The essays in Imperial Decline describe the major changes that have occurred in Russia’s relations with China, Japan, and South Korea under Boris Yeltin’s presidency, speculating about both Russia’s future in the region and the impact this future could have on relations with the United States. Contributors to this volume demonstrate how incoherent taxation and investment, uncoordinated and contradictory economic policies, runaway inflation and currency instability, and problems of defense now constrain the possibility of Russia expanding its economic influence in the region. This book is essential for students and scholars of international relations, foreign policy, and Russian history.
Contributors. Stephen J. Blank, Bruce A. Elleman, Harry Gelman, Hongchan Chun , Rajan Menon, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Oles M. Smolansky, Henry Trofimenko, Charles E. Ziegler
The essays in Imperial Decline describe the major changes that have occurred in Russia’s relations with China, Japan, and South Korea under Boris Yeltin’s presidency, speculating about both Russia’s future in the region and the impact this future could have on relations with the United States. Contributors to this volume demonstrate how incoherent taxation and investment, uncoordinated and contradictory economic policies, runaway inflation and currency instability, and problems of defense now constrain the possibility of Russia expanding its economic influence in the region. This book is essential for students and scholars of international relations, foreign policy, and Russian history.
Contributors. Stephen J. Blank, Bruce A. Elleman, Harry Gelman, Hongchan Chun , Rajan Menon, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Oles M. Smolansky, Henry Trofimenko, Charles E. Ziegler
Imperial Decline: Russia's Changing Role in Asia
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Overview
The essays in Imperial Decline describe the major changes that have occurred in Russia’s relations with China, Japan, and South Korea under Boris Yeltin’s presidency, speculating about both Russia’s future in the region and the impact this future could have on relations with the United States. Contributors to this volume demonstrate how incoherent taxation and investment, uncoordinated and contradictory economic policies, runaway inflation and currency instability, and problems of defense now constrain the possibility of Russia expanding its economic influence in the region. This book is essential for students and scholars of international relations, foreign policy, and Russian history.
Contributors. Stephen J. Blank, Bruce A. Elleman, Harry Gelman, Hongchan Chun , Rajan Menon, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Oles M. Smolansky, Henry Trofimenko, Charles E. Ziegler
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780822396994 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Duke University Press |
| Publication date: | 06/01/2012 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 304 |
| File size: | 460 KB |
About the Author
Stephen J. Blank is MacArthur Professor of Research, U.S. Army War College. Alvin Z. Rubinstein is Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania.
Read an Excerpt
Imperial Decline
Russia's Changing Role in Asia
By Stephen J. Blank, Alvin Z. Rubinstein
Duke University Press
Copyright © 1997 Duke University PressAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8223-9699-4
CHAPTER 1
OLES M. SMOLANSKY
Russia and the Asia-Pacific Region: Policies and Polemics
At present, Atlanticism (or Westernism) and Eurasianism denote two different trends in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. In their latest reincarnation, these terms surfaced soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union and addressed the questions of Russia's national interests and the orientation of its foreign policy. The Atlanticists were led by Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and embraced many former adherents of Mikhail Gorbachev's New Thinking, which, among other things, advocated the incorporation of the Soviet Union in a "common European home." The Atlanticists believed that the Russian Federation should at long last become an "integral part" of the West and Western civilization. Moscow could do so by renouncing the ideologically inspired Soviet foreign policy objectives of the cold war era, by abandoning reliance on military power as a method of promoting Russia's national interests, and by improving relations with the industrially developed, democratic governments of the Western world. Domestically, the Atlanticists, who, for the most part, enjoyed the support of President Boris Yeltsin, favored the conversion of Russia's command economy to a free market and upheld the principle of "democratization" of the country's institutions and political structure. They were convinced that close cooperation with the industrial giants of the West would help Moscow attain two related objectives: freeing additional resources for the development of the Russian economy and securing "large-scale [Western] support for market-oriented reforms in Russia." As Yeltsin stated in his December 1991 message to NATO, relations between Russia and the West would henceforth be founded on "recognition of common values and a single view of the ways of ensuring international security."
