Kant and Skepticism

by Michael N. Forster

Overview

This book puts forward a much-needed reappraisal of Immanuel Kant's conception of and response to skepticism, as set forth principally in the Critique of Pure Reason. It is widely recognized that Kant's theoretical philosophy aims to answer skepticism and reform metaphysics—Michael Forster makes the controversial argument that those aims are closely linked. He distinguishes among three types of skepticism: "veil of perception" skepticism, which concerns the external world; Humean skepticism, which concerns the existence of a priori concepts and synthetic a priori knowledge; and Pyrrhonian skepticism, which concerns the equal balance of opposing arguments. Forster overturns conventional views by showing how the first of these types was of little importance for Kant, but how the second and third held very special importance for him, namely because of their bearing on the fate of metaphysics. He argues that Kant undertook his reform of metaphysics primarily in order to render it defensible against these types of skepticism. Finally, in a critical appraisal of Kant's project, Forster argues that, despite its strengths, it ultimately fails, for reasons that carry interesting broader philosophical lessons. These reasons include inadequate self-reflection and an underestimation of the resources of Pyrrhonian skepticism.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780691146515
Publisher:	Princeton University Press
Publication date:	06/06/2010
Series:	Princeton Monographs in Philosophy , #32
Pages:	168
Product dimensions:	5.50(w) x 8.40(h) x 0.80(d)

About the Author

Michael N. Forster is professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago. His books include Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar (Princeton), Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit, and Hegel and Skepticism.

Read an Excerpt

Kant and Skepticism

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By Michael N. Forster Princeton University Press
Copyright © 2008 Princeton University Press
All right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-12987-7

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Chapter One Varieties of Skepticism

IN THE FIRST part of this essay I shall give a general exposition of the role of skepticism in Kant's critical philosophy. In the second part, I shall offer a critical assessment of the Kantian position that emerges.

The critical philosophy, as first set forth by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason of 1781/7 (henceforth: the Critique), grew from and addresses a very complex set of philosophical concerns. But among these, two which stand out as especially central are a concern to address skepticism and a concern to develop a reformed metaphysics.

That much is widely recognized. However, it is a fundamental thesis of the present essay that these two projects belong tightly together, namely in the following sense: The types of skepticism which really originated and motivate the critical philosophy are types of skepticism that mainly threaten metaphysics; and conversely, what originated and motivates the critical philosophy's reform of metaphysics is above all an aspiration to enable metaphysics to withstand skepticism.

To amplify a little on the first of those points: Treatments of Kant have commonly been plagued, it seems to me, by two closely connected weaknesses-a failure to distinguish with sufficient care between different types ofskepticism, and a (largely consequent) failure to discern the different roles that different types of skepticism played in connection with the origination and motivation of the critical philosophy. For the purposes of interpreting Kant, it is especially important to distinguish between the following three sorts of skepticism: First, there is "veil of perception" skepticism, or skepticism concerning the legitimacy of inferring from the existence and character of one's mental representations to the existence and character of a mind-external world (this tends to be the very paradigm of skepticism for most Anglophone philosophers). "Veil of perception" skepticism is not especially targeted at the claims of metaphysics (though they are among its targets). Second, there is Humean skepticism, or skepticism concerning (1) the existence of concepts not derivable from corresponding sensible impressions (in Kant's idiom: a priori concepts), and (2) knowledge of propositions neither true simply in virtue of logical law nor known from experience (in Kant's idiom: synthetic a priori knowledge). Both of these forms of Humean skepticism are exemplified in Hume's treatment of causation. This Humean type of skepticism does have a special bearing on metaphysics due to the prevalence of such putative concepts and such putative knowledge within metaphysics. Third, there is Pyrrhonian skepticism, a skepticism which, in the manner of the ancient Pyrrhonists, motivates suspension of judgment by establishing a balance of opposing arguments, or "equipollence" (isostheneia). As Kant interprets it, this ancient form of skepticism too has a special bearing on metaphysics.

It turns out, I shall argue, that of these three types of skepticism, the first, "veil of perception" skepticism, played no significant role at all in the origination of the critical philosophy and only a secondary role in its mature motivation (despite the fact that it is already present in the first edition of the Critique and rises to some prominence in the second edition). The second type, Humean skepticism, did play an important role in originating the critical philosophy, in virtue of its special bearing on the tenability of metaphysics, namely some time in or shortly after 1772, and also remained central to the critical philosophy's mature motivation (facts reflected in Kant's famous remarks about it near the start of the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics of 1783 [henceforth: Prolegomena]). But it was actually the third type, Pyrrhonian skepticism, which, again in virtue of a perceived special bearing on metaphysics, first really shook Kant's faith in the precritical discipline of metaphysics, namely in the mid-1760s, and thence eventually led to the reform of metaphysics undertaken by the critical philosophy, and which (like Humean skepticism) also remained at the heart of the mature motivation of the critical philosophy.

