An Introduction to Game Theory / Edition 1

An Introduction to Game Theory / Edition 1

by Martin J. Osborne
ISBN-10:
0195128958
ISBN-13:
9780195128956
Pub. Date:
08/07/2003
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
ISBN-10:
0195128958
ISBN-13:
9780195128956
Pub. Date:
08/07/2003
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
An Introduction to Game Theory / Edition 1

An Introduction to Game Theory / Edition 1

by Martin J. Osborne
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Overview

Game-theoretic reasoning pervades economic theory and is used widely in other social and behavioral sciences. An Introduction to Game Theory, by Martin J. Osborne, presents the main principles of game theory and shows how they can be used to understand economic, social, political, and biological phenomena. The book introduces in an accessible manner the main ideas behind the theory rather than their mathematical expression. All concepts are defined precisely, and logical reasoning is used throughout. The book requires an understanding of basic mathematics but assumes no specific knowledge of economics, political science, or other social or behavioral sciences.
Coverage includes the fundamental concepts of strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, and coalitional games; the more advanced subjects of Bayesian games and extensive games with imperfect information; and the topics of repeated games, bargaining theory, evolutionary equilibrium, rationalizability, and maxminimization. The book offers a wide variety of illustrations from the social and behavioral sciences and more than 280 exercises. Each topic features examples that highlight theoretical points and illustrations that demonstrate how the theory may be used. Explaining the key concepts of game theory as simply as possible while maintaining complete precision, An Introduction to Game Theory is ideal for undergraduate and introductory graduate courses in game theory.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780195128956
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Publication date: 08/07/2003
Edition description: New Edition
Pages: 560
Product dimensions: 9.52(w) x 7.78(h) x 1.19(d)

