| I. | The Argument for the Tensed Theory of Time | |
| 1. | The Translation Method and the Tensed and Tenseless Theories of Time | 3 |
| 1.1. | The Translation Method | 3 |
| 1.2. | The Old Tenseless Theory of Time | 8 |
| 1.3. | The New Tenseless Theory of Time | 11 |
| 1.4. | The A Priori Version of the Nonsemantic Tenseless Theory of Time | 14 |
| 1.5. | The A Posteriori Version of the Nonsemantic Tenseless Theory of Time | 18 |
| 2. | The Untranslatability of A-Sentences by Tenseless Date-Sentences | 27 |
| 2.1. | The Date Theory of A-Sentences | 27 |
| 2.2. | The Truth Conditions of A-Sentence-Tokens and Tenseless Date-Sentences | 33 |
| 2.3. | The Confirmation Conditions of A-Sentence-Tokens and Tenseless Date-Sentences | 39 |
| A. | Adolf Grunbaum's Theory of A-Date-Sentence-Tokens | 40 |
| B. | William Lycan's Theory | 42 |
| C. | David Kaplan's and Nathan Salmon's Implicit Theories | 44 |
| D. | Michelle Beer's Theory | 49 |
| 2.4. | The Entailment Relations of A-Sentence-Tokens and Tenseless Date-Sentences | 50 |
| 2.5. | The Logical Identities of A-Sentence-Tokens and Tenseless Date-Sentences | 56 |
| 2.6. | A Similarity Between A-Sentence-Tokens and Tenseless Date-Sentences: Intersubstitutivity in Extensional Contexts | 61 |
| 3. | The Untranslatability of A-Sentences by Tenseless Token-Reflexive Sentences | 67 |
| 3.1. | The Old and New Token-Reflexive Theories of A-Sentences | 67 |
| 3.2. | The Truth Conditions of A-Sentences and Tenseless Token-Reflexive Sentences | 72 |
| 3.3. | The Confirmation Conditions of A-Sentences and Tenseless Token-Reflexive Sentences | 78 |
| 3.4. | The Entailment Relations of A-Sentences and Tenseless Token-Reflexive Sentences | 81 |
| 3.5. | The Logical Identities of A-Sentences and Tenseless Token-Reflexive Sentences | 86 |
| 3.6. | The Psychological Theory of A-Sentences | 90 |
| 4. | The Tensed Theory of A-Sentences | 94 |
| 4.1. | The Transition to Positive Arguments for the Tensed Theory of Time | 94 |
| 4.2. | Outline of the Argument That A-Sentences Express A-Propositions | 94 |
| 4.3. | The Tensed Explanation of the Tenseless Token-Reflexive Rules of A-Sentence-Tokens | 98 |
| 4.4. | The Tensed Explanation of the Tenseless Token-Independent Rules Governing the Propositions Expressed by A-Sentence-Tokens | 105 |
| 4.5. | The Tensed Explanation of A-Indexicals and their Relation to A-Nonindexicals | 110 |
| 4.6. | The Tensed Theory of Temporal Quasi Indicators | 121 |
| 4.7. | The Cognitive Significance of A-Indexicals | 124 |
| II. | The Argument for Presentism | |
| 5. | Presentness as a Logical Subject of A-Sentences | 133 |
| 5.1. | The Theory of Presentism | 133 |
| 5.2. | A Preliminary Analysis of Property Ascription | 136 |
| 5.3. | The Conveyance Relation | 141 |
| 5.4. | Two Species of the Propositional Relation | 144 |
| 5.5. | Direct and Indirect Property Ascription | 148 |
| 5.6. | States of Affairs | 151 |
| 5.7. | Presentness as a Metaphysical Subject of All A-States-of-Affairs | 158 |
| 5.8. | The "No-Property" Tensed Theory of Time | 166 |
| 5.9. | McTaggart's Paradox | 169 |
| 6. | Presentness as a Logical Subject of Tenseless Sentences | 180 |
| 6.1. | All Subjects but Presentness Are Local Logicometaphysical Subjects | 180 |
| 6.2. | Tenseless Singular and Existential Sentences Other Than B-Sentences | 188 |
| 6.3. | B-Sentences | 192 |
| 6.4. | Synthetic Generalizations | 199 |
| 6.5. | Tautological and Analytic Sentences | 204 |
| 6.6. | Non-English Sentences | 215 |
| 7. | Absolute Presentness and the Special Theory of Relativity | 225 |
| 7.1. | The Special Theory of Relativity | 225 |
| A. | All Elsewhere Events Are Present | 226 |
| B. | All Events Orthogonal to the Time Axis of a Present Event Are Present | 227 |
| C. | Only What Is Here-Now Is Present | 228 |
| 7.2. | Metaphysical Time and Special-Theory-Relativity-Time | 229 |
| 7.3. | The Reductionist Nature of the Special Theory of Relativity Temporal Definitions | 232 |
| 7.4. | The Primitiveness and Absoluteness of Metaphysical Time | 234 |
| 7.5. | All Mental Events Exist in Metaphysical Time | 236 |
| 7.6. | All Physical Events Are in Metaphysical Time | 239 |
| 7.7. | Metaphysical Time Is the Only Possible Time | 241 |
| 7.8. | Metaphysical Time Distinguished from Other Candidates for "Absolute Time" | 243 |
| A. | Cosmic Time | 244 |
| B. | Physically Reducible Absolute Time | 245 |
| C. | Neo-Lorentz Time | 246 |
| D. | Newtonian Time | 247 |
| E. | Divine Time | 248 |
| 8. | Conclusion | 251 |
| 8.1. | Summary of the Argument for Presentism | 251 |
| 8.2. | Ethical Implications of the Argument for Presentism: The Presentist Attitude | 252 |
| Index | 260 |