In its first and third parts, this interpretation will strike many scholars of Kant, especially in the Anglophone tradition, as heresy (or worse). This is one reason why it has seemed to me to be worth articulating.

To amplify a little on the second point made above (that what originated and motivates the critical philosophy's reform of metaphysics is above all an aspiration to enable it to withstand skepticism): I shall argue that the key features which define the distinctive character of the reformed metaphysics at which Kant ultimately arrives in the critical philosophy-including, not only its specific conceptual and propositional contents, but also its status as a priori rather than supersensuous, its status as transcendentally ideal, and its systematicity-are all built into it mainly in order to enable it to withstand skepticism. And I shall argue that Kant has in the critical philosophy an elaborate set of strategies dependent on these features for actually defending his reformed metaphysics against skepticism.

(Continues...)

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Table of Contents

Preface ix

PART I : EXPOSITION

CHAPTER ONE: Varieties of Skepticism 3

CHAPTER TWO: "Veil of Perception" Skepticism 6

CHAPTER THREE: Skepticism and Metaphysics (a Puzzle) 13

CHAPTER FOUR: Kant's Pyrrhonian Crisis 16

CHAPTER FIVE: Humean Skepticism 21

CHAPTER SIX: Kant's Reformed Metaphysics 33

CHAPTER SEVEN: Defenses against Humean Skepticism 40

CHAPTER EIGHT: Defenses against Pyrrhonian Skepticism 44

PART II : CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

CHAPTER NINE: Some Relatively Easy Problems 55

CHAPTER TEN: A Metaphysics of Morals? 58

CHAPTER ELEVEN: Failures of Self-Reflection 63

CHAPTER TWELVE: The Pyrrhonist's Revenge 76

Notes 93

Index 149

What People are Saying About This

Michael Inwood

I found this book rather gripping. It outlines several varieties of skepticism, considers the role that each plays in Kant's thought, and analyzes his responses to them. The scholarship is impeccable. I know of no other book on this theme.
— Michael Inwood, University of Oxford

Beatrice Longuenesse

This book gives a clear and lucid account of Kant's relation to skepticism, both in its historical development and in its systematic import. Forster connects Kant's views to contemporary discussions even while avoiding the pitfalls of anachronism. The confidence with which he traces the various strands of skepticism in the history of philosophy as well as Kant's responses to them is remarkable.
— Beatrice Longuenesse, New York University

From the Publisher

"This book gives a clear and lucid account of Kant's relation to skepticism, both in its historical development and in its systematic import. Forster connects Kant's views to contemporary discussions even while avoiding the pitfalls of anachronism. The confidence with which he traces the various strands of skepticism in the history of philosophy as well as Kant's responses to them is remarkable."—Béatrice Longuenesse, New York University

"I found this book rather gripping. It outlines several varieties of skepticism, considers the role that each plays in Kant's thought, and analyzes his responses to them. The scholarship is impeccable. I know of no other book on this theme."—Michael Inwood, University of Oxford

Editorial Reviews

"In this precise, lively work, Forster establishes the significance of skepticism in the motivation, development, and formulation of Kant's thought. He examines three varieties of skepticism: 'veil of perception skepticism' concerning the external world, which he interprets as secondary for Kant despite its priority in previous literature; 'Humean skepticism' concerning the possibility of a priori knowledge; and 'Pyrrhonian skepticism,' employing a 'zetetic method' of equipollence and antinomies in order to suspend judgment. . . . Forster concludes, however, that Kant's reliance on transcendental arguments and transcendental idealism reintroduces the skeptical problems they were meant to resolve through inadequate self-reflection and radical skepticism's revenge on Kant's incorporation of its moderate variant."—-E. S. Nelson, University of Massachusetts Lowell, for, CHOICE

"[N]o one interested in the basic issues of Kant's theoretical philosophy can afford to neglect Forster's elegantly written (and produced) book, and it should prove particularly valuable for stimulating discussion in courses on Kant's first Critique."—-Paul Guyer, Philosophical Review

"The message is persuasive and ingeniously conveyed in an enjoyable and refreshing book. I recommend Kant and Skepticism to Kant scholars, those interested in skepticism, and those interested in Hegel's criticisms of Kant."—-Craig French, Heythrop Journal

