Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this study addresses the difficult problems presented to the US military establishment by so-called low-intensity conflict. The author's objective is to develop counterinsurgency doctrinal concepts. The author provides a foundation for the concepts by analyzing insurgent warfare with particular emphasis on the fundamental differences between insurgencies an conventional European-style warfare. From this analysis, the author develops and describes both the fundamental and operational dilemmas the United States faces when attempting to engage in counterinsurgency. Finally, the author draws upon the entire study to present the four basic elements, and their corollaries, of a counterinsurgency doctrine and resulting force structure implications.
Frustrated by the historically inconclusive outcome of the Vietnam War, the American military has all but turned its back on the study and preparation for low-intensity conflicts and has concentrated its efforts on worst-case scenarios involving nuclear deterrence and a major war against the Warsaw Pact in Europe or Southwest Asia. The military's calculated avoidance of serious study in the low-intensity arena should not have come as a surprise to knowledgeable observers. Such "shadow wars" have been anathema to the American military establishment for at least three decades. In the aftermath of the Korean War and before heavy combat involvement in Vietnam, the United States pinned most of its hopes on nuclear weapons in the belief (disputed by some) that "atomic airpower" could deter all forms of war, and, if deterrence failed, could quickly end any conflict large or small.1 Because "atomic airpower's" strength lay in technology rather than massive manpower, it was relatively inexpensive — a prime policy requirement of the Eisenhower administration.
When the Kennedy administration sought to achieve some latitude for maneuver between the limited choices of nuclear war or surrender developed during the Eisenhower years, they met surprising resistance from the Army. In addition to building conventional force capabilities, President Kennedy also was intrigued by insurgent or guerrilla warfare and pressed for increased capabilities in these "unconventional" operations. For a variety of reasons, the Army resisted, preferring to prepare for what it saw as the more serious threat—a major war in Europe involving the Soviets.
Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this study addresses the difficult problems presented to the US military establishment by so-called low-intensity conflict. The author's objective is to develop counterinsurgency doctrinal concepts. The author provides a foundation for the concepts by analyzing insurgent warfare with particular emphasis on the fundamental differences between insurgencies an conventional European-style warfare. From this analysis, the author develops and describes both the fundamental and operational dilemmas the United States faces when attempting to engage in counterinsurgency. Finally, the author draws upon the entire study to present the four basic elements, and their corollaries, of a counterinsurgency doctrine and resulting force structure implications.
Frustrated by the historically inconclusive outcome of the Vietnam War, the American military has all but turned its back on the study and preparation for low-intensity conflicts and has concentrated its efforts on worst-case scenarios involving nuclear deterrence and a major war against the Warsaw Pact in Europe or Southwest Asia. The military's calculated avoidance of serious study in the low-intensity arena should not have come as a surprise to knowledgeable observers. Such "shadow wars" have been anathema to the American military establishment for at least three decades. In the aftermath of the Korean War and before heavy combat involvement in Vietnam, the United States pinned most of its hopes on nuclear weapons in the belief (disputed by some) that "atomic airpower" could deter all forms of war, and, if deterrence failed, could quickly end any conflict large or small.1 Because "atomic airpower's" strength lay in technology rather than massive manpower, it was relatively inexpensive — a prime policy requirement of the Eisenhower administration.
When the Kennedy administration sought to achieve some latitude for maneuver between the limited choices of nuclear war or surrender developed during the Eisenhower years, they met surprising resistance from the Army. In addition to building conventional force capabilities, President Kennedy also was intrigued by insurgent or guerrilla warfare and pressed for increased capabilities in these "unconventional" operations. For a variety of reasons, the Army resisted, preferring to prepare for what it saw as the more serious threat—a major war in Europe involving the Soviets.
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: American Military Dilemmas and Doctrinal Proposals - Low Intensity Conflict, Political Infrastructure, Guerrilla Tactics, Public Support, Human Intelligence
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: American Military Dilemmas and Doctrinal Proposals - Low Intensity Conflict, Political Infrastructure, Guerrilla Tactics, Public Support, Human Intelligence
Product Details
| BN ID: | 2940152603453 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Progressive Management |
| Publication date: | 01/30/2016 |
| Sold by: | Smashwords |
| Format: | eBook |
| Sales rank: | 297,062 |
| File size: | 444 KB |