GCC-Iran relations are at the heart of important political dynamics in the Middle East today. This is not limited to the ongoing disputes in the Gulf, one of the most important strategic locations globally. Iran and the GCC states also find themselves on opposing sides in the Syrian and to some extent the Iraqi conflicts. This volume traces the origins of the troubled relations between Iran and the majority of the GCC monarchies. It discusses not only geostrategic rivalries, but also matters of identity which have been of increased importance since 2010. While important differences are noticeable among the GCC monarchies in regard to their willingness to engage Iran, the difficult relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran puts a strain on the possibilities for engagement between Iran and the GCC as a whole.
GCC-Iran relations are at the heart of important political dynamics in the Middle East today. This is not limited to the ongoing disputes in the Gulf, one of the most important strategic locations globally. Iran and the GCC states also find themselves on opposing sides in the Syrian and to some extent the Iraqi conflicts. This volume traces the origins of the troubled relations between Iran and the majority of the GCC monarchies. It discusses not only geostrategic rivalries, but also matters of identity which have been of increased importance since 2010. While important differences are noticeable among the GCC monarchies in regard to their willingness to engage Iran, the difficult relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran puts a strain on the possibilities for engagement between Iran and the GCC as a whole.
Iran's Relations with the Arab States of the Gulf: Common Interests over Historic Rivalry
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Iran's Relations with the Arab States of the Gulf: Common Interests over Historic Rivalry
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Overview
GCC-Iran relations are at the heart of important political dynamics in the Middle East today. This is not limited to the ongoing disputes in the Gulf, one of the most important strategic locations globally. Iran and the GCC states also find themselves on opposing sides in the Syrian and to some extent the Iraqi conflicts. This volume traces the origins of the troubled relations between Iran and the majority of the GCC monarchies. It discusses not only geostrategic rivalries, but also matters of identity which have been of increased importance since 2010. While important differences are noticeable among the GCC monarchies in regard to their willingness to engage Iran, the difficult relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran puts a strain on the possibilities for engagement between Iran and the GCC as a whole.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9783959940047 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Gerlach Press |
| Publication date: | 07/30/2016 |
| Pages: | 186 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 0.00(d) |
Read an Excerpt
Iran's Relations with the Arab States of the Gulf: Common Interests over Historic Rivalry
By Maaike Warnaar, Luciano Zaccara, Paul Aarts
Gerlach Press
Copyright © 2016 Gulf Research Centre CambridgeAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-3-95994-004-7
CHAPTER 1
The Prospects of "Constructive Engagement" in Iran-GCC Relations: The Levant Dimension
Gülriz Sen
The start of Hassan Rouhani's presidency in Iran raised hopes and expectations anew after Mahmood Ahmadinejad's presidency, marked by Iran's growing confrontation with the West. Rouhani's electoral campaign and his political messages afterwards constantly drew on the themes of "moderation", "prudence" and "constructive engagement" in Iran's foreign policy conduct, pledging to eradicate the past mistakes of the outgoing administration. As a pragmatist tone with constant emphasis on "realism" and "prudence" gains preeminence in Iran, mending fences with the Gulf neighbors resurface on the political agenda, which is reminiscent of the growing moderation and pragmatism of Iran's foreign policy throughout the 1990s. However, Iran's old agenda faces new challenges with the crisis in the Levant looming large over the prospects of Iran's relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This chapter aims to discuss the implications of the ongoing turmoil in the Levant over Iran's pursuit of moderation and rapprochement with the Gulf countries. With the unsettling of state-society relations and regional politics through the "Arab Spring", the Levant dimension has assumed greater significance in Iran-GCC relations, particularly for Iran-Saudi Arabia relations, granted the fact that the two powerhouses of the Persian Gulf are embroiled in increasing competition and deepening fault lines in Syria as the sponsors of diametrically opposed political groups.