The Atlanticists were opposed by the Eurasianists, who rejected what they described as uncritical acceptance of Western political and economic ideas. They argued that Russia's geographic position—covering as it did vast expanses of both Europe and Asia—left Moscow no choice but to develop extensive participation in the affairs of both continents. In fact, some Eurasianists suggested that Russia assume the role of a bridge connecting Europe and Asia, and many insisted that the Kremlin concentrate its attention on the East, not the West. Not surprisingly, many adherents of this school of thought were connected with the old Soviet institutes and think tanks devoted to the study of Asian affairs.
Russian Foreign Policy: The First Stage
In examining Russian diplomacy of the post-Soviet period, Sergei Rogov of the Institute of the USA and Canada distinguished between three distinct stages. During the first, which lasted from December 1991 to September 1992, the Kremlin conducted an openly pro-Western policy and uncritically accepted Western positions on such major international issues of the day as Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Moscow regarded itself as part of the Western world, claimed that its interests were identical to those of Western countries, and was prepared to make concessions to its erstwhile rivals even without being asked to do so. It was during this period that Russia pulled out of Eastern Europe, paid little attention to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and, in the process, lost the cold war. At the same time, as Rogov notes, having abandoned Communist dogma, Russia espoused a different type of ideology: "With the enthusiasm of converts we went from exporting the idea of 'world revolution' to exporting Western values'" Rogov found Moscow's policy during this period to be extremely shortsighted. The concessions that it made were unnecessary, and the West never reciprocated. Nor did the Kremlin ask for or receive any guarantees that the vacuums that it had created by withdrawing Russian troops would not be filled by the Western powers. In any event, the first stage drew to a close in September 1992, when Yeltsin bowed to determined pressure by the opposition and canceled his planned visit to Japan. As Rogov put it, "This was the first wave of nationalist reaction against excessive expectations.... And this was the first evidence that foreign policy was being turned into one of the key issues in the growing domestic policy fight."
Among the initial indications of the existence of Eurasianist thinking was an article written by Sergei Goncharov, head of the Sino-Soviet section at the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS). In it, Goncharov objected to Moscow's preoccupation with the West "as a development model and a business partner" and warned the Kremlin not to neglect other regions, such as "China and the Islamic world," that were of great importance to Russia.
Another early exponent of Eurasianist thinking was a well-known politician, State Counselor Sergei Stankevich. Writing in March 1992, he described Atlanticism as a foreign policy line that favored Russia's rapid integration with Europe and the general world economy. More specifically, its adherents wanted Russia to join the Group of Seven (G-7), an organization of the most developed industrial nations, and to establish particularly close ties with the United States and Germany— the "dominant members of the Atlantic alliance." It is noteworthy that Stankevich and other Eurasianists did not reject Atlanticism out of hand; after all, it was the industrially advanced nations that could deliver what Russia needed most: credits, economic assistance, and advanced technology. What Stankevich and others objected to was the Kremlin's tilt toward the West at the expense of other parts of the world, most notably Asia. They argued that the dissolution of the Soviet Union confronted Moscow with a new geopolitical reality—Russia was "separated from Europe by a whole chain of independent states." This, in Stankevich's opinion, required a redistribution of "our resources, our possibilities, [our] ties, and our interests in favor of Asia." In addition to geopolitics, Russia's economic weakness made competition with the West impossible, leaving Moscow no choice but to look for trade opportunities elsewhere. In this sense, too, Asia definitely merited the Kremlin's attention. In short, Stankevich believed that Eurasianism was bound to emerge as a legitimate and important factor in the foreign policy decision-making process because Moscow "will have to look for a new balance of Western and Eastern orientations that is distinctive to today's Russia."
At this juncture, it might be appropriate to note that the notion of Eurasianism was not a new phenomenon on Russia's political and philosophical scenes. It first appeared in the mid-nineteenth century as a reaction to the strong Slavophile tendencies of that period and counted among its adherents many of the empire's intellectuals, writers, and administrators. It reemerged in Russian emigre circles during the 1920s and 1930s and, in its latest version, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As exemplified by the views of Stankevich, moderate contemporary Eurasianism was neither antidemocratic nor really anti-Western. Instead, its adherents were arguing that Russia had major interests in regions other than Europe and the Atlantic and that Moscow should advance these interests independent of its relations with the Western powers.