"I highly recommend this book to those working on Kant's philosophy, the general history of modern skepticism, or the influence of Pyrrhonism on modern thought."—-Diego E. Machuca, Philosophy in Review

"Kant and Skepticism is an excellent book that is well worth thinking about long and hard, and will also, I predict, be a much discussed contribution to Kant studies in the foreseeable future."—-Robert Hanna, Philosophical Quarterly

"[T]he reviewer suspects that his fellow Anglophones will find Forster's book interesting, challenging, and enlightening, but probably something short of heretical. . . . The great strength of Kant and Skepticism is that it neatly slices one set of issues from the complex whole of the first Critique, allowing Forster and the reader with him to assess a particular, extremely important question about Kant's philosophy."—-Ted Kinnaman, Kant-Studien

From the Publisher

[T]he reviewer suspects that his fellow Anglophones will find Forster's book interesting, challenging, and enlightening, but probably something short of heretical. . . . The great strength of Kant and Skepticism is that it neatly slices one set of issues from the complex whole of the first Critique, allowing Forster and the reader with him to assess a particular, extremely important question about Kant's philosophy.

Kant-Studien - Ted Kinnaman

Kant and Skepticism is an excellent book that is well worth thinking about long and hard, and will also, I predict, be a much discussed contribution to Kant studies in the foreseeable future.

Philosophical Quarterly - Robert Hanna

I highly recommend this book to those working on Kant's philosophy, the general history of modern skepticism, or the influence of Pyrrhonism on modern thought.

Philosophy in Review - Diego E. Machuca

The message is persuasive and ingeniously conveyed in an enjoyable and refreshing book. I recommend Kant and Skepticism to Kant scholars, those interested in skepticism, and those interested in Hegel's criticisms of Kant.

Heythrop Journal - Craig French

[N]o one interested in the basic issues of Kant's theoretical philosophy can afford to neglect Forster's elegantly written (and produced) book, and it should prove particularly valuable for stimulating discussion in courses on Kant's first Critique.

Philosophical Review - Paul Guyer

In this precise, lively work, Forster establishes the significance of skepticism in the motivation, development, and formulation of Kant's thought. He examines three varieties of skepticism: 'veil of perception skepticism' concerning the external world, which he interprets as secondary for Kant despite its priority in previous literature; 'Humean skepticism' concerning the possibility of a priori knowledge; and 'Pyrrhonian skepticism,' employing a 'zetetic method' of equipollence and antinomies in order to suspend judgment. . . . Forster concludes, however, that Kant's reliance on transcendental arguments and transcendental idealism reintroduces the skeptical problems they were meant to resolve through inadequate self-reflection and radical skepticism's revenge on Kant's incorporation of its moderate variant.

Choice

[T]he reviewer suspects that his fellow Anglophones will find Forster's book interesting, challenging, and enlightening, but probably something short of heretical. . . . The great strength of Kant and Skepticism is that it neatly slices one set of issues from the complex whole of the first Critique, allowing Forster and the reader with him to assess a particular, extremely important question about Kant's philosophy.
— Ted Kinnaman

Kant-Studien

Kant and Skepticism is an excellent book that is well worth thinking about long and hard, and will also, I predict, be a much discussed contribution to Kant studies in the foreseeable future.
— Robert Hanna

Philosophical Quarterly

I highly recommend this book to those working on Kant's philosophy, the general history of modern skepticism, or the influence of Pyrrhonism on modern thought.
— Diego E. Machuca

Philosophy in Review

The message is persuasive and ingeniously conveyed in an enjoyable and refreshing book. I recommend Kant and Skepticism to Kant scholars, those interested in skepticism, and those interested in Hegel's criticisms of Kant.
— Craig French

Heythrop Journal

[N]o one interested in the basic issues of Kant's theoretical philosophy can afford to neglect Forster's elegantly written (and produced) book, and it should prove particularly valuable for stimulating discussion in courses on Kant's first Critique.
— Paul Guyer

Philosophical Review

In this precise, lively work, Forster establishes the significance of skepticism in the motivation, development, and formulation of Kant's thought. He examines three varieties of skepticism: 'veil of perception skepticism' concerning the external world, which he interprets as secondary for Kant despite its priority in previous literature; 'Humean skepticism' concerning the possibility of a priori knowledge; and 'Pyrrhonian skepticism,' employing a 'zetetic method' of equipollence and antinomies in order to suspend judgment. . . . Forster concludes, however, that Kant's reliance on transcendental arguments and transcendental idealism reintroduces the skeptical problems they were meant to resolve through inadequate self-reflection and radical skepticism's revenge on Kant's incorporation of its moderate variant.

University of Massachusetts Lowell, for "CHOICE - S. Nelson