In accounting for Iran-GCC relations through the prism of the crisis in Levant, this chapter will first provide a brief historical trajectory of Iran's relations with the GCC since the Iranian Revolution and assess the foundations of Iran's Persian Gulf policy and its evolution. It will draw upon the dynamics of confrontation and coexistence in Iran-GCC relations and elaborate on the implications of Iran's growing regional salience and nuclear standoff, particularly upon Iran-Saudi Arabia relations in the last decade. The second part of the paper will focus on the prospects of "constructive engagement" between Iran and the GCC under the presidency of Hassan Rouhani. It will articulate recent attempts by Iran to address regional challenges and build opportunities for cooperation which are motivated by a number of dynamics comprising Iran's quest for moderation, ongoing progress in nuclear talks, the growing political, economic and ideological costs of the Syrian turmoil and lastly the rising threat of extremism in the region with ISIS. Building on the assessment that the politics and future of the Levant have become an integral part of the politics of the Persian Gulf increasingly so in last few years particularly with the civil war in Syria, the this contribution will argue that prospects for positive change in Iran-Saudi Arabia relations also depend on how they will manage their countervailing positions in Syria. In this regard it will focus on Iran's latest position and proposals. The chapter will conclude that the extent to which Iran-Saudi Arabia engagement will be "constructive" pertains to the trajectory of domestic, regional and international dynamics which provide elements for cooperation, if only both states choose to do so. The assessments of the chapter will mainly cover the period until June 2014, whereas the concluding remarks will briefly analyze the shifting sands of the region after the ISIS advances to Iraq in August 2014 and the following developments in the context of Iran-Saudi Arabia affairs.
Iran and the GCC: The Origins and Evolution of a Troubled Relationship
The 1980s & 1990s: Dynamics of Confrontation and Coexistence in Iran-GCC Relations
Soon after the Iranian Revolution toppling Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi from the Peacock Throne, regional politics started to change with the revolutionary turmoil in Iran. Particularly threatening for the Gulf monarchies was Iran's subversive and revisionist agenda and its commitment to export its revolution. It was mainly in the context of containing Iran's revolutionary activism that the Gulf Kingdoms constituted the GCC and hoped to struggle with the changing landscape of the Gulf in the light of the Iranian Revolution and the ensuing Iran-Iraq War started by Iraqi aggression. Therefore, the raison d'etre of the GCC was defined in contradistinction to Iran's regional aspirations as much as it was shaped by Iraq's decision to invade Iran. During the 1980s, Iran's relations with the Gulf kingdoms further deteriorated, as Iran despised the financial and diplomatic support offered by the Gulf countries to Iraq as well as their invitation of American forces to the Persian Gulf waters in the midst of the "Tanker War" for the protection of Kuwaiti tankers. The decade also brought forward deep ideological chasms between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Gulf monarchies, as Ayatollah Khomeini and the leading elites of post-revolutionary Iran denigrated the GCC states as "mini satans" for their alliance with the United States and as bearers of elitist "American Islam" against Iran's populist revolutionary Islam of the "dispossessed".
In the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, the immediate challenge facing the political elite in Iran was "reconstructing" the country. As a matter of fact the Islamic Republic stepped into a new epoch in the 1990s with the end of the war with Iraq, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the systemic change brought by the end of the Cold War. Iran's foreign policy took a moderate and pragmatist turn in this new conjuncture. One of the salient shifts in Iran's foreign policy behavior was its retreat from revisionism. As Ehteshami argues, Iran no longer tried to change the regional map and it embraced coexistence with the given regimes and state-forms in the region. The primary purpose of foreign policy in the new era was to provide Iran with much needed international capital and technology to rebuild itself.
As Iran attempted to reintegrate into global politics and economy after a decade of isolation, building relations with the Gulf was of utmost significance. Iran's regional diplomacy was oriented to develop economic and strategic ties with the Persian Gulf states in line with Iran's transformation from a war-making state into a state that was now primarily in pursuit of development (tows'ehgera). Under the presidencies of Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, Iran aimed to achieve normalization in the Persian Gulf; a region which it deems essential for its economy, regional standing and security. The decade has laid out pragmatic foundations of Iran's Gulf policy which more or less continued even during the crisis-ridden presidency of Mahmood Ahmadinejad.
Throughout the 1990s a number of principles and objectives regarding Iran's Persian Gulf policy took shape. Regarding the security of the Persian Gulf and its strategic role in the area, Iran in the post-revolutionary era started to see the American presence as inimical to its national interests and the fate of its revolution. Sariolghalam argues that facing US dominance over Gulf politics, Iran's strategy was the "containment of the United States" by enhancing its outreach and relations in the region with regional states and non-state actors. Iran promoted the strategy of collective security (amniyat-e dast-e jam'ii) with a renewed belief in its role as "the only power that can provide peace and stability of the Persian Gulf" as then President Rafsanjani argued." Regarding the GCC, as Cronin and Mashalla observe, since the 1990s, the Islamic Republic did not have a single policy except for weaning them away from dependence on US protection into establishing bilateral relations with Iran. Iran was successful in developing its ties with the UAE and Oman despite problems related to Iran's control of the Persian Gulf islands with the former.