It is noteworthy that Kozyrev addressed some of these issues only three days after the publication of Stankevich's article. Writing in Izvestia, the minister said that Russia's foreign policy must be based on "common sense." This meant the rejection of "messianic ideas" and their replacement by "practical concerns about the spiritual and material revival of Russia as a democratic state." Although the termmessianism was generally understood to mean "Communist ideology," in this particular instance Kozyrev may be assumed to have attacked the adherents of Eurasianism as well. Be that as it may, he went on to say that Russia's national interests should be defined not in terms of "geopolitical alignment" but in terms of the "establishment of a high standard of living for its population and the preservation of human rights." It is equally noteworthy, however, that Kozyrev did not advocate neglect of the non-Western world. In this sense, there was some overlap between the basic premises of Stankevich's Eurasianism and Kozyrev's Atlanticism.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) position was supported by a group of scholars, associated with the Center for International Studies at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations. In an article devoted to Russian foreign policy, Andrei Zagorski, Anatolii Zlobin, Sergei Solodovnik, and Mark Khrustalev presented an image of the world economy in the shape of overlapping or concentric circles. At the center were situated the G-7 states, followed by circles representing the developed and developing countries of Europe, Asia, and the rest of the world. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and its economy left Russia on the outskirts of the world system, Moscow's main "foreign policy objective ... should be preparing the ground for rising from the periphery to the core of the world economy and joining the Group of Seven." The scholars also argued that "another basic interest of Russia ... [was] to retain her role as a European nation." It was not necessary for Moscow to "join every major multilateral European structure," but the Kremlin should "strengthen ... the political dialogue and cooperation with these structures, particularly with the European Community."
Turning to Asia, Zagorski et al. attacked the Eurasianists for creating "a great illusion to reincarnate the myth of Russian 'special destiny' as a cultural and economic 'bridge' between Europe and Asia." In doing so, the Eurasianists neglected the fact that "a genuine synthesis of European and Asian cultures" had been going on since 1945, as evidenced by a "growing number of Asian states joining or approaching the core of the world economy." Therefore, Russia's task was not to serve as some mythical "bridge" but "to join in the process of synthesis [between Europe and Asia] that was already going on." Specifically, Moscow was urged to gain "access to mechanisms of regional cooperation and development" in the Asia-Pacific region (APR), a task that, as will be shown below, Kozyrev had already begun to tackle. In any event, during the first stage of Russia's foreign policy, the Atlanticists, led by Kozyrev and backed by Yeltsin, clearly had the upper hand.
Russian Foreign Policy: The Second Stage
The second stage (September 1992-December 1993) produced some early indications that the Kremlin was now ready openly to contradict the West. For one thing, the two began to differ over trade in weapons and missile technology. Moscow also modified its anti-Serbian policy in the Yugoslav conflict and began to shift its stand on Iraq. Nevertheless, the basic pro-Western thrust of Russia's foreign policy remained intact, as evidenced by Yeltsin's initial consent to letting Poland and other East European states join NATO. In another new development, as Rogov reports, "Russian diplomacy came to be openly party-oriented and became a tool for mobilization of foreign policy support for ... forces competing in the Russian political arena." Reference was made here to Kozyrev's call for Western backing in Yeltsin's struggle against the "reds and browns," which led to a conflict between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Supreme Soviet and eventually culminated in an open confrontation between the government and the parliament in October 1993.
In the meantime, in his 22 October 1992 speech before the Supreme Soviet, Kozyrev made a bow to the Eurasianists, saying that Russia should not limit its opportunities in the international arena to any one region. Rather than choosing between the West and the East, Moscow should seek a "maximum of possible interactions" in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. Some observers were not sure whether this display of even-handedness signified a change of heart on the part of Russia's leading Atlanticist or whether Kozyrev, the consummate diplomat, was simply mindful of his audience. (It will be recalled that the conservative legislature and its speaker, Ruslan Khasbulatov, were often critical of the pro-Western slant to Moscow's foreign policy.) In retrospect, it would appear that the second explanation was closer to the mark. Nevertheless, in November and December 1992, respectively, Yeltsin traveled to South Korea and China. Both visits were intended to promote trade and improve economic cooperation between the Russian Federation and the two important East Asian states —an indication that, rhetoric aside, Yeltsin's Kremlin was aware of Asia's importance to Russia.
