Intuitions as Evidence / Edition 1

by Joel Pust

Overview

This book is concerned with the role of intuitions in the justification of philosophical theory. The author begins by demonstrating how contemporary philosophers, whether engaged in case-driven analysis or seeking reflective equilibrium, rely on intuitions as evidence for their theories. The author then provides an account of the nature of philosophical intuitions and distinguishes them from other psychological states. Finally, the author defends the use of intuitions as evidence by demonstrating that arguments for skepticism about their evidential value are either self-defeating or guilty of arbitrary and unjustified partiality towards non-intuitive modes of knowledge.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780815337638
Publisher:	Taylor & Francis
Publication date:	01/03/2000
Series:	Studies in Philosophy
Pages:	150
Product dimensions:	5.44(w) x 8.50(h) x (d)
Age Range:	18 Years

About the Author

Joel Pust is at the University of Delaware.

Table of Contents

Preface; Acknowledgements; Introduction; Chapter 1: The Use of Intuitions as Evidence in Philosophy; Chapter 2: The Nature of Philosophical Intuitions; Chapter 3: Empiricist Explanationist Skepticism About Intuitions; Chapter 4: Problems with the Empiricist Skeptical Argument; Chapter 5: Reliability, Epistemic Circularity, and the Undue Partially of Empiricist Skepticism About Intuitions; References; Index

Editorial Reviews

This volume comprises the unrevised text of Pust's 1997 University of Arizona dissertation in philosophy. In it he considers the nature of intuitions, argues that contemporary philosophy relies on them as evidence, and rebuts empiricist arguments against the use of intuitions as evidence. Special attention is given to the work of Thomas Reid and William Alston. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

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