Doubtlessly, rebuilding Iran-Saudi Arabia relations was at the heart of Iran's post-war regional diplomacy. The 1990s were marked by Iran's quest for détente and concrete developments took place in this regard. Iran restored its diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia in 1991 in the aftermath of the Gulf War (1990-91). Its tacit cooperation with the Coalition forces against Iraq in the war and downward trend in military spending with a priority placed on economic progress at least partially diluted the past aggrandizement of Iran's revolutionary agency. Iran under the Rafsanjani and Khatami administrations pursued confidence building measures for reconciliation which were later accompanied by a similar impetus on the side of Saudi Arabia particularly under the growing political prominence of then Crown Prince Abdullah in the late 1990s. Their shared concern over Iraq and Israel as much as on stabilization of oil prices through a common policy at OPEC back then facilitated a remarkable thaw in relations despite persistent mistrust.
However, Iran's sustained efforts to re-integrate into the regional system did not succeed in breaking the Gulf kingdoms away from their strategic ties with the US. Iran had to contend with the growing US hegemony following the Gulf War of 1990-1991, and the ensuing policy of containment that denied Iran's recognition as a part of the Gulf security architecture. Designs for collective security in the Persian Gulf largely remained confined to Tehran, as the GCC shied away from inclusive political and geostrategic steps. The following decade marked by Iran's rising power and influence in the region would bring new tension to the mixed record of relations.
The 2000s: Coexistence Amidst Crisis
The early 2000s have seen momentous changes in the Middle East with the overthrow of the Taliban and Saddam regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq through American-led interventions. The United States through its penchant for military intervention in the region has ceased to be an "offshore balancer" and turned into a "regional power" with its mounting physical presence in the Middle East. The end of the Saddam regime was decisive for the politics of the Persian Gulf, as it effectively changed the regional balance of power in favor of Iran. The Islamic Republic benefited immensely from the American occupation and de-Ba'thification of state and army which followed afterwards. Iran's ties to the Shiites and Kurds in Iraq as well as the rejection of the Sunnis to participate in the new order transformed Iran into a significant political actor in post-Saddam Iraqi politics. Among the GCC states, the rise of Shiites to power and prominence culminated in a sense of loss of Iraq to Iran. Saudi Arabia viewed the Nuri al-Maliki government in Baghdad as an Iranian pawn; refused to send an ambassador to Baghdad and encouraged other GCC members to follow the same suit. The Sunni insurgency found sympathy and support from the GCC rulers and nationals, and as Mashalla and Cronin argue, participation of a significant number of Saudi nationals in the civil war in Iraq has turned it into an Iran-Saudi proxy war.
The decade also witnessed further growth of Iran's political influence in the Levant through significant developments in Lebanese and Palestinian politics which strengthened the position of Iran's non-state allies in regional politics. Tehran's sustained support for Hezbollah and Hamas became more essential with the intensification of its standoff with the United States and Israel, as Iran's strategy of deterrence was built on its ability to inflict pain on Israel and the US through regional proxies in case of an attack. The July War in 2006 between Israel and Hezbollah was viewed by many as a rehearsal of the looming confrontation between Israel and Iran. Hezbollah's robust resistance spared Israel from a victory and started a new epoch for Iran's regional popularity, self-confidence and political influence in the Levant.
Meanwhile Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt were seriously discredited for denouncing Hezbollah and "betraying" the struggle of the Arab people. Bashar al-Assad, staunch ally of the Islamic Republic, would blame Saudi Arabia for acting as a "half-man" for failing to support Hezbollah's struggle against Israel. Relieved by the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon in 2005, Saudi Arabia has seen the deepening of the Hezbollah-Iran axis in Lebanese politics with the rise of Hezbollah's power and prominence in military, political and ideological terms since 2006 and the decline of the power of the Saudi-supported Hariri bloc with the resignation of Saad Hariri.
Iran's ties with Hamas have also grown stronger since 2005 and brought Tehran closer into the heart of the Arab world. It was Iran's financial support and political backing which helped the survival of the newly elected Hamas government following its victory in the January 2006 parliamentary elections. Iran's relations with Hamas mattered, for Hamas turned into a pillar of defense and deterrence for Iran against a possible military attack from Israel.