About the Author

University of Toronto

Table of Contents

PrefaceEach chapter ends with notes.1. Introduction1.1.. What is Game Theory? 1.1.1.. An Outline of the History of Game Theory1.1.2.. John von Neumann1.2.. The Theory of Rational Choice1.3.. Coming Attractions: Interacting Decision-MakersI. GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION2. Nash Equilibrium: Theory2.1.. Strategic Games2.2.. Example: The Prisoner's Dilemma2.3.. Example: Bach or Stravinsky? 2.4.. Example: Matching Pennies2.5.. Example: The Stag Hunt2.6.. Nash Equilibrium2.6.1. John F. Nash, Jr.2.6.2.. Studying Nash Equilibrium Experimentally2.7.. Examples of Nash Equilibrium2.7.1.. Experimental Evidence on the Prisoner's Dilemma2.7.2.. Focal Points2.8.. Best Response Functions2.9.. Dominated Actions2.10.. Equilibrium in a Single Population: Symmetric Games and Symmetric Equilibria3. Nash Equilibrium: Illustrations3.1.. Cournot's Model of Oligopoly3.2.. Bertrand's Model of Oligopoly3.2.1.. Cournot, Bertrand, and Nash: Some Historical Notes3.3.. Electoral Competition3.4.. The War of Attrition3.5.. Auctions3.5.1.. Auctions from Babylonia to eBay3.6.. Accident Law4. Mixed Strategy Equilibrium4.1.. Introduction4.1.1.. Some Evidence on Expected Payoff Functions4.2.. Strategic Games in Which Players May Randomize4.3.. Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium4.4.. Dominated Actions4.5.. Pure Equilibria When Randomization is Allowed4.6.. Illustration: Expert Diagnosis4.7.. Equilibrium in a Single Population4.8.. Illustration: Reporting a Crime4.8.1.. Reporting a Crime: Social Psychology and Game Theory4.9.. The Formation of Players' Beliefs4.10.. Extension: Finding All Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria4.11.. Extension: Games in Which Each Player Has a Continuum of Actions4.12.. Appendix: Representing Preferences by Expected Payoffs5. Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Theory5.1.. Extensive Games with Perfect Information5.2.. Strategies and Outcomes5.3.. Nash Equilibrium5.4.. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium5.5.. Finding Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Finite Horizon Games: Backward Induction5.5.1.. Ticktacktoe, Chess, and Related Games6. Extensive Games With Perfect Information: Illustrations6.1.. The Ultimatum Game, the Holdup Game, and Agenda Control6.1.1.. Experiments on the Ultimatum Game6.2.. Stackelberg's Model of Duopoly6.3.. Buying Votes6.4.. A Race7. Extensive Games With Perfect Information: Extensions and Discussion7.1.. Allowing for Simultaneous Moves7.1.1.. More Experimental Evidence on Subgame Perfect Equilibrium7.2.. Illustration: Entry into a Monopolized Industry7.3.. Illustration: Electoral Competition with Strategic Voters7.4.. Illustration: Committee Decision-Making7.5.. Illustration: Exit from a Declining Industry7.6.. Allowing for Exogenous Uncertainty7.7.. Discussion: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and Backward Induction7.7.1.. Experimental Evidence on the Centipede Game8. Coalitional Games and the Core8.1.. Coalitional Games8.2.. The Core8.3.. Illustration: Ownership and the Distribution of Wealth8.4.. Illustration: Exchanging Homogeneous Horses8.5.. Illustration: Exchanging Heterogeneous Houses8.6.. Illustration: Voting8.7.. Illustration: Matching8.7.1.. Matching Doctors with Hospitals8.8.. Discussion: Other Solution ConceptsII. GAMES WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION9.1.. Motivational Examples9.2.. General Definitions9.3.. Two Examples Concerning Information9.4.. Illustration: Cournot's Duopoly Game with Imperfect Information9.5.. Illustration: Providing a Public Good9.6.. Illustration: Auctions9.6.1.. Auctions of the Radio Spectrum9.7.. Illustration: Juries9.8.. Appendix: Auctions with an Arbitrary Distribution of Valuations10. Extensive Games with Imperfect Information10.1.. Extensive Games with Imperfect Information10.2.. Strategies10.3.. Nash Equilibrium10.4.. Beliefs and Sequential Equilibrium10.5. Signaling Games. 10.6.. Illustration: Conspicuous Expenditure as a Signal of Quality10.7.. Illustration: Education as a Signal Of Ability10.8.. Illustration: Strategic Information Transmission10.9.. Illustration: Agenda Control with Imperfect InformationIII. VARIANTS AND EXTENSIONS11. Strictly Competitive Games and Maxminimization11.1.. Maxminimization11.2.. Maxminimization and Nash Equilibrium11.3.. Strictly Competitive Games11.4.. Maxminimization and Nash Equilibrium in Strictly Competitive Games11.4.1.. Maxminimization: Some History11.4.2.. Empirical Tests: Experiments, Tennis, and Soccer12. Rationalizability12.1.. Rationalizability12.2.. Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Actions12.3.. Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Actions12.4.. Dominance Solvability13. Evolutionary Equilibrium13.1.. Monomorphic Pure Strategy Equilibrium13.1.1.. Evolutionary Game Theory: Some History13.2.. Mixed Strategies and Polymorphic Equilibrium13.3.. Asymmetric Contests13.3.1.. Side-blotched lizards13.3.2.. Explaining the Outcomes of Contests in Nature13.4.. Variation on a Theme: Sibling Behavior13.5.. Variation on a Theme: The Nesting Behavior of Wasps13.6.. Variation on a Theme: The Evolution of the Sex Ratio14. Repeated Games: The Prisoner's Dilemma14.1.. The Main Idea14.2.. Preferences14.3.. Repeated Games14.4.. Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma14.5.. Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma14.6.. Strategies in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma14.7.. Some Nash Equilibria of an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma14.8.. Nash Equilibrium Payoffs of an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma14.8.1.. Experimental Evidence14.9.. Subgame Perfect Equilibria and the One-Deviation Property14.9.1.. Axelrod's Tournaments14.10.. Some Subgame Perfect Equilibria of an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma14.10.1.. Reciprocal Altruism Among Sticklebacks14.11.. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Payoffs of an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma14.11.1.. Medieval Trade Fairs14.12.. Concluding Remarks15. Repeated Games: General Results15.1.. Nash Equilibria of General Infinitely Repeated Games15.2.. Subgame Perfect Equilibria of General Infinitely Repeated Games15.3.. Finitely Repeated Games15.4.. Variation on a Theme: Imperfect Observability16. Bargaining16.1.. Bargaining as an Extensive Game16.2.. Illustration: Trade in a Market16.3.. Nash's Axiomatic Model16.4.17. Appendix: Mathematics17.1.. Numbers17.2.. Sets17.3.. Functions17.4.. Profiles17.5.. Sequences17.6.. Probability17.7.. Proofs
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