Jungle of Snakes: A Century of Counterinsurgency Warfare from the Philippines to Iraq

by James R. Arnold

Overview

The end of the Cold War promised a new, more peaceful era was at hand. But with the escalation of violence by terrorists, insurgents, and guerillas, former CIA director James Woolsey said "After forty-five years of fighting a dragon we finally killed it, and now instead, we find ourselves standing in a jungle with a bunch of snakes." The emergence of a fresh set of conflicts has forced militaries across the world to reevaluate their strategies or risk never-ending conflicts with insurgencies. James Arnold traces the successes and failures of counter-insurgency in the 20^th century. He examines the US in the Philippines, the British in Malaysia, the France in Algeria, and the US in Vietnam, with an epilogue that looks at Iraq, where American generals are striving to apply the lessons of the previous conflicts. In A Jungle Full of Snakes, Arnold shows that the tug of war over civilian support and the build up of a strong central government are crucial victories for any attempted counter-insurgency.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781608191802
Publisher:	Bloomsbury Publishing
Publication date:	07/01/2009
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
Pages:	304
File size:	5 MB

About the Author

James Arnold is a Civil War and military historian and author of Tet Offensive 1968: Turning Point in Vietnam.
James Arnold is a Civil War and military historian and author of Tet Offensive 1968: Turning Point in Vietnam.

James R. Arnold is author of more than 30 books devoted to military and political history as well as the coauthor of the award-winning Understanding U.S. Military Conflicts through Primary Sources.

Table of Contents

Introduction 1

Part 1 The Philippine Insurrection

1 An American Victory Yields a Guerrilla War 11

2 Chastising the Insurrectos 26

3 The War Is Won Again 36

4 The Policy of Destruction 50

5 Why the Americans Won 63

Part 2 The War in Algeria

6 Terror on All Saints' Day 75

7 Terror Without Limits 86

8 The Question of Morality 97

9 The Enclosed Hunting Preserve 110

10 The Sense of Betrayal 120

Part 3 The Malayan Emergency

11 Crisis in Malaya 133

12 Personality and Vision 142

13 A Modern Cromwell 155

14 Victory in Malaya 167

Part 4 The Vietnam War

15 In Search of a New Enemy 183

16 Pacification, Marine Corps Style 195

17 Progress and Setback 203

18 The Army's Other War 217

19 Lessons from a Lost War 230

Conclusion: Reflections on a War Without End 237

Acknowledgments 255

Notes 257

Bibliography 275

Index 285

Maps

Capture of Manila, August 13, 1898 13

Philippines 18

Luzon Military Departments 37

Philippines Showing Batangas and Balangiga 51

Algeria Showing Aures Massif and Kabylie 76

Algeria Showing Philippeville 87

The Challe Offensive, 1959-1960 112

The Federation of Malaya, 1948 169

South Vietnam Showing the Central Highlands 192

South Vietnam Showing Corps Boundaries 201

South Vietnam Showing Hau Nghia 219

Editorial Reviews

…useful to learn the fundamentals, competently summarizing past counterinsurgency campaigns in the Philippines, Algeria, Malaya and Vietnam, but offering few striking insights. Read it if you want to learn the basics of the American CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support) program in Vietnam, for example, or learn who tortured whom in the Battle of Algiers.
—The Washington Post

Eliot A. Cohen

This is a thoughtful history of two successful counterinsurgency campaigns (the Philippines after 1898 and Malaya 1948-1960) and two failures (Algeria 1954-1962 and Vietnam). According to Arnold (Tet Offensive 1968), in the Philippines, the entire U.S. army of 70,000 spent a decade brutally suppressing a poorly equipped, almost leaderless rebellion. The British campaign in Malaya enjoyed the priceless advantage that the insurgents were Chinese, a minority and traditionally hated by the majority Malays. Despite this, victory took 12 bloody years. French forces had overwhelmed Algerian rebels when French President De Gaulle ordered a withdrawal, having decided the political cost of remaining in a hostile country was too great. And American troops in Vietnam killed so many Vietcong that North Vietnamese troops took over most of the fighting, but the civilians never trusted the government to protect them-and all insurgencies feed off this failure, notes Arnold. The author makes a convincing case that killing insurgents never defeats an insurgency. That happens when a nation's population feels safe, a painful lesson that America is relearning the hard way in Iraq and Afghanistan. B&w illus. (June)

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Publishers Weekly

Arnold examines five insurgencies, including the Philippines over 100 years ago, as well as Malaya, Algeria, Vietnam, and Iraq, i.e., insurgencies countered variously by U.S., French, and British forces. He attempts to bring some general principles to light, e.g., the notion that information is important and that whoever can best control its flow has a great advantage in motivating the populace. For subject collections.

—Edwin B. Burgess

Library Journal

Military historian Arnold (Crisis in the Snows: Russia Confronts Napoleon: The Eylau Campaign 1806-1807, 2007, etc.) studies past insurgency responses to help clarify the U.S. efforts in Iraq. The author investigates four counterinsurgencies that either proved successful in putting down rebellion-the United States in the Philippines following war with Spain in 1898; the British response to the Malayan Emergency in 1948-or disastrous-the French invasion of Algeria in 1830; the U.S. quagmire in Vietnam-and offers lessons to be drawn from them. For each case, Arnold sketches a brief history of the country and how its nationalist sentiments played out against the wishes of the colonial occupiers. Gaining the support of the civilian population became a basic thrust of counterinsurgency, which Sir Gerald Templer handily phrased during the crisis in Malaya as "winning hearts and minds." Indeed, the model set by the British response in Malaya, which included the implementation of schools and elections, proved winning in "hitching the forces of nationalism to an emerging democratic Malay state." Moreover, the British quelled the rebellion within the rules of law rather than by the use of brutality and acts of terror, which would factor heavily in the French loss of Algeria. Gaining public support at home was also crucial, as America shakily learned during the insurrection in the Philippines, and abdicated completely during the Vietnam War. The mastery of intelligence, understanding the native culture and language and being committed to a long, bloody stay would become important counterinsurgency standards as well. In his valuable conclusion, "Reflections on a War Without End," Arnold quotes Romanstatesman Cicero, who in 44 BCE said, "an army abroad is of little use unless there is wise counsel at home."A reasonably argued work that delivers needed insight and historical precedent to the current war debate.

Kirkus Reviews

Delivers needed insight and historical precedent to the current war debate.” —Kirkus Reviews

“A thoughtful history…[Arnold] makes a convincing case that killing insurgents never defeats an insurgency. That happens when a nation's population feels safe, a painful lesson that America is relearning the hard way in Iraq and Afghanistan.” —Publishers Weekly

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