Tehran's growing sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf and the Levant took place at the zenith of its confrontation with the US over its nuclear program. The standoff was marked by increasing economic pressure on Iran through sanctions and imminence of a military attack on its nuclear sites which would risk an all-out war. The fallout of Iran's domestic politics, regional empowerment and the international crisis on Iran-GCC relations was a growing concern over Tehran's hegemonic ambitions and entanglement in a possible military conflict between Iran and the United States. Tehran's neighbors feared that in case of a military attack, Tehran would target the US bases in the Persian Gulf, exert direct pressure and punish the GCC states for their acquiescence. Furthermore, Iran's threat to close the Strait of Hormuz, if attacked, posed a grave concern for the Gulf economies, for it would disrupt the oil traffic in the Gulf and have worrisome repercussions on the global economy.
Iran meanwhile tried to assure its neighbors of its peaceful motivations and to preserve the ties built during the détente policy of previous epochs. For instance, despite the rise of war game exercises in the Persian Gulf waters, Iranian officials were careful to reiterate that their response was a strong signal to its enemies and Iran had no intention of threatening its neighbors. The Foreign Ministry of Iran also underlined the "defensive" nature of Tehran's military policy which was portrayed as "positive for the security of the region" rather than as a threat.
Yet, the extent to which Iran could convince its neighbors of its defensive pursuit remained dubious. According to Ehteshami and Zweiri, Iran failed to communicate fully and effectively with its Arab neighbors about the essence of its nuclear ambitions. In the region, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were assured that Iran posed a multifaceted threat that had to be curtailed. One Saudi newspaper editor even argued that "Iran has become more dangerous than Israel itself", and portrayed its rising power as tantamount to a "clash of civilizations" between Persian and Arab civilizations. Back in 2004, Jordan's King Abdallah II had already coined the term of the rise of a "Shiite Crescent" with Iran's growing influence in post-Saddam Iraq, which revived the historical sensitivities of the Gulf on Iran's past subversive influence over Shiite communities in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the Gulf kingdoms were disturbed by Iran's rising power, they did not want to antagonize Iran and refrained from publicly opposing her. They rather wanted the United States to take a firm stand. As Wikileaks has revealed, behind closed doors Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah was asking the Bush administration to "cut off the head of the snake."
The growing rift in Iran-US relations and intensification of sanctions eventually had an effect on Iran's rather stable economic relations with the smaller kingdoms of the Persian Gulf. As mentioned earlier, Iran chose to deal with the members of the GCC on individual terms rather than as a monolithic bloc. Individual states of the GCC pursued their own policies with Iran and built varying relations. Iran's affairs with Oman and the UAE, particularly with Dubai were much better compared to Iran-Saudi relations, which carried inherent tensions for regional hegemony. The Gulf states, caught in the middle of confrontation between the US and Iran, aspired to pursue a meticulous diplomacy and they had to walk a tightrope not to antagonize Iran or the United States, while containing hawks on both sides. However, Iran's economic ties to Dubai to circumvent sanctions and compensate for the loss of markets, business and trade in Europe with the Gulf markets came under growing scrutiny by the United States, with greater American pressure on the UAE to cut back trade and finance services to Iranian businessmen operating in Dubai.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Iran's Relations with the Arab States of the Gulf: Common Interests over Historic Rivalry by Maaike Warnaar, Luciano Zaccara, Paul Aarts. Copyright © 2016 Gulf Research Centre Cambridge. Excerpted by permission of Gerlach Press.
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Table of Contents
Contents
Preface Anoushiravan Ehteshami, vii,Introduction: Prospects for Change in GCC-Iran Relations? Behzad Shahandeh and Maaike Warnaar, 1,
1 The Prospects of "Constructive Engagement" in Iran-GCC Relations: The Levant Dimension Gülriz Sen, 12,
2 Changing the Lens: Contemporary Saudi-Iran Relations and Potential Benefits of Détente Sara Masry, 34,
3 Saudi Sectarianism in Saudi-Iranian Relations Luay Radhan, 58,
4 The Hobgoblin of Little Minds: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Sectarianism in the Gulf Sean Foley, 80,
5 Why Can't We Be Friends? Bridging the Divide between Iran and the GCC Maaike Warnaar, 102,
6 Ozgur Pala Perceptions toward Iran's Nuclear Program: The Case of Qatar University Ozgur Pala, 125,
7 Iran-GCC Relations: The Case of Oman Gertjan Hoetjes, 144,
8 Conclusions Abdullah Baabood, 166,
About the Contributors, 177,