Observers 72
III The Argument from Correctness 75
IV The Argument from Injustice 77
V The Argument from Principles 80
6 The Ideal Dimension of Law 83
I The Claim to Correctness 83
II Conceptual Analysis and Conceptual Necessities 86
A The Argument from Fruitlessness 86
B The Argument from Deficiency 88
III The Necessity of the Real Dimension of Law 90
IV A Conceptual Framework 91
A First-Order and Second-Order Correctness 91
B Observer and Participant 92
C Perspectives and Dimensions 94
D Classifying and Qualifying Connections 94
V The Relation between the Real and the Ideal Dimension 97
A The Radbruch Formula 98
B The Special Case Thesis 103
C Human Rights 104
D Democracy 105
E Principles Theory 106
7 Gustav Radbruch's Concept of Law 107
I Gustav Radbruch's System 108
A The Law Triad 108
B The Idea Triad 111
C The Triad of Purpose 113
II The Radbruch Formula 115
Part II Constitutional Rights, Human Rights, and Proportionality
8 The Construction of Constitutional Rights 121
I The Rule Construction 121
A Rules and Principles 121
B The Postulate to Avoid Balancing 122
C Problems of the Rule Construction 123
II Principles Construction and Proportionality Analysis 124
III Objections to the Principles Construction 124
IV The Rationality of Balancing 126
A The Central Role of the Rationality Problem 126
B The Irrationality Objection 127
C Pareto-Optimality 127
D The Law of Balancing 128
E The Weight Formula 128
9 Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation 133
I Balancing 133
A Two Objections 134
B The Structure of Balancing 135
II Constitutional Review 138
III Representation 139
A Argumentative Representation 139
B Conditions of True Argumentative Representation 140
10 The Existence of Human Rights 142
I The Theoretical and Practical Significance of the Existence Question 142
II The Concept of Human Rights 143
III The Justification of Human Rights 145
A The Principles Structure of Human Rights 145
B Scepticism and Non-Scepticism 146
C Justification and Thesis 147
D Eight Justifications 147
11 The Weight Formula 154
I The Norm-Theoretic Basis: Rules and Principles 154
II The Principle of Proportionality in the Narrower Sense 155
III The Triadic Scale 159
IV The Formula 165
V The Extended Formula 173
12 Formal Principles: Some Replies to Critics 175
I The Problem 175
II Some Basic Elements of Principles Theory 176
A Rules and Principles 176
B Proportionality 176
C Weight Formula 177
III The Concept of Formal Principle 179
IV Principles and Balancing in General 180
V The Wrong Way 182
VI Two Kinds of Discretion 184
VII Second-Order Epistemic Optimization 184
VIII Formal Principles and Discretion 188
13 Ideal 'Ought' and Optimization 190
I The Index Model of the Ideal 'Ought' 191
II The Law of Competing Principles 193
III The Weight Formula 196
IV Law of Competing Principles and Law of Balancing 197
V A Fundamental Equivalence 198
VI Poscher's Argument from Identity 199
VII Sieckmann's Reiterated Validity Obligations 200
14 Human Dignity and Proportionality 205
I Absolute and Relative Conceptions of Human Dignity 205
II Practical Significance 205
III Some Basic Elements of Principles Theory 207
A Rules and Principles 207
B Proportionality 208
C Weight Formula 209
IV The Concept of Human Dignity 211
A Descriptive and Normative Elements 211
B The 'Double-Triadic' Concept of Person 212
C Human Dignity as a Bridge Concept 213
V Human Dignity as Principle and as Rule 214
A Human Dignity as Principle 214
B Human Dignity as a Rule 215
VI Devaluation of Human Dignity? 216
A Clear Cases 216
B Object Formula 217
C Abstract Weight and Epistemic Reliability 217
D Rationality 218
15 Proportionality and Rationality 220
I Empirical and Analytical Approaches 220
II Proportionality and Principles Theory 220
A Rules and Principles 220
B Proportionality 221
III Balancing and Argumentation 226
A The Formal and the Substantive Dimension of Rationality 226
B Numbers, Classification Propositions, and their Justification 228
C Disagreement, Discourse, and Rationality 229
IV Balancing, Universalizability, and Legal Certainty 231
A The ad hoc Problem 231
B The Law of Competing Principles 232
C Rules and Conditions 234
16 The Absolute and the Relative Dimension of Constitutional Rights 235
I The Absolute and the Relative 235
II Constitutional Rights 236
A Constitutional and Human Rights 236
B The Degree of the Absolute Dimension of Constitutional Rights 238
III Proportionality 240
A The Absoluteness of the Principle of Proportionality 240
B The Relativity and Absoluteness of the Application of the Principle of Proportionality 247
Part III Argumentation, Correctness, and Law
17 A Discourse-Theoretical Conception of Practical Reason 255
I Introduction 255
II In Defence of the Concept of Practical Reason 256
III A Kantian Conception of Practical Rationality: Discourse Theory 258
A The Basic Idea of Discourse Theory 259
B The Status of Discourse Theory as a Theory of Practical Correctness and Rationality 261
C Towards the Justification of the Rules of Discourse 263
D The Application of Discourse Theory 269
18 Problems of Discourse Theory 275
I Discourse Theory as a Procedural Theory 275
II Rules of Discourse 277
III The Ideal Discourse 278
A The Problem of Construction 278
B The Problem of Consensus 279
C The Problem of the Criterion 280
D The Problem of Correctness 281
IV The Real Discourse 285
A The Discursive Modalities 285
B The Relative Concept of Correctness 286
19 Legal Argumentation as Rational Discourse 288
I Models 288
A The Model of Deduction 288
B The Model of Decision 289
C The Hermeneutic Model 290
D The Model of Coherence 291
II A Discourse Theory of the Law 292
A General Practical Discourse 293
B Institutionalization 295
III Legal Argumentation 296
A The Different Kinds of Legal Arguments 296
B The Strength of the Arguments 297
20 Jürgen Habermas's Theory of the Indeterminacy of Law and the Rationality of Adjudication 299
I The Problem of Rationality in Adjudication 299
II Three Insufficient Answers 300
III Ronald Dworkins's Theory of Rights 301
IV Law as an Ideally Coherent System of Norms 304
V Theory of Legal Argumentation 306
VI The Special Case Thesis 307
A Moral, General Practical, and Legal Discourse 307
B The Rules and Forms of Legal Discourse 309
C Unjust Law 310
D Specific Legal Nature? 311
21 Law and Correctness 312
I The Concept of the Claim to Correctness 312
A The Subjects 312
B The Addressees 313
C Raising a Claim 314
II The Necessity of Connecting Law and Correctness 315
A An Absurd Constitutional Article 316
B An Absurd Judgment 318
C The Alternative 319
III Legal and Moral Correctness 320
A Law's Open Texture 320
B The Autonomy Objection 321
C The Objection of Impossibility 322
D Reality and Ideal 323
Index of Names 327
Index of Subjects 329
