Information, Incentives and the Economics of Control

by G. C. Archibald

Overview

This book examines methods for controlling or guiding a sector of the economy that do not require all the apparatus of economic planning or rely on the vain hope of sufficiently "perfect" competition, but instead rely entirely on the self-interest of economic agents and voluntary contract. The methods involved require trial-and-error steps in real time, with the target adjusted as the results of each step become known. The author shows that the methods are equally applicable to industries that are wholly privately owned, wholly nationalized, mixed or labor-managed.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780521330459
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
Publication date:	09/24/1992
Pages:	192
Product dimensions:	5.59(w) x 8.86(h) x 0.71(d)

Table of Contents

Preface; Part I. Introductory: 1. Two preliminary matters; 2. Extended preferences; Part II. Iterative Controls: 3. Feedback control processes; 4. First example: an externality problem; 5. Second application of the control process: Lerner's problem; 6. Third example of the control process: implementation of a second-best solution; 7. Two examples of the control process in a mixed economy; Part III. Non-convexities: 8. Non-convexities in the technology; 9. Non-convexity and optimal product choice; Part IV. Cooperatives: 10. Pareto-improvements and cooperatives; 11. Achieving pareto-efficiency in the LMF; 12. Risk-sharing in Illyria (the ELMF); Appendix: the taxation of economic rent; Notes; Bibliography; Index.

Editorial Reviews

"Archibald's book is timely: its contents throw light on several important current debates which are being argued within frameworks less appropriate than the one he sets out...this is a short, insightful, and timely book in a distinguished interventionist intellectual tradition in the area of public policy and public institutions." Geoffrey Heal, Journal of Economic Literature

From the Publisher