Still, in terms of the public debates of the second stage, the deck remained stacked in favor of the Atlanticists. An interesting analysis of Russian foreign policy appeared in late 1992. Written by Aleksei Arbatov (Center for Geopolitical and Military Prognosis), it endorsed many of Kozyrev's pet positions and initiatives, including the notion of close cooperation between Russia and the United States. This course of action was all the more desirable because Washington no longer harbored expansionist, "hegemonic" ideas. Rather, as its power declined, and as it "reduce[d] its military presence ... in Europe and the Far East, the United States ... [was] not interested in disturbing the regional and subregional balance of forces." Since Arbatov saw "a strong democratic Russia ... [as] a most important element in this balance," he concluded that Moscow's "constructive role correspond[ed] to American interests of maintaining regional stability." All this seemed to pave the way for close cooperation or what will later be described as a "strategic partnership" between the former cold war rivals.
To help maintain stability, Arbatov suggested that Moscow adopt "various methods in various regions." In Europe, Russian interests were best served by continued "American military presence and leadership in [NATO's] command structures." In the Middle East and South Asia, Russia should be concerned about threats to the security of the new Transcaucasian and Central Asian republics. To help protect them, the Kremlin should not shy away from the use offeree, a course of action to which Washington, presumably, would not object. (Arbatov did not elaborate.) In the Far East, as in Europe, "Russian interests (as distinct from those of the USSR) are met by retaining the American military presence in Japan." Arbatov arrived at this conclusion in the following manner: U.S. withdrawal was bound to lead to the remilitarization of Japan and, in due course, to a confrontation between Tokyo and Beijing. Such a turn of events would not serve Moscow's interests: "A sharp change in the balance of power in favor of either China or Japan, and the appearance of hegemonistic aspirations in one of these powers, could create a direct threat to the Russian Far East." Elsewhere, Moscow should seek Washington's consent for "joint measures ... for maintaining stability in the western part of the Pacific Ocean."
In early 1993, Kozyrev circulated in the Supreme Soviet the draft of a document entitled "The Concept of Russian Federation Foreign Policy." According to the foreign minister, it was being used by the MFAas "the basis for its own political activities." It was noted at the time that this draft "Concept" rested on three "fundamental postulates":
1. The ideologically motivated struggle between the "two systems" was over, rendering a "large proportion of arms accumulated in the era of confrontation unnecessary." (V. Isakov, an opposition member of the Supreme Soviet who publicly commented on the draft "Concept," attacked this proposition on the ground that the world was still a dangerous place, that some of the old contradictions remained, and that the collapse of the Soviet Union made "the situation even more unpredictable." For these reasons, Russia should not engage in unilateral disarmament.)
2. "The chief threat to world stability today comes from the countries of the 'third world.'" This made it necessary for Moscow and Washington to cooperate in efforts to maintain international security. "For these purposes," the draft "Concept" noted, "we should reorient our military potential toward ensuring global stability and creating in conjunction with the United States reliable guarantees of our common safety." (To Isakov, the casting of Russia in the role of an international policeman —even on equal terms with the United States —made no sense: "Don't we look rather ridiculous in this cowboy get-up?")
3. "Russia is a democratic rule-of-law state sharing 'a general understanding of the fundamental values of world civilization.'" (Isakov found this pronouncement hypocritical. Since when had this been the case? he asked. "Since Yeltsin read his manifesto on a tank?")
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Imperial Decline by Stephen J. Blank, Alvin Z. Rubinstein. Copyright © 1997 Duke University Press. Excerpted by permission of Duke University Press.
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Table of Contents
Preface 1What is Asia to Russia? 5
Russia and the Asia-Pacific Region: Politics and Polemics / Ole M. Smolansky 7
Russian and China in Central Asia / Stephen J. Blank 40
Russian and China 63
Russia Looks at China / Stephen J. Blank 65
Russian Foreign Policy in the Chinese Context / Bruce A. Elleman 99
Russia and Japan 127
Russo-Japanese Relations: Implications for Northeast Asian Security / Rajan Menon 129
The Korean Peninsula 153
Russia's Relations with North Korea / Alvin Z. Rubenstein 155
The Russian Federation and South Korea / Honghchan Chun and Charles E. Ziegler 185
Russia and the United States 211
Implications for the United States of Russia's Far East Policy / Harry Gelman 213
U.S.-Russian Relations in East Asia: A View from Moscow / Henry Trofimenko 244
Conclusion 272
Index 285
Contributors 295