Judicial Vetoes: Decision-making on Mixed Selection Constitutional Courts

by Lydia Tiede

Overview

How does the selection of judges influence the work they do in important constitutional courts? Does mixed judicial selection, which allows more players to choose judges, result in a court that is more independent and one that can check powerful executives and legislators? Existing literature on constitutional courts tends to focus on how judicial behaviour is motivated by judges' political preferences. Lydia Brashear Tiede argues for a new approach, showing that, under mixed selection, institutions choose different types of judges who represent different approaches to constitutional adjudication and thus have different propensities for striking down laws. Using empirical evidence from the constitutional courts of Chile and Colombia, this book develops a framework for understanding the factors, external and internal to courts, which lead individual judges, as well as the courts in which they work, to veto a law.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781009079228
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
Publication date:	08/04/2022
Series:	Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
File size:	7 MB

About the Author

Lydia Brashear Tiede is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Houston. Her current research focuses on constitutional courts in Latin America and Eastern Europe as well as comparative research on the rule of law, judicial independence, and democratic backsliding in developing countries.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction; 2. The implications of mixed judicial selection on decision-making; 3. Mixed judicial selection: prevalence and variation; 4. The Chilean Constitutional Tribunal in political context; 5. The Colombian Constitutional Court in political context; 6. Determinants of legal invalidation by constitutional judges; 7. Determinants of legal invalidation by constitutional courts; 8. Weak judicial vetoes and contentious politics; 9. Conclusion: Judicial selection and decision-making.